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Norms are standards of appropriate behaviour for actors and as such they do have a role 
in international politics. When norms are adopted by actors, they affect the actors’ policy 
behaviour, and consequently, the actors’ practices. Changing norms and policy practices 
of the actors in the system would result in changing the intersubjective knowledge of the 
actors and eventually the system. In international politics, small states are more inclined 
to international law and norms than great powers. Although realists and structuralists 
argue that small states need to behave according to great powers’ interests and small 
states are system-ineffectual, these arguments hold only to military power. In terms of 
economic power, small states have control over their success, while the power over 
opinion is not related to the size of the actors. Therefore, small states can influence global 
politics by intellectual leadership, norm-setting and norm entrepreneurship.  
The thesis observes whether and to what extent New Zealand has been acting as norm 
entrepreneur in the policy areas of nuclear-free politics and promoting free trade. To 
regard an actor as norm entrepreneur in a policy area, the actor should have no authority 
over the addressees of the proposed norm, the actor should consider the norm as 
appropriate for others too, the extent and intensity of the conscious efforts to promote 
the norm internationally should be sufficient, the norm-promoting efforts should be 
performed during the emerging and cascade phases of the norm life-cycle, and the actor 
should behave consistently with the norm. According to these criteria, New Zealand has 
been a norm entrepreneur in nuclear-free policy since 1984. Concerning free-trade, New 
Zealand has also been a norm entrepreneur between 1984 and 2017. Both cases illustrate 
how small states can influence international politics. Based on the findings, small states’ 
domestic policies may have larger effects on world politics than their direct international 
advocacy, other states can ignore the advocacy and remain reluctant to modify their 
policy agendas.  
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1. Introduction: New Zealand as a norm entrepreneur? 
1.1. The research question 
New Zealand is widely known for the state`s leading role in establishing and promoting 
progressive social ideas. New Zealand was the first country to introduce female suffrage 
in 1893 (Grimshaw, 1972; Hocken Collection of Essays, 1986; King, 2003; Sulkunen, 2015). 
The state supported multilateral organisations (Patman & Iati, 2018, p. xxxv) and had a 
pioneering role in the establishment of the United Nations (UN) when New Zealand stood 
up for the incorporation of human rights into the UN Charter (Aikman, 1998; Fawthorpe, 
1995; Richard Jackson, 2005; Templeton, 1995).  
In addition to New Zealand’s strong track record on human rights, the country’s stance on 
nuclear-free policies since the 1980s is also widely known. The nuclear-free policy has 
become emblematic after the government initiated a ban on the entry of nuclear-fuelled 
and nuclear-capable vessels to New Zealand’s ports in 1984.  This latter act resulted in the 
United States of America (US) ceasing its Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) 
obligations towards New Zealand. As Catalinac (2010) put it, this move asserted New 
Zealand as autonomous in the international arena, by which New Zealand presented itself 
on the stage of world politics (Dalby, 1993; Hensley, 2013, p. x). Regarding New Zealand`s 
possible leadership role in nuclear-free policies, one of the main proponents of the policy, 
Helen Clark, who was Prime Minister from 1999 to 2008, explicitly highlighted this option: 
“I speak for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone primarily because of the leadership 
New Zealand can give by establishing one” (Catalinac, 2010, p. 333). 
According to academics New Zealand was also ahead of the world with the introduction 
of neoliberal economic reforms in the middle of the 1980s. Among other elements of this 
policy, New Zealand opened its economy for international competition and investments  
(Iati, 2015, p. 55). Three decades after the neoliberal reforms, New Zealand’s 
achievements are outstanding in international trade policy. The state became the first 
developed country to sign a free trade agreement with China in 2008 (MFAT, n.d.-g; 
Scollay, 2018, p. 134). Mike Moore,  a former Labour Prime Minister who was in office in 
1990, was elected to be the Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for 
the period between 1999 and 2002 (Moore, 2010, 2017). New Zealand’s trade experts are 
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highly regarded; the United Kingdom, for example, hired a New Zealander, Crawford 
Falconer, to help with the post-Brexit trade negotiations (Wallace, 2017).  
Recently, New Zealand`s leading role in establishing progressive social ideas has been 
reassured internationally after the announcement of the current government`s ‘Well-
Being Budget’. The government`s fiscal plan for 2019-2020, which was released in May 
2019, focuses on mental health issues, child poverty and education rather than economic 
productivity and GDP growth (Kirk, 2019). The international reception of the 
announcement was complimentary. The New York Times regarded the plan as “New 
Zealand’s next liberal milestone” (Graham-McLay, 2019). The Bloomberg analyst, Cass R. 
Sunstein (2019) has asserted that “New Zealand has taken an important step in the right 
direction. Other nations should follow its lead.”  
This thesis addresses New Zealand’s leadership role in implementing social ideas which 
are perceived as progressive and by which the country may be paving the way for other 
states in the international community. The subjects of the study are the nuclear-free 
policy and the state`s trade policy. This phenomenon, when an agent presents a new way 
of policy for the community to follow, is captured in the concept of norm 
entrepreneurship. 
A norm is “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (e.g. 
Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891; Puschkarsky, 2009, p. 9), a definition which is widely 
accepted by scholars. A norm entrepreneur is the agent that is interested in social change; 
this agent presents a model of behaviour (new patterns of conduct) for others in a given 
society to follow (Sunstein, 1996, p. 6).1 In International Relations (IR) theory, Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) applied Sunstein’s model first to explain 
global norm dynamics, and they developed the ‘cascade model’ to describe the norm life-
cycle which is a three-stage process: norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm 
internalisation. In their definition, norm entrepreneurship is the political agenda when an 
 
1 It is debated who defined the concepts of norm entrepreneur and norm entrepreneurship first. Florini 
(1996, p. 375) argues that John Mueller used the concept of norm entrepreneur first at a conference on 
“The Emergence of New Norms in Personal and International Behavior” held at the University of California 
Los Angeles (UCLA), May 1993. However, Jeffrey Checkel (2012) argues that a similar concept, the policy 
entrepreneur, was discussed earlier in the late 1970s, and Nadelmann (1990) discussed a similar concept, 
the moral entrepreneur, in 1990.  
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actor mobilises efforts to promote norms to the community it lives in or to other 
communities as well. Therefore, the study of New Zealand’s leadership in establishing the 
nuclear-free status of the country and promoting free trade can be summarized in the 
research question of whether and to what extent New Zealand has been acting as norm 
entrepreneur in nuclear-free policy and promoting free trade internationally.  
  
1.2. The related theoretical debates in IR 
Analysing New Zealand as a norm entrepreneur entails engagement with three streams 
of theoretical studies. First, the thesis relates to the findings of the IR theories focussing 
on the role of norms in international relations. Second, because New Zealand is a small 
state, the thesis needs to relate to the findings of the literature on small states’ foreign 
policy behaviour. Third, it is imperative to present the arguments of the studies of norm 
dynamics about how norms develop over time, and it is also significant to clarify the issues 
concerning the concept of norm entrepreneurship.  
Regarding the role of norms in international relations, it is important to show that the 
literature which discusses norms in international relations is fairly voluminous, yet there 
is no agreement among scholars what roles norms have. Although academic scholarship 
in International Relations started to discuss norms systematically and explicitly after the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, with the so-called ‘constructivist turn’ in IR (Dannreuter, 
2013), scholars addressed the questions of norms earlier. Carr (1940) described the 
expected behaviour of humans (practically norms) regarding the stability of international 
law and showed how peace treaties were expected to be observed and breached after 
the power relations of the parties changed. The classical realist Morgenthau (2006, pp. 
25-26) was more explicit about the role of norms when he discussed how normative 
limitations to the struggle for power, such as international law, morality and world public 
opinion, were relevant to maintain peace.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, first, the scholars of the English School, Martin Wight (1991) 
and Hedley Bull (1995) thoroughly discussed the role of international society’s norms. Bull 
(1995, pp. 22-23) introduced the concept of the society of states in which state leaders 
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have particular responsibilities to their citizens.2 There are various forms of the liberal 
tradition of IR – sociological liberalism, interdependence liberalism, institutional 
liberalism (Robert Jackson & Sørensen, 2010; Keohane & Nye, 1977, 1987) and republican 
liberalism – among which republican liberalism has the most comprehensive 
argumentation regarding the role of norms. This scholarship convincingly argues that 
norms can affect international politics through democratization. The origins of this theory 
go back to the German philosopher, Kant (1795) who published this thesis in the 
pamphlet, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. This thesis was given (re)birth in 
1964 when Dean Babst argued that democracies were more peaceful (Chernoff, 2004, p. 
51). The main assumption of this thesis is that in democracies politicians adhere 
themselves to seek peaceful resolution of conflicts in domestic issues and they transmit 
this approach to conflict resolution into their international dealings. Therefore, 
democracies do not wage war against one another (Robert Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p. 
111).3  
Since the 1980s, the discussion of norms in international relations has become a dominant 
topic. Feminist scholars described relevant norms, for example, structural violence,4 when 
they emphasised the facilitation of gender equality and gender awareness in IR 
scholarship. Others, such as Marxists, described how rules and norms define ’social 
structures’ (Rupert, 2016, p. 129). Although the Marxists’ theories raised the discussion 
of the role of norms to the systemic level and they aimed at introducing new and more 
just social structures, it was the constructivist school that has elaborated the role of norms 
 
2 The significance of the English School is apparent: it was they who noted the importance of the state 
leaders’ responsibility to keep order within the international society, and this approach was later echoed 
in the United Nations’ humanitarian interventions (Robert Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, pp. 144-150) and 
also in the United Nations’ norm of the Responsibility to Protect initiative, which was adopted by the 
Member States in 2005. 
3 The validity of the claims of the democratic peace thesis is proven, not just intuitively but also 
statistically (Chernoff, 2004). Critics of this theory claim that during the transition phase in the 
democratization process, the transiting states are rather violent and armed conflicts emerge often 
(Mansfield & Snyder, 1995, p. 12). But these are intrastate conflicts and once the democratic institutions 
are consolidated, the democratic peace theory still holds. Some studies (for example Etten, 2014) describe 
that in the case of the Trent Affair in 1861, two democratic countries, the United States and Great Britain 
avoided warfare only because the United States (the Northern States) could not take on two battlefronts 
at the same time. Nevertheless, democratic states did not yet wage war against each other. 
4 Structural violence refers to those behaviours when the potential development of an individual or a 
group is held back by the conditions of one relationship, and in particular by the uneven distribution of 
power and resources (Cockburn, 2001, p. 17). 
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in the most comprehensive way. For this study, the most relevant constructivist argument 
is that they suppose a causal relationship between norms and identity and between norms 
and interests (Finnemore, 1996). In the constructivist framework, between the 
environment and the norms within it, identity is the link to interests (Jepperson, 
Katzenstein, & Wendt, 1996, p. 59). States have to be aware of who they are and what 
their interests are, in any environment before they start pursuing their interests and 
performing their politics. The international society can create pressures on states to 
comply with specific norms, and compliance with these norms changes states’ identities 
leading to the modification of their interests/preferences (Finnemore, 1996, pp. 2-3). 
As this brief literature review shows, most scholars argue that norms affect international 
relations and the constructivists even presume causal links between norms and identities 
and interests, while structural realists deny these causal links. Mearsheimer (1994, p. 13) 
asserts that in world politics, states’ interests are the leading causes of policy outcomes, 
and ideas or norms, as elements of international institutions, do not act as explanatory 
variables.5 This debate between constructivists and structural realists is still relevant, 
despite the facts that structural realism falls short in explaining how individuals, such as 
Henry Dunant, the founder of the International Red Cross, did indeed influence 
international security issues (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897).6  
Concerning the foreign policy behaviour of small states scholars identify four elements in 
small states’ foreign policy behaviour. First, to alleviate security concerns, small states can 
form alliances in various ways, such as a coalition of other peer states (Vital, 2006, p. 83), 
alignment with (bandwagoning) a great power for protection or joining multilateral 
military organizations (Hey, 2003, p. 187; Kassimeris, 2009, pp. 94-96; Keohane, 2006, pp. 
64-69; Vital, 2006, p. 83). Second, small states participate in those international 
institutions (organizations, military alliances and regional cooperative initiatives) that are 
 
5 Later, Mearsheimer (2014, 2016)  confirmed his stance opposing the possible causality between norms 
and interests.  
6 Mearsheimer’s scepticism is even more surprising because other realist scholars also believe norms have 
explanatory roles in international politics. As presented earlier, Morgenthau argues that beside the 
balance of power there are normative limits for politicians to exercise power. Morgenthau (2006, p. 236) 
implicitly endorses the critical argument of the democratic peace theory that in democracies politicians 
have to adhere to certain norms when he writes about how Western democracies are able to block the 
accumulation of power. In a similar vein, the structural realist Waltz (1979, p. 92) describes the British 
Parliamentary system where there are domestic regulatory forces for politicians, because of which only 
politicians with limited aims can be elected. 
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based on the existing international system and which allow them to take part in 
multilateral decision-making procedures (Gstöhl & Neumann, 2006, p. 25; Hey, 2003, pp. 
187-188; Ingebritsen, 2006a, pp. 289-290; Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567). Third, small states 
have appeal to international law and norms (Gstöhl & Neumann, 2006, p. 24; Hey, 2003, 
p. 187; Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567), are interested in the rule of international law, and make 
definite steps to strengthen it. Fourth, small states can become intellectual leaders (Tow 
& Parkin, 2007); they can act as norm setters (Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567) and norm 
entrepreneurs (Björkdahl, 2002; Ingebritsen, 2006b). 
There are relevant concerns whether it is possible for a small state to become an 
intellectual leader, norm setter or a norm entrepreneur because this appears to require 
independence in foreign policy. However, the classical realists (e.g. Morgenthau, 2006) 
argue that small states need to align with the intentions of great powers. Even though a 
small state formally has independence, their decisions to make commitments or to choose 
any great power as an ally involve further risks because of the possible changes in the 
international balance of power as Gleason et al. (2008)  or Hinnebusch (2006, p. 451) 
warn. Furthermore, the option for a small state to become an intellectual leader, norm 
setter or norm entrepreneur also seems to be impossible for structuralist scholars, who 
argue that small states are by definition system-ineffectual (Kassimeris, 2009; Keohane, 
2006).  
Regarding norm dynamics, scholars have various views, however they tend to accept how 
norms spread, and they identify the phases of norm emergence, when new norms first 
appear, the norm cascade when the majority of states adopt the norm and the 
internalisation phase when the norm becomes a general practice. Nevertheless, there are 
various views about the concept of the norm entrepreneur which raise methodological 
problems for answering the research question of the thesis, whether and to what extent 
New Zealand has been acting as norm entrepreneur.  
The first problem is related to the fact that in most of the case studies on norm 
entrepreneurship, scholars present examples of actors who attempt to convince others 
over that they have no authority. However, there are papers, for example by Hetcher 
(2000) or Souaré (2014) who discuss cases where the norm entrepreneur candidates, the 
US Federal Trade Commission and the African Union respectively, have certain authorities 
7 
 
over the addressees of the norms. Another problem that appears in the case studies is the 
scholarly understanding of the motives of the norm entrepreneurs. Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998, p. 898) emphasise that norm entrepreneurs do not act against their self-interest, 
but they also argue that “it is very difficult to explain the motivation of norm 
entrepreneurs without reference to empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment.” 
Consequently, norm entrepreneurs act according to their interests, in line with the logic 
of consequences, but this coincides with their commitment to ideals in line with the logic 
of appropriateness.7 Some of the case studies, however, present actors that perform their 
agendas based solely on their self-interests, for example, the analysis of Bloomfield  
(2015) about the opposition between the pro-whalers and anti-whalers where both actors 
can become norm entrepreneurs, subject to the existing legislation. 
The third problem in the case studies on norm entrepreneurs refers to the question 
whether a norm entrepreneur should perform its efforts internationally as well or just 
domestically. Most of the case studies analyse extensive international efforts to promote 
certain norms (e.g. Björkdahl, 2002, 2013; Kleibrink, 2011; C. F. Parker & Karlsson, 2010; 
Smed & Wivel, 2017; Tryggestad, 2014). Meanwhile, there are papers in which it is 
challenging to identify international norm promotion. For example, the case study of the 
institutionalisation of sustainable development in global environmental policy was 
published by Ingebritsen (2006b). However, she presented the culture of the Scandinavian 
countries and policies which were focussing mainly on domestic issues (establishing 
natural reserves or initiating sustainability projects in urban territories).   
Finally, it is important to note that case studies frequently present actors as norm 
entrepreneurs who were not the initiators of framing and promoting norms. Even the 
recent case studies show different scholarly understandings of whether the norm 
entrepreneurs have roles during the norm emergence and norm cascade phases of the 
spread of the norm or have roles during the internalisation phase as well. Meanwhile, 
Baldino and Carr (2015), Rive (2018), and Madokoro (2019) understand the norm 
entrepreneur to be an actor that has a role in the norm emergence and norm cascade 
phase, Nah (2016), Tomsa (2017), Jakobi (2017), and Hellmüller, Federer, and Pring (2017) 
 
7 The logic of appropriateness can be best understood as the choice to act on ethical basis, on virtue, “as 
an ethical matter, appropriate action is action that is virtuous” (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 951). 
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treat norm entrepreneurs as actors who participate in policies during the norm 
internalisation phase. 
 
1.3. Contribution to the existing academic literature 
The research is relevant for multiple reasons. First, by analysing the New Zealand state, 
the thesis provides an empirical contribution to the norm entrepreneur literature. So far, 
the empirical analyses about New Zealand as a norm entrepreneur candidate have been 
sporadic, and the publications focus on the normative development of various policy 
areas, not the attributes of norm entrepreneurship. For example, Burford (2016) 
discussed cases of Canada and New Zealand performing nuclear disarmament advocacy. 
He mentioned individuals, such as the former New Zealand Prime Minister, Norman Kirk, 
civilian advocacy groups and the New Zealand state as norm entrepreneurs. However, his 
focus was on the causes of nuclear disarmament advocacy, and he used the concept of 
norm entrepreneur in a broad sense, as an analytical frame for all kinds of agency that is 
proposed by the constructivist scholarship. Another author, Rive (2018), presented a non-
G20 group of states, the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFFSR) as an international 
norm entrepreneur, and among the member states (Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, 
Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) New Zealand had a pivotal role. 
This paper aimed to show how efforts against climate change can be facilitated by 
reforming the economic conditions of fossil fuel exploitation. 
Second, to address the questions related to the causal relationship between norms, 
identities and interests, the thesis outlines a theoretical framework which posits the 
problem from a different perspective. In this framework, the concept of norms is clarified 
first. With respect to norms, their regulative aspect is highlighted, and the thesis argues 
that norms attempt to answer the question of how certain actions should be performed. 
The question of what policies shall be carried out cannot be answered by the use of norms. 
This assumption will limit the extent to which norms can influence identity formation. 
Owing to the role of norms in defining how actors should pursue their interests, the thesis 
argues that norms do have an influence over the various policy outcomes, but it remains 
uncertain whether norms have effects on interests.  
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In the thesis, it is accepted that the structures and the agents are mutually constitutive. 
The entirety of the system is defined as the summation of the actors and their relations 
to each other, which reflects the natural scientific definitions of systems (Csányi, 1989; 
László, 1996). This approach emphasises that both norms and identities have roles in 
defining the characteristics of the system. Finally, it is argued that interests may not be 
directly affected by norms, but norms do have an effect on policy outcomes that result in 
actors pursuing their interests in ways that appear to take into account other actors’ 
interests as well.  
Third, the thesis connects the various forms of power; military power, economic power 
and the power over opinion defined by Carr (1940) to the structuralist view of politics that 
is based on the analysis of the perceived power levels of actors. In this effort, the thesis 
argues that states can have control over their economic conditions and their sizes do not 
entirely define the states’ economic power. Concerning the power over opinion, it is 
argued that this form of power is not related to the actor’s size because any actor can 
have a good idea or opinion. Practically, opinions are not related to the size of the country. 
Therefore, the logic of how power over opinion operates partially falsifies the structuralist 
theories of international relations. This is how the thesis outlines why it is theoretically 
possible that small states can become intellectual leaders (2007), how they can act as 
norm setters (Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567) and norm entrepreneurs (Björkdahl, 2002; 
Ingebritsen, 2006b).  
Fourth, the thesis develops an analytical tool to recognise the norm entrepreneur and to 
contribute to better understand norm entrepreneurship. The development of the criteria 
is also a clarification of how the thesis applies the concept of norm entrepreneurship. The 
ambition is to recommend five steps as an analytical tool to identify norm entrepreneurs: 
1) decide whether the actor has authority over the addressees of the norm; 2) analyse the 
actors’ ideologies; 3) observe conscious efforts to promote the norm; 4) analyse the phase 
of the norm life-cycle when the policies were performed; 5) assess the actors’ political 
consistency. The first four areas of questions, those referring to authority, ideology, 
efforts and leadership, can be derived from the definition of norm entrepreneurship. The 
fifth question has been derived according to the arguments of Björkdahl (2013, p. 334), 
who argues that consistency of the state’s policies with the promoted norm and the ideals 
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and values that are embodied in the norm are critical. This is because any distortions from 
these ideational phenomena related to the promoted norm might erode the credibility of 
the norm entrepreneur. With the application of this analytical tool it will be achievable to 
identify norm entrepreneurs who were not successful. In other words, the tool facilitates 
analyses that do not show a positive bias concerning the selected cases,  and the use of 
this analytical tool would not be a case of ‘reading history backwards’ (Checkel, 2012).  
 
1.4. Main findings 
The thesis applies a case study approach to analyse New Zealand`s nuclear-free policy and 
the country`s international trading policies. First and foremost, with respect to the 
nuclear-free policy, New Zealand can be regarded as a norm entrepreneur since 1984. The 
criteria to recognise the norm entrepreneur are all met. New Zealand did not have 
authority over the addressees of the norm, the nuclear-weapon states. The ideology of 
the actor showed why the actor believed the policy would be appropriate for the 
members of the international community. The state has been performing extensive 
efforts in promoting the norm in concern, and New Zealand was among the leaders of this 
policy; in other words, the norm life-cycle has not yet reached the internalisation phase 
in the case of the addressees of the policy, the nuclear weapons states. Finally, the policy 
has remained consistent to the time of writing, November 2019. 
In terms of promoting free trade, New Zealand has been elaborating a remarkable trade 
track record since 1984. With respect to the system of criteria, all five questions can be 
answered positively for the period between 1984 and 2017. New Zealand has had no 
authority over the addressees of the policy. The ideology of the trade policy showed why 
politicians believed free trade was appropriate for others too, given that they believed it 
was economically beneficial for the countries involved and that trade relations would 
strengthen the rule of law internationally. New Zealand did carry out extensive efforts to 
facilitate free trade in the Asia-Pacific Region and within the WTO. Concerning leadership, 
New Zealand was slightly ahead of the curve in recognising the benefits of free trade, and 
in terms of the norm life-cycle, the state was moving quicker than the most important 
actors in the Asia-Pacific Region. Finally, the policy was consistent until 2017. The recent 
policy developments, the incorporation of social goals into the role of trade mean a new 
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era in New Zealand’s trade policies and it is too early to evaluate them. Moreover, the 
free trade norm appears in the internalisation phase of its life-cycle. For these reasons, 
norm entrepreneurship cannot be applied.  
The theoretical implications of the two cases are far-reaching for multiple reasons. First, 
the cases show that norm entrepreneurship is a viable option for small states. The nuclear-
free policy had significant repercussions internationally. When New Zealand banned 
nuclear-powered vessels and warships capable of carrying nuclear weapons in 1985, the 
United States suspended its ANZUS obligations towards New Zealand, causing intense 
geopolitical debates within the Western alliance. The case, therefore, caused problems 
for the US strategic thinkers, mainly because they sensed a possible option for larger 
countries, such as Australia and Japan, to become nuclear-free, similarly to New Zealand 
(Dalby, 1993, p. 444). As the case shows, New Zealand does not count in the military-
geopolitical balance of power; therefore, in military terms, New Zealand is a system-
ineffectual state. However, the case might have triggered other states to follow the 
example. Concerning this option, namely the spread of the idea to become nuclear-free, 
the New Zealand case could have affected the system.  
Similarly, New Zealand’s free trade policy has had significant effects internationally. The 
effects appear to be larger in terms of unilateral and domestic measures. After 1984, New 
Zealand became the leader of neoliberal economic reforms and the country’s example 
had other states’ economists consider the New Zealand method. Both cases, therefore, 
justify the structuralist classification in military terms (New Zealand itself is not relevant 
militarily), but they falsify it in connection to the terms of power over opinion. 
Consequently, norm entrepreneurship means small states individually are not system-
ineffectual.  
Nevertheless, the comparative case studies show strong limits concerning the level of 
independence that small states might have in general and regarding their influence on 
other states’ behaviours. In the theoretical framework, the thesis cannot provide 
arguments about how the risks of choosing allies for small states can be alleviated. When 
a state faces the constraint to consider the possible interests of great powers that 
constraint affects the state’s foreign policies, which also affects possible norm 
entrepreneurship agendas. Because New Zealand’s geopolitical location is unique, given 
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that the country is located far from great powers’ buffering zones and enjoys the ‘tyranny 
of distance.’ Concerning this, the state is an extreme case. Therefore, in terms of the 
necessity of balancing between great powers’ interests, New Zealand can be regarded as 
a least likely case. However, the state does face the problem of the presence of two 
hegemon powers and continuously attempts to avoid choosing sides between the 
hegemons, the United States and China. This experience makes it likely that other small 
states face this constraint which limits their independence in performing foreign policy 
and their options to become a norm entrepreneur.  
Regarding the normative power of small states, based on the New Zealand case, it appears 
that the unilateral domestic steps have more significant effects internationally than the 
small states’ international advocacies. It is crucial to note that in both nuclear-free policy 
and trade policy, the global approach to nuclear issues and trade relations has evolved 
during the last three decades; however, the norms are regressing as well which questions 
the effectiveness of former advocacies. Although states would likely not use nuclear 
weapons soon, the number of nuclear weapon states has been growing since the early 
1970s when the New Zealand advocacy against the exploration of nuclear power started. 
The destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons are also at their historical peak in 2019. 
Concerning trade policies, free trade appeared to be entrenched by the early 2000s; 
however, recently, signs of protectionism have appeared, and trade sanctions have been 
used again as a hard power component to discipline ‘rogue’ states. Besides, to compete 
with other states, governments establish protectionist measures to facilitate domestic 
and international policy goals; the trade war in 2019 between the United States and China 
illustrates this.  
 
1.5. The structure of the thesis 
After this introduction, the second chapter of the thesis describes the theoretical and 
conceptual background of the study. The first section presents the concepts and the role 
of norms in international politics. This section argues that norms are relevant in 
international politics, mainly for disciplining and regulating actors’ behaviours. Norms 
have effects on the identity of the actors in the system. The constitutive role of norms is 
analysed here, and the section argues that actors have capabilities to define their 
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identities creatively, and this identity is regulated by norms. Concerning the causal links 
between norms and interests, the main argument is that norms have effects on policy 
outcomes, but there cannot be established a causal link between norms and interests.  
The second section describes how norms appear, the stages of how norms become settled 
norms from ideas and the main phases of the spread of norms. The third section discusses 
the role of agency by introducing the concept of norm entrepreneurship. The fourth 
section presents which actors can become norm entrepreneurs, and what their motives 
might be when starting a policy agenda of promoting new social norms, and the section 
separately addresses the issue of states acting as norm entrepreneurs and highlights what 
concepts and problems are related to this kind of policy. The fifth section develops the 
arguments of why small states can become norm entrepreneurs. To make the argument, 
the section discusses how the various forms of power (military, economic and power over 
opinion) operate. This section briefly presents the Scandinavian cases, which can be 
considered paradigmatic cases of small states acting as norm entrepreneurs.  
The sixth section of this chapter presents an analytical tool with which various policies can 
be analysed as to whether they can be regarded as norm entrepreneurship. This analytical 
tool has five elements. First, it emphasises the policy domain where the actor should not 
have authority over the addressees of the proposed norm. Then, it observes the ideology, 
the performed efforts of the actor, whether the actor was the first or among the leaders 
of a particular norm promotion to identify in which phase of the norm life cycle the policy 
was performed. Finally, the consistency of the actor’s policies is under scrutiny. 
The third chapter of the thesis discusses the applied methodology. First, the chapter 
presents the research design and shows why the case study approach is necessary. The 
second section presents the case selection, why the nuclear-free policy and the 
international trade policy were chosen for the analysis. The third section of this chapter 
discusses how the various constructivist methods – process tracing, discourse analysis and 
the method of counterfactuals – are employed. Finally, this chapter presents the source 
materials and the main tools for data generation.  
The fourth chapter of the thesis shows the general features of New Zealand’s foreign 
policy. The country shows typical small state behaviour with two specific features: first, 
probably New Zealand has the largest latitude in geopolitical terms, and second, the 
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country has larger ambitions to influence international politics than most similar peer 
states. The ambitions are vital to initiate norm entrepreneurship. The characteristics of 
New Zealand’s policymaking also show that the country is capable of concentrating 
resources on niche areas, which was key in the Scandinavian states becoming norm 
entrepreneurs. 
The fifth chapter discusses the New Zealand nuclear-free policy. In that chapter, I argue 
there are three aspects of this policy that can be regarded as unique. First, it is strongly 
related to New Zealand’s redefinition of its identity; therefore, the policy has a symbolic 
aspect for the public. Second, the chapter emphasises that the extent of the nuclear-free 
policy has been different domestically and internationally. Third, the chapter shows that 
according to the intentions of the main ideologists of the nuclear-free policy, the agenda 
was meant to become international norm entrepreneurship, but it was blocked by the 
United States’ diplomacy.  
The sixth chapter presents New Zealand’s policy on promoting free trade. In this chapter, 
it is demonstrated that the ideology of the policy did include elements which show why 
New Zealand has regarded free trade as beneficial and appropriate for everyone. The 
main argument here is that this policy area can be regarded as norm entrepreneurship 
between 1984 and 2017. Although the free trade norm had already been known globally 
and the norm was already in the cascade and the internalisation phase of the spread of 
the norm, New Zealand was ahead of the norm life-cycle in this period. After 2017 the 
New Zealand Government initiated a reconsideration of the role of trade which signalled 
a new trade policy. Because it is too early to assess these policies and because the free 
trade norm appears to be in the internalisation phase after 2017, norm entrepreneurship 
cannot be applied for this period.  
The seventh chapter of the thesis presents the main findings of the study and how these 
findings bring import and novelty to the existing literature. Here, the arguments why New 
Zealand had the chance to become a norm entrepreneur are discussed. Then the 
concluding chapter summarises the main arguments and outlines those questions that 
need to be addressed later in separate studies.
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2. Norm entrepreneurship and small states in international politics 
There are various aims in this chapter. First and foremost, the chapter discusses the most 
relevant aspects of the concept of norms, what roles norms have in international politics, 
how norms shape policy behaviour and outcomes, and what limits norms have in shaping 
identities and interests. Regarding norms, the discussion presents how they emerge and 
how they transform from ideas to become settled. The chapter analyses the various forms 
of norm dynamics, how norms can change and develop and what blocks may emerge 
against new norms to be adopted by the given society. Third, in section 2.3, the thesis 
introduces the concept of norm entrepreneur and discusses what affects norm 
entrepreneurs have in norm dynamics. 
Then, the chapter discusses what kind of actors can become norm entrepreneurs and 
what motivations they have. Within the possible actors, it is relevant to highlight when 
states play the role of norm entrepreneurs and what additional aspects of norm 
entrepreneurship emerge in these cases. Here, the chapter provides discussions about 
hypocrisy, the available resources for a state, how norm entrepreneurship is related to 
the state’s soft power, and the responsibilities that states have due to their domestic 
legislative power, and why they can lead the community by example when they 
recommend norms to adopt. Section 2.5 describes the specific case of small states acting 
as norm entrepreneurs. Here, the analysis presents the typical features of small states’ 
foreign policy behaviour, why it is recommended for them to take the role of norm 
entrepreneur. This section addresses the theoretical debates on whether small states can 
have independence in foreign policy, and whether they can influence global politics 
through norm entrepreneurship. The ambition is to explain why it is possible for small 
states to affect international relations through intellectual leadership, norm-setting and 
norm promotion.   
Finally, the chapter outlines a system of criteria to recognize norm entrepreneurs in 
section 2.6. The criteria have been developed by derivation from the definitions of norm 
entrepreneurship and the norm life-cycle, as well as by the practical experience obtained 




2.1. Why norms matter: Their roles in world politics 
To outline the relevance of norms in international relations, first, it is crucial to clarify the 
definition of norms. The definition is widely accepted by scholars: a norm is a standard of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity. However, regarding this definition 
of norms, there remain problems such as what their differences are from rules or 
principles or what ‘identity’ and ‘appropriate’ refer to in the definition. Second, it is 
imperative to show what kinds of roles and effects norms have, whether and to what 
extent they are regulative or constitutive concerning both the identities (actors) and the 
international system. Third, it is relevant to clarify whether norms affect the interests of 
the actors, whether there are causal links between international norms, identities and 
interests.   
Concerning the definition of norms, a leading scholar in the field of legal reasoning in 
international affairs, Friedrich V. Kratochwill (1989, p. 10) states that he uses the terms 
‘principles’, ‘rules’ and ‘norms’ more or less interchangeably. However, norms are 
different from principles and rules. Rules can simply be defined as legal regulations, while 
norms are not necessarily codified. The definition of principles is debated.1 The Collins 
Dictionary (n.d.) has three definitions for principle. According to these definitions, 
principles can be beliefs of how people should behave, theories in philosophy and 
scientific rules. Importantly, principles are ideational narratives that can have descriptive 
content (describing a rule or law either in nature or in society) as well as prescriptive 
content to underpin, set and facilitate policies, aims or projects. Similar to principles, 
norms are ideational phenomena (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 26), however, norms are standards 
for concretised forms of behaviour, they are closely related to practices. Meanwhile, 
because principles can describe theories or scientific rules, they are more closely related 
to ideas than to practices.  
Regarding the other problem with the definition of norms as “standards of appropriate 
behaviour for actors with a given identity,” it is crucial to note that the contents of the 
terms ‘appropriate’ and ‘identity’ are not entirely clarified. When the actor behaves 
 
1 During the work of the thesis, my supervisors provided me with advice on this question and I am also 
indebted to my friend at the Hungarian Foundation for Sportphylosophy, György Svachulay, who helped 
me with highlighting important aspects of the concepts of principles and norms.  
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according to the logic of appropriateness, the actor does what the actor finds ethically 
right. According to March and Olsen  (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 952) “the logic of 
appropriateness is explicitly a logic of individual action.” This implies that appropriateness 
refers to the actor with a given identity, and the appropriateness is related to that specific 
identity. Besides, Sending (2002, pp. 445-447) argues that the context of the logic of 
appropriateness is communitarianism. Communitarianism defines the actors as members 
of community(ies) with specific attributes, like being Irish, Jewish, male or female, and 
these attributes define the responsibilities of the actors (Erskine, 2016, pp. 241-244). 
However, when constructivists (Finnemore, 1996; Jepperson et al., 1996; Wendt, 1992, 
1999) describe the role of norms in international relations, they discuss norms that refer 
to states in the international society. Moreover, as shown later in sections 2.2, 2.4 and 
2.5, the case studies on norm entrepreneurship all present actors that promoted the given 
norms as they were universally recommended for actors. To alleviate this problem, the 
thesis uses the concept of ‘norms’ as they are standards of appropriate behaviour for all 
actors.  
Concerning the roles and effects of norms, first, it is essential to emphasise that the 
differentia specifica of norms is that they are standards. Although most constructivist 
scholars assert that there are regulative (enabling) norms and constitutive norms 
(Jepperson et al., 1996; Kratochwill, 1989), owing to norms’ primary feature as standards, 
I argue that all norms are regulative. This is because norms answer the questions of how 
an actor should behave in certain situations. However, at the same time, norms also have 
constitutive effects.  
Up to the extent for an actor (an individual or a state) which adheres to a specific norm, 
the norm can be regarded as constitutive for the actor’s identity too, simply because in 
this case the norm becomes part of the identity. The actor’s identity is “enriched” by the 
new norm. Although these norms are important for the actor’s identity, they are not the 
decisive feature of any identity. An example of how norms can become part of the identity 
of a state is the case of Germany. After the Second World War, Germany decided to 
develop a non-military character of the country. It was prescribed in the German 
constitution that only peace should emanate from German soil (Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 
61). For this reason, the overall character of Germany and the German politicians 
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changed, and by now, it appears that Germany would not initiate war and Germany 
prefers those resolutions in conflicts that do not involve armed interventions. However, 
the identity of Germany is much more than that, for example, Germany, together with 
other states, is one of the founding members of the European Union.  
The reason why any new norm is never an essential part of the actor’s identity is that 
actors (both individuals and states) have certain capacities to creatively define their 
identities. In the case of individuals, the most crucial component of their identities is the 
professions they choose and the work they create in their lifetimes. This creative decision 
precedes all possible adherence to norms.2 It is not just individuals that can creatively 
define their identities, but organizations3 and states too. Regarding the option that states 
can (re)define their identities various scholars provided arguments. Wendt (1992, pp. 419-
422) for example, emphasized the actors’ capacities for ‘character planning’ which can 
even result in the strategic decision of the state to change its role identity. Role identity 
refers to the specific role that a state intends to play internationally. Wendt uses the 
example of the Soviet Union which was one of the poles (the Communist Pole) within the 
bipolar world.  Keohane (1989, p. 6) highlighted that ”institutions may also affect the 
understandings that leaders of states have of the roles they should play and their 
assumptions about others’ motivations and perceived self-interests.” His views were later 
reflected by constructivists such as Barnett and Finnemore (2005).4   
The understanding that all norms are regulative, and at the same time, they have 
constitutive effects has relevant implications on the role of norms in the international 
system and how causal links can exist between norms and actors’ interests. Concerning 
the role of norms in the international system, it is relevant to argue that based on the 
perception that all norms are regulative, the theory of Wendt (1992, 1999) still holds. In 
 
2 It is possible to argue that to be a member of a profession means adhering to certain norms. However, 
this argument is problematic as an individual may comply with all the norms which physicians should 
comply with, for example the hippocratic oath, yet compliance with all those norms does not necessarily 
mean that the given individual is a physician.    
3 For examples of how corporates define their missions see Kolovich (2019). 
4 An example of how a state can define its role identity is the United States of America. One of the 
founding documents of the United States, the ‘Mayflower Compact’ (History.com, 2019), sets up a 
principal aim, to secure the freedom of religion for the pilgrims of the colony. 
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his theory, the system and the actors in it are perceived as mutually constitutive.5 The 
practices of the actors (states) may follow and also reproduce norms in the international 
system, and these “practices determine the character of anarchy” (Wendt, 1992, p. 395). 
“Changing the practices will change the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes the 
system” (Wendt, 1992, p. 407). The system of anarchy can be transformed by the co-
determination processes of the practices and the intersubjective knowledge6 after 
introducing new norms into the system  (Wendt, 1992, pp. 410-422). 
Finally, regarding the possible causal links between international norms and the interests 
of the actors the thesis highlights that because norms include ‘oughtness,’ the logic of 
appropriateness, norms have a disciplinary role for actors in international politics. Norms 
attempt to discipline policy actors to pursue their interests in ways which are regarded as 
appropriate. This immediately implies that norms would affect the policy behaviour of 
actors. However, second, norms may or may not become adopted by actors. (For example, 
case studies often mention how the authoritarian state of China resists international 
pressure for democratisation (Kinzelbach, 2013), so that China does not adopt those 
norms.) Once norms are adopted, norms do influence policy outcomes. Third, the fact 
that policy outcomes change does not necessarily inform us about the extent how actors 
have modified their interests, and it remains uncertain whether interests change under 
the influence of norms. 
To support this argument, it is relevant to present how norms can be adopted by actors. 
First, it is relevant to note that adoption means, it is the decision of the actor. The options 
when other states force an actor to comply with a norm are by definition not adoption. 
Second, there are many case studies about successful norm promoting efforts, such as 
female suffrage or the prohibition of the use of landmines (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). 
In the case studies, scholars mention various reasons for the actor’s compliance. None of 
the reasons prove that the compliance with the norms changed the interests of the actors.  
 
5 This view is similar to the natural scientific view of systems according to which the system is built up by 
the summation of the elements in it and the various relations among all these constitutive elements 
(Csányi, 1989; László, 1996). 
6 Intersubjective knowledge is the understanding of the actors in the system about one another (Wendt, 
1992, p. 407). 
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Behaving according to the logic of consequences7 is the first reason why states may adopt 
norms. Scholars acknowledge that “certainly, some norm conformance may be driven by 
material self-interest” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 912). In this case there is no reason 
to believe that any interest might have changed after the adoption of a norm.  
Compliance can be based on argumentative action. Arguing refers to those cases when 
actors let themselves be convinced by others about any topic, and they are willing to 
modify their opinion. Gorbachev, for example, modified his opinion about the issue of the 
reunification of Germany during the negotiations with the US (Risse, 2000). The actors can 
be open-minded and willing to modify their opinion through argument. However, when 
anyone is willing to argue, that can coincide with his/her pursuit of interests, so this way 
of compliance cannot inform us about the possible changes in interests after adopting a 
norm. 
There may be concrete, practical issues as well that can serve as motivations for a state 
to comply. For example, the desire for legitimation can result in states adopting new 
norms, because states usually do not want to be regarded as rogue states that do not 
comply with the rules of the community to which they intend to belong. Legitimation can 
help governments to stabilise their power, and in this sense, domestic legitimation is also 
relevant in norm acceptance: states can refer to international norms to prove that their 
institutions are better than other alternatives (Acharya, 2004). In this case, similarly to the 
former cases, there is no reason to assume, the actor’s interests change by the adoption 
of the norm.  
Besides, the “evaluative relationships between states and their state peers” can motivate 
state leaders for conformity which also contribute to their self-esteem (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998, pp. 903-904). However, this case of compliance does not imply changes in 
state interests. Conformity as social proof can assist in sustaining social rules because 
feelings of embarrassment, guilt or shame are all avoided by compliance. In case of state 
leaders, ambiguity or uncertainty also facilitates norm compliance, because in this way 
they can avoid disapproval aroused by norm violation. 
 
7 The logic of consequences defines actions that are based on self-interests.  
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Furthermore, it is also possible that norm promotion and acceptance depend on the 
diplomats’ motives since they are concerned about their relationships with other 
diplomats in the United Nations. For example, there are case studies of norms which were 
initiated in the United Nations that support this claim (Ambrosetti, 2010). This case is 
again an example, why original self-interested actors may comply with certain norms.  
Finally, it is possible that a state complies with a norm, because the state leaders believe 
that is the appropriate political action. This is the way of acting according to the logic of 
appropriateness.8 This case might imply that the state revised its behaviour and decided 
to follow another way to pursue its interests. In this case the interests of the actor might 
have changed. However, states can act hypocritically, and states can be deceived by other 
states. Therefore, Copeland`s arguments about the lack of trustworthy information about 
states’ behaviour are relevant (Robert Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, pp. 175-177). This is 
again a proof that any adoption of a norm cannot inform us about whether the interests 
of the actor have changed.  
For all these reasons, it is fair to argue that norms have causal links to policy behaviour, 
but it is not possible to establish causal links between norms and interests. Nevertheless, 
it is relevant to briefly discuss the significance of this argument which contradicts those 
constructivists who assume causal links between norms and interests. When 
constructivists illustrate how the adoption of norms has changed the states’ interests they 
use the examples by Finnemore (1996): the treatment of wounded people in warfare, the 
establishment of science bureaucracies and the implementation of donating development 
assistance to poorer countries. These examples definitely show changes in the actors’ 
policy behaviour. However, the examples do not prove the changes of the actors’ 
interests. It is possible that even in these cases, the actors believe that it is their interests 
to behave in these ways because then they can maintain their relationship to a certain 
group of countries. Therefore, all these changes in policy behaviour shall not be identified 
as changes in the actors’ interests.9  
 
8 Similarly to the defiition of norms, appropriateness is broader than individual action, it refers to a 
general good, ethics.  
9 Sometimes constructivists use the word ‘preference’ interchangeably with interests. However, this is 




It is important to note that when a state complies with a norm, the state’s policy 
behaviour changes. Therefore, there is a causal link between adopted norms and policy 
outcomes. This change in policy outcomes may become solid when the norm becomes 
tied to the identity, so that the actor`s compliance with the norm is stable (Wendt, 1992, 
p. 417). States might even risk their physical security to protect their identities – and in 
this case all the norms that are incorporated in the identities. This phenomenon is the 
concept of ontological security (S. S. Daniels, 2016; Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2008). The case 
of France is a good example of how states may act against their primary interests. The 
French state was willing to make economic sacrifices by decreasing its foreign currency 
reserves during the 1992-93 currency crisis within the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) to protect the fixed exchange rates within the European Economic 
Community (EEC) (Krugman, 1996) because protecting the institutions and achievements 
of the EEC was a significant part of the identity of France.     
Although causal relationship between norms and states` interests cannot be established, 
the role of norms in international politics is essential, because states at least act as they 
have adopted those norms based on the logic of appropriateness. In these cases, probably 
only temporarily, but by complying certain norms, states appear as they consider others` 
interests in their decisions. Nevertheless, the scepticism by Krasner (Robert Jackson & 
Sørensen, 2010, pp. 175-177) about whether constructivists’ claims are relevant is 
significant. He argues that international norms do exist, but the norms can be ignored 
when ignoring them is in the interest of powerful states. For this case, however, in the 
21st century, in a globalizing world, there are remedies. Globalisation is the 
“intensification of interconnections between societies, institutions, cultures and 
individuals on a worldwide basis” (Patman, 2005, p. 5). The process is facilitated by the 
improving conditions for international transportation and the inventions of 
telecommunications. Regarding the remedies for powerful states ignoring established 
norms, McKeown (2009), for example, discusses the case of the torture norm and its 
regress in the case of the United States during the Iraq invasion in 2003. In that case, the 
 
behaviour. However, the question arises if it is a change in interests because preference may refer to a 
certain policy outcome as well as to certain interests. So, the interchangeable use of these words implies 
the modification of the meaning of interest and preference. Due to the use of unclarified terms 
constructivists are even accused of transforming the meanings of various reasons of a policy outcome, and 
by doing this, they name a cause for the policies in concern (Fierke, 2016, pp. 172-173).  
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accelerated flow of information, thanks to the internet, revealed the non-compliance of a 
great power, and the intense international public opposition put the United States into a 
weaker rhetorical position. The risks of weakening a state’s rhetorical position may 
restrain states from regressing from certain norms.  
 
2.2. How norms appear and spread 
Norms are ideational phenomena and after an idea emerges to change existing social 
practices, it takes time for the actual practices of the society to represent the idea, while 
the idea becomes a settled norm. In this section I present how norms appear, what stages 
they go through until they are implemented into practice and how the norms are spread 
among the members of the society, either in the cases of individuals and states.    
There are five forms of how a norm appears according to the stages of how an actor 
adopts a norm. In the first form, a norm is still an idea. The second form is when the norm 
is the subject of consideration. The third one is when a decision is made by the actor over 
the norm (adoption or rejection). The fourth form is when the norm is the subject of 
various efforts to implement it into practice. Finally, the fifth one is when the actor’s 
practices reflect the recommendations implied by the norm, the norm becomes settled 
for the actor.  
Regarding the first form, importantly, the norm is merely a thought. An actor selects an 
idea about a possible change in practices, choosing those practices which might be more 
appropriate than the existing ones. The actor is typically an individual. It is not possible to 
identify states as inventors of ideas, because the origins of the ideas can be traced back 
to the individuals who first raised them. The practices may affect an individual’s life or the 
social life of the community. Regardless what the practices affect, the origins of the new 
ideas to change the practices are the same.  
Because norms are ideational, it is impossible to trace their origins. What is relevant for 
the discussion is that usually, normative changes are triggered by some tensions within 
the normative system. Many types of tensions may arise, such as conflict between the 
generality of the rules and the specificity of real experience, and conflict between 
separate bodies of rules (Sandholtz, 2008, p. 101). Concrete, practical experience can also 
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contradict specific ideas and principles, such as in the case of the discrepancy between 
the adoption of human rights including the equality of races in the United States during 
the 1960s when the phenomenon of segregation was criticised by many, for example, by 
Martin Luther King Jnr. Furthermore, there are shock events such as flooding or wildfire 
triggered by environmental effects, for example climate change, that raise concerns 
regarding the appropriateness of existing norms. All these tensions eventually make 
individuals and/or communities reconsider their norms so that changes in the normative 
environment may result.   
There are four main sources of norms (Kowert & Legro, 1996): norms may come from 
other norms (when they are modified and create the basis for new ways of behaving), 
from the natural environment, from the social environment, and from the actors’ 
individual considerations. When norms come from other norms that can be a result of 
existing debates over norms, for example, when the existing norms are contested by 
certain interest groups of a community. When the environment provides the new norms, 
these norms might stem from shocks in the environment (e.g. a war), from iteration 
among the actors, and from ambiguity in social knowledge (for instance, the debates 
whether chemical weapons can be used in a war might be concluded in establishing a new 
norm of banishing them). The social sources of norms can be human interactions, 
organisational behaviour (for example, rules of advertisements), states’ interactions and 
other actors’ actions. The considerations of an actor are typically those cases when an 
individual faces a problem that he/she intends to solve, such as the case of Henry Dunant 
who wanted to find a solution to look after the wounded people in warfare. 
When the norms enter the second stage of their adoption, they take on their second form 
and become the subject of consideration. It is then when the discussion about the possible 
new norms starts. The discussions are relevant; this is the period when the new norms 
may face competition from other norms. Scholars, such as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 
p. 897) claim that new norms “never enter a normative vacuum,” they have to compete 
with existing norms and perceptions of interests. Moreover, promoted norms often face 
challenges from alternative norms and interests. There are cases, however, when the 
proposed norms do not have to face any competing norms. This phenomenon comes from 
the expansive nature of politics and human life. We want to discover new things and 
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explore territories. However, there may be debates about the new norms, those that are 
similar to debates over existing norms. 
Thirdly, there must be a decision made about the adoption or the rejection of the possible 
new norms; when there is no formal decision about the norms that can be regarded as a 
rejection. This point is crucial because this is the turning point concerning the 
institutionalisation of the new norm. After the decision, we can expect that actors (states) 
start performing all those steps by which they set up organisational standards to 
institutionalise those practices that are derived from the norm. The decision, the adoption 
of the norms is typically the evidence for scholars to claim that the norms are beyond the 
tipping point in the ‘cascade model.’ However, it is important to observe whether the 
steps to institutionalise the norms happen as this is the fourth form of how norms appear. 
That is the proof whether an actor has accepted the new norms. Otherwise, the 
expression of adopting the norms is just hypocrisy or ‘lip service.’ For example, the UN 
accepted the target of 0.7% ODA/GNI10 spending on 24 October 1970. The rate was 
suggested by the Pearson Commission of the OECD in 1969 and this suggestion aimed for 
the ODA to increase to 0.7% by 1975 and no later than 1980 (OECD, n.d.). However, the 
members of the UN do not contribute to this amount for the ODA; as Ingebritsen (2006b, 
p. 282) points out, the norm to help underdeveloped countries is not widely internalised. 
Given that the formal ‘adoption’ of the norm happened in 1970, we may raise the question 
whether the underperforming countries really accepted the norm. In that case, they 
would comply with these recommendations.    
The fourth form of how a norm appears is when the processes to institutionalise the norm 
are constructed. This form is essential for another reason, not just because it is proof that 
the adoption of a norm did happen, but because there are norms which are almost 
impossible to implement entirely into practice. For example, it appears almost impossible 
to achieve democracy with equal rights and opportunities: although the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was adopted by the UN member states in 
1966 (United Nations, n.d.), after the early 1970s, among UN diplomats there were 
concerns whether the framework of the ICCPR was sufficient to secure the rights for 
 
10 The ODA abbreviation refers to Official Development Assistance, meanwhile GNI is Gross National 
Income of a country. 
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everyone, for example, how to provide independence and equal social and economic 
rights for disabled people (Frost, 2009, p. 102). After the early 1970s, most Western 
diplomats realized that the existing human rights framework was not comprehensive, in 
some countries birth certificates and passports were not issued for persons with 
disabilities and political participation was cumbersome, given that blind voters could vote 
only with another person (MacKay, 2016, p. 79). The recognition of these practical 
adversaries and obstacles led eventually to the initiation of the drafting of the rights of 
the disabled persons in the early 2000s. Even though the Convention on Rights of the 
Disabled Persons is adopted by the UN, it is certain that there are cases in which 
individuals are not capable to participate in politics, simply because of their health 
conditions. Meanwhile, for lawmakers it would not be feasible to prepare the legislation 
in advance for all individual cases.  
To handle the case when a norm cannot be entirely realised, the thesis employs a specific 
approach. As defined earlier, norms are standards. Owing to this, in the thesis, those 
efforts, and policies which aim to establish all those conditions and organisational 
processes which a norm requires will be accounted for, as the state complies and 
facilitates with the given norm.  
Finally, the fifth form of how a norm appears is when it is institutionalised by a state or 
planted into routine exercises by the individuals. At this stage, it is a settled norm. 
Constructivists such as Jepperson, Katzenstein, and Wendt (1996, p. 54) or Björkdahl 
(2002, p. 40) argue that norms can become collectively held expectations. However, it is 
important to note, that this holds only in the case of widely settled norms and all those 
which are in the phase of implementation. All the other forms of norms may bring about 
deceiving behaviour by actors, such as states or individuals. Settled norms are by 
definition, the ‘normal’ behaviour for a community. Only the institutionalised or settled 
norms can become the facilitator of cooperation. 
Concerning the spread of norms, scholars so far have not reached an agreement on how 
normative change takes place in communities and what sort of actors influence the 
process (Bloomfield, 2015, p. 3). What we can assert about the process, however, is that 
normative change can happen through coercive ways and non-coercive ones. The coercive 
ways are those cases when the practices and the debates among the great powers 
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eventually modify the standards of behaviours, as in the case of the great powers’ 
disputes about the plundering rights and practices during the Napoleonic wars  
(Sandholtz, 2008). Furthermore, although it has not yet happened, hypothetically it may 
happen, when a state ‘devours the international system’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 198); in this case 
the normative change, the spread of various norms would be a forced way. In both cases, 
those actors (states) that are subordinate to the dominant powers, cannot consider the 
adoption and the implementation of the norms, they are simply forced to adjust to them. 
Importantly, the spread of norms, the normative change can also happen in a non-
coercive way11 but it is debated how this may happen. As mentioned earlier, Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998) or Björkdahl (2002) believe this kind of normative change requires an 
agent with conscious efforts (the norm entrepreneur) to change social norms. However, 
regarding the process of this sort of normative change (the one without coercion); we 
have to note that it can also happen naturally without norm entrepreneurs. First, the 
discussion outlines this way, the one without norm entrepreneurs and then norm 
entrepreneurship is presented.  
The natural spread of norms happens when a new way of behaving enters an 
environment, and it serves as an example for others to follow. In ordinary life, for 
example, a person who develops a healthy lifestyle with usual exercises (running, cycling, 
rowing, etc.) can present an example for others to follow. In this case, he/she finds the 
idea first, then considers it, decides about the adoption and starts implementing the 
lifestyle into his/her daily routine. When the idea is part of the individual’s life, it is settled. 
Later on, the followers and other individuals consider the norm as well and they go 
through the same process of decision, implementation and the settlement of the norm.  
Similarly, in international politics, we can mention cases of how an actor showed an 
example for others to follow. For instance, the case of the United States served as a 
beacon for European states to build up their democratic institutions. Although the United 
States intended to avoid interference in European policy, by building up democratic 
institutions, it still performed a mission, to show a precedent for others about how to 
 
11 Scholars, even Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) mention in their paper that norm entrepreneurs use 
communicative actions such as naming and shaming. However, these actions are not coercive, they point 
to the ’inappropriateness’ of actors’ actions.   
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establish and maintain democracy. The symbols of the United States, for example the 
Statue of Liberty, represent this missionary aim of the United States. Practically, this is the 
way how an actor’s identity can serve as a platform to promote norms in foreign policy 
(Devetak & True, 2006; True & Tanyag, 2018). It is relevant to notice that in these cases, 
the actors are present in a normative environment and they intend to follow the lives in 
line with their preferred norms, but they do not intend to convince others to follow them. 
Others may follow them, mainly because they find those norms to be attractive, 
appropriate, profitable or useful for them.  
The spread of the norm has three stages, as it is described in the ‘cascade model’ 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). At the beginning, when the norms emerge, only a limited 
number of actors (or maybe just one) adopt and implement the norms into practice. In 
case more and more actors adopt and implement the norms, the norm cascade occurs. 
The first and second stages (norm emergence and norm cascade) of the process are 
divided by the so-called tipping point when the process of promoting a norm reaches a 
breakthrough, and other actors realise the promise for success by following the new way 
of behaving. The tipping point is a critical mass of states that become norm leaders (the 
first states which adopt the norm). However, it is uncertain how many states are necessary 
for a norm to tip because states are not equal in their normative weight.12 Furthermore, 
some states are critical to norm adoption. For example, France and Great Britain were 
both land-mine producers in 1997 when they signed the Ottawa Treaty that was designed 
to ban the use of land-mines. The support from these land-mine producer states was 
critical for the norm cascade (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). That is the border after 
which a certain number of actors (states) realize the importance to adopt and implement 
the norms. After the norm cascade the norms are implemented into practice and the 
majority of actors behave according to the norms. At this stage, the non-complying actors 
face tension generated by their environment, so they may become interested to comply 
with the norms.  
The relation between the spread of the norms among actors and the forms of how norms 
appear is illustrated in figure 1. The vertical axis shows the various forms of norms (idea, 
 
12 It is relevant to note here that by the time the norm tips in the community, some actors (states) might 
have already implemented practices to secure the norm and for them the norm is already settled. 
29 
 
subject of consideration, subject of decision, implementation and settlement), while the 
horizontal axis shows the stages of how norms spread. 
Figure 1.: The relation between the forms and the spread of norms: 
Regarding figure 1, it is crucial to emphasise the role of the bold line. The norm cascade 
cannot occur when the norm is an idea or subject of consideration. However, it is possible 
that so many countries adopt a norm at the same time that the norm cascade happens. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that when the norm cascade happens, there are actors that are 
already implementing or have settled the norm. Similarly, the norm internalization phase 
can occur only after the norm is adopted, when the decision to adopt it has already been 
made. Therefore, in the figure, only those points are applicable which are either above 
the bold line or are to the left of it.  
Concerning how individual actors adopt a norm and how norms spread, it is essential to 
note that there is no guarantee that an idea after being selected for norm construction 
becomes a settled norm. Also, the process how an idea becomes a norm is not a one-way 
street, and the process can be reversed (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 45). For example, after the 
First World War, Germany and Austria went through a democratic change. The Weimar 
Republic of Germany had a democratic representative government and was regarded as 
the most democratic country in Continental Europe. However, after a short while, 
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Germany ceased to be a democratic country because of the Nazi Party’s victory in 1933. 
The Nazi regime systematically abolished democratic institutions. Austria went through a 
similar path. Similarly, regarding the spread of norms, after the norms got through the 
tipping point and the norm cascade, they still can be replaced or abolished. These cases 
may serve as examples of a ‘reversed norm cascade.’ So, any points that are relevant in 
the spread of norms (above and left from the bold line in figure 1.) can move to every 
direction.  
There are cases which show norms can survive after their replacements by other norms. 
As earlier mentioned, during the Iraq Invasion 2003, the United States was criticised by 
the international community because of applying torture. The ban of torture is one of the 
robust norms of human rights, it appears that during an extended period, the system of 
torture has survived its disclosure (McKeown, 2009, p. 10), and to abolish such norms 
altogether, they must be deleted not only from existing legal documents but also from 
human minds – which seems to be quite problematic. The possibility of the survival of the 
norms and the withdrawal of complete institutions based on relevant norms already show 
how vulnerable the norm development process is. For all these reasons, it appears as 
though there is no guarantee within the ‘cascade model’ that would facilitate the stability 
of the normative change. 
In regard to the length of the norm life-cycle, there is no simple answer as to how norms 
spread among actors. After the establishment of the United Nations, international 
institutions can set up international rules (institutionalisation) that may facilitate the 
norm cascade. In the case of women’s suffrage, the Inter-American Commission of 
Women was established in 1928, the first intergovernmental agency to promote the 
norm. The establishment of this agency coincided with the tipping point of the norm, but 
women’s suffrage had been promoted for almost 80 years before the first organisation 
was set up. After 1948, “emergent norms have increasingly become institutionalised in 
international law” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 900). Such institutionalisation 
contributes to a norm cascade, and the norm cascade after the establishment of the 
United Nations has become faster.   
So far, the discussion has covered those cases when the norms have either been forced 
to be implemented or the spread of the norms occurred without an active agent to 
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promote it. The case when an agent performs conscious efforts to promote a certain norm 
is norm entrepreneurship and it is discussed in the next section.  
 
2.3. Norm entrepreneurship  
When the norm-spread occurs without coercion yet through conscious efforts of an agent, 
this agent is a norm entrepreneur and the agenda is called norm entrepreneurship.13 In 
his definition, Sunstein (1996, p. 6) emphasized that norm entrepreneurs are the people 
who are interested in changing social norms, and they are successful if the norms they are 
promoting are accepted by the community, when they produce the phenomenon of norm 
bandwagons or norm cascades (Sunstein, 1996, p. 7). Sunstein’s model for norm cascade 
was later applied to describe international norm dynamics by Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998). The ‘cascade model’ emphasises that the process of how normative change 
happens is instigated by conscious efforts. The model was developed for the international 
context, but it can be generalised into domestic contexts as well. The three-stage process 
of norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation build up the norm life cycle. 
For a given society, when a norm reaches the point when a critical mass of the members 
adhere themselves to the new norm (decide to adopt it), it becomes the standard way of 
appropriate behaviour. 
Within the various stages of the model, norm entrepreneurs play a critical role during the 
initial phase (norm emergence) and the next stage, during the norm cascade. In the final 
stage of the norm life cycle, in the internalisation phase, it is the members of the 
community who have the most significant role. In the first phase, norm emergence, norm 
entrepreneurs select an idea, then they frame the idea to construct a norm candidate 
(Björkdahl, 2002, pp. 60-61). Until this point, the norm takes the form of an idea only. 
After the creation of the norm candidate, it is the norm entrepreneurs who then mobilise 
resources to persuade other actors to accept the norm concerned. This is when the norm 
is the subject of discussions. The discussion process requires active communication to 
members of the community (either domestic or international) to achieve the acceptance 
 
13 Some scholars have named the case when the spread of norms occurs without conscious efforts by an 
agent norm entrepreneurship. Fisk and Ramos (2014, p. 165) define the concept of ‘reluctant norm 
entrepreneur’ which is the actor whose practices become attractive for the broader community without 
specific efforts by the actor to promote the norms. 
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(the decision to adopt) of the specific behaviour implied by the norm candidate. For a 
successful persuasion, the frame of the idea (how norm entrepreneurs present the 
problem addressed by the proposed norm) should call sufficient attention to any concerns 
and ‘create alternative perceptions of both appropriateness and interests’ (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998, p. 897).  
The norm entrepreneurs’ success is related to achieving a critical mass of actors, states 
(norm leaders) which embrace the norms. To convince this critical mass of actors to 
embrace the proposed norm, during the creation of cognitive frames, norm 
entrepreneurs sometimes have to dramatise the problem the norm addresses. Framing is 
an essential element of norm promotion because it is quite rare that new norms do not 
have to face competing norms. Usually, promoting a new norm “takes place within the 
standards of appropriateness defined by prior norms”  (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 
897). The presence of other norms is the reason why the norm entrepreneurs have to 
focus on framing because when they promote a norm, they contest the society’s existing 
standards of appropriateness. However, there are cases as well when the society is 
already open to introducing new norms because the ‘old ones’ are already outdated or 
were forcefully imposed.   
In the case of when the new norms face competition from existing norms or other 
interests, norm entrepreneurs can be successful if they are “able to frame normative ideas 
in such a way that they resonate with relevant audiences” (Payne, 2001, p. 39). However, 
there are other factors that make it difficult for norm entrepreneurs to perform 
successfully. In a local cultural environment, the phenomenon of norm resistance may 
happen when the local norms are so strong that the relevant states do not adopt new 
ones. Besides resistance, there exists norm displacement, when the new norms can 
replace existing norms, mainly because of the weakness of the local norms (Acharya, 
2004, pp. 240-254). There may be other actors as well, the norm antipreneurs, the 
competitive entrepreneurs and the creative resistors, that make the norm promotion 
efforts rather complicated. Norm antipreneurs defend the actual normative status quo, 
and competitive entrepreneurs provide alternatives to the norms promoted by the norm 
entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, the creative resistors perform a seemingly two-folded policy. 
On the one hand, they raise arguments to promote the proposed norms; however, on the 
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other hand they encourage the resistance of the new norms. During this process the 
norms cannot be accepted by the community (Bloomfield, 2015, p. 8).   
To overcome all these challenges, norm entrepreneurs have to mobilise sufficient 
resources to frame and promote the norms. These resources are usually provided by 
organisational platforms. These platforms can be constructed specifically for the purpose 
of promoting the specific norms (such as Greenpeace or the Red Cross). However, norm 
entrepreneurs can use existing organisations and cooperating with these organisations 
can be fruitful for several reasons. The organisations can shape the promoted norms and 
they have specialised expertise to exchange information and contacts to actors in order 
to change their behaviour or opinion. Furthermore, the organisations have professionals 
who can further clarify and improve the promoted norms. Most importantly, international 
organisations can have resources and leverage to convince a large number of states to 
endorse the promoted norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 899-900). We can add that 
social media can also provide resources for organising movements, and these resources 
can also be exploited by norm entrepreneurs. When sufficient resources are mobilized, 
more and more states may adopt the new norm(s). 
In the case where a sufficient number of states adopts the norm, the process of the norm 
spread enters the second phase, the norm cascade. After the tipping point, in the norm 
cascade, new states start to accept and adopt the norm, even without pressure from other 
actors. This is the time when states, after deciding to adopt the norm, start complying 
with it. The compliance can happen because of reasons that relate to states’ identities as 
members of the international society. Many motives can facilitate states’ compliance, 
similarly to those as presented previously in section 2.1 (acting on the logic of 
appropriateness, on the logic of consequences, arguing, search for legitimacy, securing 
self-esteem, etc.).  
After the norm cascade, scholars identify the stage of internalisation (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998). According to them, it is at this stage that the new norm becomes a general 
norm of the community; at this time, the norm can be regarded as habitual. In the 
internalisation stage, professional training has a significant role and organisations adjust 
their workflow in line with the new norms, and everyday processes start reflecting the 
norms. These are procedural changes: when norms become habits, the procedures create 
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predictability and stability (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 905) in the organisations or in 
the society.  
As it was argued earlier, after the norm cascade, the environment in which non-complying 
actors need to pursue their interests is qualitatively different from the one before the 
norm cascade. After the norm cascade, the majority of the states adopted the norm and 
they are able to create pressure for non-complying actors to embrace the norms. 
Nevertheless, there are ways to promote further those norms that are already established 
in a large number of states, as indicated by the ‘spiral model.’ For example, Risse, Ropp 
and Sikkink (2013) describe how human rights (including democratic political rights) may 
spread to new states. Theoretically, this agenda of promoting norms can fit both in the 
process of the ‘norm cascade’ phase of the cascade model and in the ‘norm 
internalisation’ phase. However, because the ‘spiral model’ emphasises the role of the 
international community, it is more likely that this process occurs during the 
internalisation phase of the norm life-cycle. 
As mentioned, within the ‘spiral model’, it is the international community that generates 
pressure on regimes which oppose human rights. The model consists of five steps in which 
a regime (a state) eventually accepts and implements human rights and later on behaves 
consistently with those norms (and rules). At the initial stage, the regime performs 
oppression; the society has (if at all) only a suppressed opposition. International human 
rights movements, international organisations, and other states as altogether the 
international community, receive information from domestic actors of the country of 
concern. The network of the international community accuses the regime of violations of 
human rights. This accusation of the regime’s oppressing human rights is also called 
‘shaming’.14 In this stage, the international community also mobilises other international 
organisations and liberal states. In the second stage, the repressive regime denies the 
accusations. The regime contests the validity of international human rights and can refer 
to the non-intervention principle. The opposition in the country is still weak; however, the 
international community continues the pressure. The maintained pressure has two 
 
14 The process of shaming is quite thoroughly discussed in academic papers, for example Schmitz (2002), 
as a tool of international non-governmental organizations to exercise pressure on human rights violating 




consequences. The domestic opposition can broaden its opportunities by raising the 
issues of human rights in domestic discourses. The opposition can get access to better 
networking, and even new actors and human rights activists can appear in the country. 
These altogether increase the pressure on the regime that is forced to make concessions. 
In the third stage in the model, the regime makes concessions; however, these are tactical 
only. These tactical concessions can provide more options for the human rights 
movement, and at the same time, the regime’s room to manoeuvre is decreasing. Then in 
the fourth stage when a prescriptive status is granted for human rights, the regime and/or 
its policy changes radically. The state actors accept the validity of international human 
rights. The domestic legislation adjusted to international norms and the change in 
discourses leads to the establishment of human rights institutions and rules. Also, in the 
last stage, the state performs rule-consistent behaviour (Risse et al., 2013, p. 8). Although 
the members of the domestic opposition are sometimes regarded as norm entrepreneurs, 
the process occurs in the internalisation phase of the life-cycle and the international 
community creates the decisive pressure which eventually results in the non-complying 
state to adopt the norm, it is not norm entrepreneurs that have the main role.   
 
2.4. States as norm entrepreneurs 
So far, the discussion has not addressed the questions of what kind of actors can become 
norm entrepreneurs and what sorts of motives they have. According to the scholars of 
norm dynamics, it appears straightforward that all kinds of policy participants can act as 
norm entrepreneurs who are interested in social change and who can stand up for the 
change of existing norms (Sunstein, 1996, p. 23). Individuals (Bloomfield, 2015), private 
groups or religious communities can participate in the testing or changing of current 
norms, and can also become norm entrepreneurs (Sunstein, 1996, p. 34). Others, such as 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, pp. 898-899) emphasise that if the individual agents have 
organisational platforms, then they can become norm entrepreneurs. However, it is 
debated whether norm entrepreneurs need to have organisational platforms as necessary 
resources for their aspirations. What seems to be relevant is that norm entrepreneurs do 
require sufficient resources for their agendas.  
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Among the case studies on norm entrepreneurship there are ones that describe 
individuals acting as norm entrepreneurs. Beyond the example of Henry Dunant we can 
mention, for example, Kofi Annan and the African Union who initiated the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) agenda in the UN to intervene in those states where the state can no 
longer secure the safety of its citizens (Bloomfield, 2015). The case studies about norm 
entrepreneurs also include organisations such as multinational corporates promoting 
ethical corporate practices (Deitelhoff & Wolf, 2013), the female suffrage movements 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) or the Green movements (Bloomfield, 2015).  
Most important regarding the thesis are the case studies discussing states as norm 
entrepreneurs. Among these studies we find the Scandinavian states promoting 
multilateral trade talks, sustainability and international aid (Ingebritsen, 2006b), Australia 
promoting defence diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region (A. Carr & Baldino, 2015), or Brazil 
outlining the ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ initiative as an addition to the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ norm (Benner, 2013).15 Therefore, the cases when states act as 
norm entrepreneurs are rather common. The case studies discussing states as norm 
entrepreneurs have relevant implications regarding the possible motivations of the actors 
and on the significance of sufficient resources and how acting as norm entrepreneurs 
affects the states’ soft power.  
Concerning the possible motives of the norm entrepreneurs, the most significant attribute 
is that the norm entrepreneur is interested in changing the existing norms (Sunstein, 
1996). Others, such as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 898) argue that “it is very difficult 
to explain the motivation of norm entrepreneurs without reference to empathy, altruism, 
and ideational commitment.” Norm entrepreneurship can also be derived from the 
interests of diplomats to maintain their relationships with their peers, for example in the 
UN (Ambrosetti, 2010). It is important to note, however, that norm entrepreneurs do not 
act against their interests, as altruism may suggest. They are interested in social change, 
and in the acceptance of the norms they promote, such as in the case of the suffragettes, 
they perform ethical considerations. Their acts are based on the logic of appropriateness, 
 
15 Unions of states can also be regarded as state actors playing the role of norm entrepreneurs: for 
example, the European Union promoting lifelong learning (Kleibrink, 2011), the peaceful neighbouring 
policy (Pace, 2007) and norms against climate change (C. F. Parker & Karlsson, 2010).  
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they believe what they promote is right. However, they adopt rational approaches and 
are “very sophisticated in their means-ends calculations about how to achieve their goals” 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 910). 
Those cases, when a state or a union acts as a norm entrepreneur, its motives can also be 
attributed to similar factors such as moral considerations or empathy. For example, 
promoting the norms against climate change by the EU (C. F. Parker & Karlsson, 2010) can 
count as a policy agenda when an idealistic aim was in the focus of the actor, the EU 
followed the way of the logic of appropriateness. It is also possible to identify empathy in 
states’ motivations, given that leaders do have a capacity for participating in others’ 
feelings and ideas, and empathy can lead to empathetic interdependence when an actor 
becomes interested in the welfare of others. It is quite challenging, however, to identify 
altruism in the case of states.  
Regardless of the motivation of the actors, norm entrepreneurs should be able to mobilise 
resources to achieve their goals, and this requires either material capabilities or 
organisational funding. Even in the case of Brazil, which is quite a large state, Benner 
(2013) argues that the country’s diplomatic resources were not sufficient to further 
elaborate the Responsibility While Protecting norm in 2011, and its lack of professionals 
might have also contributed to the withdrawal of their proposition in 2012. Meanwhile, 
the Scandinavian countries appear to be quite wealthy, and that may provide them with 
sufficient resources to promote norms. Sufficient resources then also play a role for an 
actor to decide to start a policy of norm entrepreneurship. 
Because states can have access to resources more flexibly than individuals and because 
states have legislative power domestically, these two conditions demand states to be seen 
as agents leading by example; otherwise, the credibility of the states can be debated 
(states have both domestic and international responsibilities). Thus, when a state 
proposes a norm internationally, it is a requirement to apply the norm in concern to 
domestic issues (whenever it is possible). Meanwhile, individuals might not have access 
to sufficient resources to implement a proposed norm, and similarly, because individuals 
alone cannot have legislative powers, for them it does not seem applicable to implement 
the proposed norms into their practices. Sunstein (1996, pp. 2-3) described cases when 
individuals were acting as norm entrepreneurs and while doing these practices they were 
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leading the community by example. For instance, by picking up fast food boxes and 
disposing of them into rubbish bins or selectively placing unused items into recycle bins. 
These agents could start the role of norm entrepreneur by acting according to the 
proposed norm because the norms did not require extensive resources. However, the 
case is different when the proposed norm requires resources, for example organizing 
selective waste collection. In that case, individuals cannot be expected to implement the 
norm on their own (unilaterally), state resources are required. Similarly, female 
suffragettes alone could not implement the proposed norm into practise because they did 
not have legislative powers. In those cases when there are particular limits that hinder 
actors from behaving according to the suggested norms, for example, the movements 
proposing female suffrage, they can act only as lobbyist.  
It appears though that in the case of states acting as norm entrepreneurs, only a minority 
of the cases creates situations in which, in order to act consistently, the state does not 
have to implement the norms unilaterally. For example, securing that in a state’s exclusive 
economic zones overfishing cannot occur may not be feasible, because it would require a 
large fleet to control large areas of sea. Regardless of these exceptional cases, to remain 
credible, states acting as norm entrepreneurs are supposed to lead the community by 
example.  
Concerning credibility, there may be policies which, in rhetoric, represent an allegedly 
appropriate aim but in practice the main aim is different (disconnect between avowed 
motive and actual motive). Regarding the motivation of states and state leaders in acting 
as norm entrepreneurs, it is especially important to discuss the concept of hypocrisy. 
Hypocrisy is the disconnect between rhetoric (the avowed values) and actual policy 
actions;  actors claim that they are doing something for one reason that appears to be 
good when actually they are doing it for another reason (Price, 2008, p. 26). Importantly, 
hypocrisy may bear positive outcomes in cases when the actor can live up to the moral 
rhetoric he/she uses. The mere existence of hypocrisy is rather problematic, because in 
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international relations, ‘the expectation of hypocrisy renders meaningful dialogue nearly 
impossible’ (M. Lynch, 2008, p. 168).16  
Finally, in this section, it is important to discuss how the role of norm entrepreneur affects 
states’ soft power. Scholars agree on the definition of soft power which is the capability 
of an actor to reach an aimed outcome by persuasion or attraction rather than by the use 
of coercion (Bially Mattern, 2005; Gallarotti, 2015; Nye, 2011). It is debated, however, 
how soft power works and makes its effect, what the sources and limitations of this power 
are, how hard power and soft power interact, or whether it is a useful concept at all. The 
most substantial criticism of the concept emerged from the realists who questioned its 
very usefulness. One of the most prominent realist scholars, Mearsheimer, paid no 
attention to this factor of power in his recent book on the forecasted evolution of 
international relations in the twenty-first century (Mearsheimer, 2014).  
The concept can be best understood through its contrast to hard power instruments like 
military and economic power, the so-called sticks (military force, threats, sanctions) and 
carrots (monetised rewards). Soft power mainly has the instruments of persuasion and 
attraction. However, the concept is often misunderstood as it is “too often 
misappropriated to cover all courses of action outside military force” (Nye, 2015a, p. 6). 
Nevertheless, the soft-power concept has proved to be very popular among politicians 
from the United States to China as well, and there are independent analytical institutions 
that publish soft-power rankings (e.g., the IfG-Monocle list, the Portland Soft Power 30), 
although their methodologies are based on mainly subjective elements (McClory, 2015, 
p. 9). Most importantly, among academic scholars, it also seems to be accepted that 
countries should cultivate soft power.  
According to mainstream scholarship, the critical resources of this power are the country’s 
“culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to 
them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and 
 
16 For example, the EU intended to be the world leader in implementing climate change measures. 
However, there have been emerging concerns regarding the EU’s credibility and commitments to 
implementing these measures. These concerns were caused by the fact that in 2010 the member states 
were lagging behind their targeted reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto protocol 
(C. F. Parker & Karlsson, 2010). The failure to fulfil the self-imposed aims is awkward at best and can be 
hypocritical at worst. 
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having moral authority)” (Nye, 2015b, p. 59). Also, when recognising the elements of soft 
power, scholars usually observe the country’s education system, the cultural 
representation of the country in the world and the strength of its diplomatic network. 
These are all qualitative variables. However, the soft power rankings of the countries also 
tend to favour the countries with the highest GDP and GDP/capita figures which are 
ranked on the top of these lists. The size of GDP is a quantitative variable, however, so the 
rankings usually prove that the great powers have the most extensive soft power as well. 
With respect to the relation between soft power and the change and the development of 
norms, there are three essential notions we have to highlight.  First, as described in section 
2.2, the development and change of norms can happen either through the imposition of 
norms by a great power or through ways without coercion. In the latter case we identified 
two processes, the automatic one in which an actor’s identity as an instrument affects the 
environment that triggers the change of norms and the one with conscious efforts, which 
is the process of norm entrepreneurship. The first case is when the actor does not have 
intentions to promote his/her norms, but others may follow them. As mentioned in 
section 2.2, the members of the community may follow these actors, mainly because they 
find those norms either attractive because of appropriateness or profitability and 
usefulness. In the cases of automatic norm promotion attraction is the key, and attraction 
is one of the ways how soft power works. Therefore, soft power can contribute to 
normative change.  
Second, it is relevant to note that norm entrepreneurship does not apply coercive 
methods, as shown in section 2.3. What norm entrepreneurs can use by exploring the 
options of organisational platforms or other resources (as states can use the resources of 
their bureaucracies) is persuasion, the second-most important element of soft power.  
Third, acting as a norm entrepreneur has positive feedback on the actor’s soft power 
capabilities – it further strengthens those capabilities. Norm entrepreneurship, in the case 
of states, contributes to the country’s culture, represents its political features and 
characteristics, and makes up an essential part of foreign policy. It is a significant 
component of the cultivation of the country’s soft power.  
How those policies of norm entrepreneurship can create a good example to follow, and a 
reputation to which other actors may be attracted as well, which are the necessary 
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attributes of soft power, can be illustrated by the case of Norway who is often presented 
as a norm entrepreneur. Ingebritsen (2006b) for example, discusses Norway as an actor 
that promoted international peace talks and the norms of providing international aid. 
These policies are also mentioned by the main propagator of soft power, Joseph Nye 
(2011, p. 23) in his book The Future of Power, where Nye describes Norway as a small 
country which “enhanced its attractiveness” through efforts such as “legitimising peace-
making and development assistance.” Therefore, we can conclude that norm 
entrepreneurship can also increase the attractiveness of an actor.  
Similarly to soft power, scholars (Manners, 2008; Pritchard, 2013) often use the concept 
of normative power, and there is a large body of scholarly literature about the Normative 
Power of Europe (NPE). Normative power refers to those capabilities of an actor that can 
convince others to accept and implement new standards of behaviours (norms), making 
it successful in norm entrepreneurship. We have to notice its similarities to soft power: 
both concepts refer to persuasion and attraction rather than coercion. Nevertheless, it is 
also problematic to assess the normative power of states or that of any actors in politics 
because, as in the case of soft power, the measurement is partly subjective. To show the 
subjectivity of the measurement of soft power, it is enough to mention that the normative 
weight of states can be different and challenging to define. For the sake of simplicity, 
wherever necessary, I use the concept of soft power in the thesis. 
 
2.5. The special case: small states as norm entrepreneurs 
Scholars of small states theory tend to agree what the crucial factors are that shape small 
states’ foreign policies. They mention the sheer physical size (Vital, 2006, p. 77), the 
perceived size of power (Hey, 2003; Keohane, 2006; Lamoreaux, 2014), the economic and 
social development, the nature of the (political) environment or in other words the culture 
of the society, the cohesion of the population and the degree of internal support to the 
government or regime type to find legitimacy in foreign policy (Hey, 2003, pp. 189-193; 
Vital, 2006, p. 77), the politicians’ ambitions (Hey, 2003, pp. 192-193), and the flexibility 
and efficacy of the bureaucracy of the state and the potential for prosperity (Kassimeris, 
2009, pp. 97-99).  
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Among the scholars discussing small states’ foreign policies, it appears to be accepted that 
the most relevant factor determining these states’ foreign policy behaviour is the size 
itself. However, the concept of ’small sized states’ is contested.17 Nevertheless, Hey (2003, 
p. 3) proposed a method to identify small states that relies on  the psychological 
dimension of state leaders, namely, the perceptions about the power level of any state. 
Practically, what Hey proposed is simple: we recognise a small state when we see one. 
This method is useful to identify any type or size of a state, whether it is a great power, 
middle-sized country or small state.  
Small states theory is abundantly informed by structuralist theorists, for example, 
Keohane (2006) or Kassimeris (2009) who accepted Hey’s method to identify the size of 
states. In its original form, the structuralist approach defines system-determining, system-
influencing, system-affecting and system-ineffectual states. However, this view needs to 
be modified. By their definition the system-affecting states can have effects on the 
international relations when they are grouped. Because of this, I argue that these states 
should also be called system-ineffectual states, because unilaterally, they cannot 
influence the system. Therefore, there are only three types of states, the system-
determining, the system-influencing and the system-ineffectual states.  
The structuralist view of the international system and the perceived size of a small state 
(the assumption that they are system-ineffectual) can explain small states’ foreign policy 
behaviour regarding three elements. First, they are able to explain why small states should 
have alliances in various forms like a coalition of other peer states (Vital, 2006, p. 83), 
alignment with (bandwagoning) a great power for protection or joining multilateral 
military organizations (Hey, 2003, p. 187; Kassimeris, 2009, pp. 94-96; Keohane, 2006, pp. 
64-69; Vital, 2006, p. 83). Second, the structuralist view is capable of explaining why small 
states participate in those international institutions (organizations, military alliances and 
 
17 Scholars, such as Kassimeris  (2009, p. 92) point to the impossibility of defining smallness, mostly 
because smallness should not be described only in terms of autonomy, territorial size, population or the 
degree of independence. Tow and Parkin (2007, p. 309) and Lamoreaux (2014, p. 569) argue that the 
concept of a small state is contested, mainly because the definition is objective only in the case when it is 
based on relativistic measures such as size of the population, land area, economic capacity, and military 
spending. Regardless, scholars tend to draw lines between small states and middle powers; for example, 
Barston (cited by Kassimeris, 2009, p. 90) sets this border at 10-15 million people. However, this setting of 
a border between size categories always remains authoritative. The European Union, for example, 
categorises the size of states based on a simple rule, given that all states with a population smaller than 40 
million people are considered to be small (Kassimeris, 2009, p. 88). 
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regional cooperative initiatives) that are based on the existing international system and 
which allow them to take part in a multilateral decision-making procedure (Gstöhl & 
Neumann, 2006, p. 25; Hey, 2003, pp. 187-188; Ingebritsen, 2006a, pp. 289-290; 
Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567). Third, based on the structuralist view it is understandable why 
small states have appeal to international law and norms (Gstöhl & Neumann, 2006, p. 24; 
Hey, 2003, p. 187; Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567) and why they are interested in the rule of 
international law, and also make definite steps to strengthen it.  
Concerning the necessity for alliances, it is sufficient to note that one of the reasons why 
small states are perceived as system-ineffectual is that these states have limited military 
capabilities. By their means, they cannot secure the survival of the state. Therefore, they 
need protection from allies18 (Hey, 2003, p. 187; Kassimeris, 2009, pp. 94-96; Keohane, 
2006, pp. 64-69; Vital, 2006, p. 83). There are various forms of alliances, such as the 
bilateral alliances with great powers, multilateral alliances with peer states, or mixed 
multilateral alliances in which there are at least one great power and middle-sized powers. 
The most preferred structure of alliances is the mixed multilateral. Finding allied states 
also becomes vital because small states can hardly afford to be independent.19 Scholars 
such as Vital  (2006) believe independence is a viable option for small states only if they 
were isolated. Although there are cases, such as Liechtenstein (Duursma, 2006), Finland, 
Austria, Switzerland, Sweden or Ireland that show small states can remain neutral, in all 
those cases there are geopolitical reasons why they have been able to remain neutral. 
There other case studies (e.g. Baker Fox, 2006) which show how small states could oppose 
the great powers’ requests to enter a war, but, similarly, in those cases (Sweden, Spain, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Finland, Portugal, Norway and Eire) geopolitical reasons had the 
leading role so that these states could refuse the great powers’ requests. For example, 
 
18 One may argue that system-affecting states (middle powers) may also sense insecurity and that they 
cannot protect themselves on their own. But, because they are perceived as system-influencing, the 
system-determining states do intend to bind them as allies, the system-determining states offer them 
protection so that the system-influencing states do not join in alliance to the other (hostile) system-
determining state (great power). In case of small states, the great powers’ interests to have them as allies 
are weaker, it is rather the small states which need to initiate the alliances with stronger states.  
19 Independence in this sense means the state is not only neutral but also free from any external influence 
to execute its policies. Although Vital did not discuss it, being independent in this sense also requires self-
sustainability, which is rare or simply non-existent in the twenty-first century. 
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Ireland is located to the west of Great Britain, and in this case, Great Britain serves as a 
protector shield to oppose all kinds of possible invasion from Continental Europe.  
When choosing great powers as allied partners, small states need to be alert to the power 
dynamics of the international system and this affects how they can establish 
commitments towards their partners (either economic or military), which creates a 
certain constraint, small states need to balance among the great powers’ interests. There 
are several arguments supporting the statement that a small state is prone to fewer 
conflicts if it is bandwagoning a great power than small states missing a large state patron. 
However, as Gleason et al. (2008) present it in the case of Kyrgyzstan, scholars also 
acknowledge that alignment can become very risky because the international status quo 
of powers can change with time. Additionally, there may be certain occasions when the 
great power’s behaviour can cause threats to its small state allies. For example, the 
unilateral approach of the United States in the case of the Iraq War in 2003 changed 
international relations in terms of the use of power. In that case, small states could 
temporarily profit from bandwagoning the great power but “it is they that are potentially 
most threatened when the great power undermines the international constraints on the 
use of power” (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 451). This constraint that makes small states balance 
among great powers’ interests is likely to affect their foreign policy choices and influences 
whether they decide to pursue an agenda to promote norms internationally. Eventually, 
this constraint can restrain small states from performing norm entrepreneurship policies.   
To alleviate their lack of security owing to their size, small states can pursue their foreign 
policy goals by engaging in international organisations and by drawing on international 
law and norms which are systemic factors  (Hey, 2003, p. 187; Kassimeris, 2009, pp. 85-
87). The possible reason for this is that international governmental organisations (IGOs), 
which operate according to the one state one vote rule, favour small states. Furthermore, 
in a multilateral negotiation, great powers can influence or manipulate the process, but it 
is more difficult for them than within a bilateral treaty/agreement. However, IGOs do not 
work outside international political realities; international organisations reflect power 
principles (Hey, 2003, p. 188). Nevertheless, there are many papers that illustrate what 
roles small states have in international institutions to enhance their influence on 
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international politics. For instance, Thorhallsson (2006, 2012) describes in detail how 
qualitative factors determine the ability of countries to influence these institutions.  
Another foreign policy option for small states is international integration, which can be 
understood within their policies in international organizations because integration is 
usually coupled with participation in the integration’s organisational structure. The level 
of integration for a small state can vary, but it is quite fair to say that even resigning some 
sovereignty when entering an integration (like the EU) can still be beneficial for small 
states (Hey, 2003, pp. 188-189).   
The legal stability of the system is essential for small states, not just because small states 
intend to find all the modes that may help them alleviate the credible, external threats 
(Hey, 2003, p. 187; Gstöhl and Neumann, 2006, p. 24; Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567), but also 
because if the rule of law is implemented internationally, it limits great powers’ use of 
power. Therefore, naturally, small states have an appeal to international law and norms 
(Hey, 2003, p. 187; Gstöhl and Neumann, 2006, p. 24; Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567) even if, 
as presented by Carr (1940), legal treaties are overruled when the power relations among 
the members of the treaty changes.  
Although the small states theory based on the structuralist view of international relations 
can show why small states need allies, participate in international organizations and have 
a preference for the rule of law and international norms, this theory cannot explain why 
small states can become intellectual leaders (Tow & Parkin, 2007), why they can act as 
norm setters (Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567) and norm entrepreneurs (Björkdahl, 2002; 
Ingebritsen, 2006b). Furthermore, the structuralist view regarding small states that 
asserts that these states are system-ineffectual directly contradicts the option of norm 
setting and norm entrepreneurship because these agendas require influential actors.  
To resolve this theoretical puzzle, first, we can mention that within the structuralist view 
there is an explanation why small states may be more flexible in their foreign policy 
choices. It is because the relative and limited capacities of a small state have a reverse 
effect on their role in the system: a unilateral step of a small state does not modify the 
overall balance of power as the step remains system-ineffectual. However, when a 
system-affecting state makes a unilateral move, that action tips the balance of power in 
the system. For example, when West-Germany joined NATO in April 1955, the event 
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caused a series of events in the Eastern Bloc, and by October that year, the Soviet Union 
organised the military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, to counterbalance the West-German 
move, despite West Germany not being a superpower.  
Because the unilateral steps taken by system-affecting states modify the balance of power 
and the unilateral steps of small states do not, paradoxically it appears as though the 
system-affecting states are more tied to the power relations of the system than small 
states. System-affecting powers are seen as stronger, but system-ineffectual ones, small 
states, can have more considerable latitude in their choices. This opens up the way for 
small states to become norm setters and norm entrepreneurs even by sacrificing their 
military alliances with great powers. However, this option does not mean that middle-
sized powers are less effective when they start promoting norms. When they do, their 
normative weight is larger (by definition, they are system-affecting states) but their 
options are rather limited. 
Second, it is crucial to note that the structuralist view is valid only in terms of military 
power; however, concerning economic power and power over opinion this theory does 
not hold. Economic power is often understood as the total wealth the state owns (E. H. 
Carr, 1940, p. 146). In the 1970s, scholars such as Katzenstein (cited by Gstöhl & Neumann, 
2006, p. 12) believed that size was a critical factor of a state’s economic success because 
it can decide the wealth of a nation. This argument was derived from the belief that small 
states have smaller domestic markets, lower diversification of production, they face 
scarcity of natural resources, lower economies of scale and low research and 
development expenditure. Furthermore, small economies were found to be more 
dependent on external trade and prone to export of a single commodity. According to this 
scholarship, smallness creates vulnerability, not only in political terms, but also in 
economic terms. Economic openness makes smaller states vulnerable to world trade 
dynamics and development. The interdependency with larger economies can create 
further vulnerability through interest rates, inflation and unemployment (Katzenstein, 
2006).  
Later these findings that the size of the states may define states’ wealth and states’ 
foreign policy behaviour were falsified, mainly by the works of Baehr (cited by Gstöhl & 
Neumann, 2006, p. 12). We can add that there are countries with relatively small GDPs, 
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such as Finland, but their economies are still strong, given that research and development 
are high in the country, and the education system is among the best in the world.20 For a 
period, Finland was also regarded as a great power in telecommunication because of one 
single company, Nokia, a high-tech manufacturer. Furthermore, the democratic 
corporatism in the Scandinavian countries can react flexibly to the effects originated from 
the most developed countries such as the US. Small states can have control over the 
critically influential financial structure of the economy (budget deficit and debt ratio 
compared with the GDP) and the financial balance of the economy helps small economies 
become resilient against financial contagion and other types of crises. For this reason, the 
size of the state does not fully define the state’s economic power and the stability of a 
small state’s wealth, by performing reliable economic policy and using the creativity of its 
citizens, can be secured to an extent. 
Power over opinion is based on the capability of an actor to persuade others (E. H. Carr, 
1940, p. 168). These capabilities, however, depend primarily upon the actor’s creativity 
and less on its material resources. Although propaganda may affect the general public, 
the attractiveness of ideas cannot be ignored. Therefore, the emergence of ideas in small 
states can result in social innovations which can be seen by others and be found as 
attractive. It is significant to note that the emergence of ideas is not related to the size of 
the actor: every actor can have a good idea.21 Through technological innovations, 
creativity has a role in a state’s economic power and economic power is to an extent 
independent from the size of the actor. However, the power over opinion is not related 
to the size of the actor at all. To illustrate how social creativity operates in terms of the 
power over opinion, Tow and Parkin (2007) argue that small states can achieve leadership 
roles in niche policy areas – because they are often socially more progressive and open to 
socially innovative ideas. Within the various policy areas, such as structural, 
entrepreneurial and intellectual, small states can have mainly intellectual leadership 
roles:  
 
20 See for example the Social Progress Index website. Retrieved 28 July, 2017 from: 
http://www.socialprogressindex.com/?code=FIN.    
21 For a philosophical description about how ideas emerge see the works of Hartmann on ’categorical 
dependence’ (studied in Simon, 2003). 
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Intellectual leaders, however, can produce ideas and use of moral principles that 
shape the norms and perspectives of those involved in structural interactions. 
Applied to small states, this concept offers an explanation of how such states are 
able to exert their influence via intellectual leadership. (Tow & Parkin, 2007, p. 
311)  
Owing to the independence of creativity from the size of the actor, any state can become 
a superpower in niche policy areas in terms of creative social or technological ideas, as 
Wivel (2016) argues. The phenomenon of when a small state influences world politics is 
usually called by scholars, for example, True and Tanyag (2018, p. 244), as ‘the small state 
punching above its weight.’ However, in terms of power over opinion, states are equal. As 
a conclusion, we can assert that owing to the structural forces of the military power, small 
states are more interested in finding creative solutions to improve their conditions 
through social innovations that may be appropriate for others too, so they are more 
inclined to become idealistic or normative superpowers. 
Section 2.4 discussed how norm entrepreneurship is related to the actor’s soft power 
capabilities. As presented there, soft power is the ability to achieve specific policy 
outcomes by persuasion and attraction rather than coercion. Again, we have to notice 
that power over opinion, as the capacity to persuade, is a soft power element, and the 
ability to persuade, as an element of soft power, is not related to the size of the actor. The 
lack of significant military power in the case of small states makes them rely more often 
on rhetorical and soft power instruments. As East (cited by Kassimeris, 2009, p. 90) argues, 
small powers make more use of verbal statements, rather than non-verbal actions, and 
take fewer risks because of their limited capabilities. Among these verbal statements, 
often references to humanistic principles, norms and international law are emphasized 
that can create attraction towards their policies.  
The emergence of ideas which is independent from the size of an actor is why, as a political 
option for small states to increase influence, scholars are right when they argue that small 
states can act as norm setters (Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567) and norm entrepreneurs 
(Björkdahl, 2002; Ingebritsen, 2006b). Once a small state is able to develop a new standard 
of behaviour, the norm can be seen by other states too. If the norm is attractive enough, 
others may follow, so the new norm can automatically spread, as discussed in sections 2.2 
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and 2.3. In the other case, when the creative small state attempts to convince others to 
follow the norm, the policy agenda of norm entrepreneurship sets off. And from that point 
on, it is only the capability of the actor to persuade others that is the limit for the 
successful norm entrepreneurship agenda.  
Regarding small states as norm entrepreneurs, the Scandinavian countries are most often 
presented as examples:   
[These countries] provide peacekeepers to distant conflicts, contribute foreign aid 
to the world’s poorest countries, support global campaigns against landmines, 
work to enhance the role of women in peace and security, mediate conflicts, and 
broker peace accords. (Björkdahl, 2013, p. 322)  
Also, these states are most often presented as forerunners of political norms, as, for 
example, Wivel (2016) mentions, and their identities contribute to these successful 
policies. After analysing case studies discussing seven political agendas that are presented 
as norm entrepreneurship, it is possible to draw relevant theoretical arguments. The 
seven cases were Sweden promoting the norm of conflict prevention (Björkdahl, 2002, 
2013), Denmark’s advocacy to implement counterpiracy measures (Smed & Wivel, 2017), 
Norway’s role in the process of the Burundi country configuration and the promotion of 
the norms of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda (Tryggestad, 2014), Norway’s 
initiative in constructive engagement in Myanmar (Olsen, 2016), Scandinavia providing 
international aid, promoting multilateral peace talks and the norm of sustainability 
(Ingebritsen, 2006b). 
The cases show that to understand norm entrepreneurship we need to observe systemic 
factors, the role of the geopolitical situation of the actor, how identity influences the 
options and the ambitions a state may have in performing influential policies, why 
resources are important, how the capabilities to focus on areas have a role in successful 
policies, and why it is necessary to have a robust bureaucracy. Based on the Scandinavian 
cases, we can assert that only those small states are able to become norm entrepreneurs 
that possess specific capabilities, robust bureaucracy and ability to concentrate resources 




Regarding the system-level aspect of the Scandinavian success, it is essential to note that 
after the Second World War, Western liberal values were crucial to facilitating 
democratisation and development internationally (as in Japan), and the Scandinavian 
states are all committed to the Western liberal world order (Wivel, 2016). These countries 
regard the existing system-level organisations, such as the UN, as important 
(Thorhallsson, 2012, p. 147) because the organisations provide platforms to pursue their 
policies. Besides, “the value of equality for the long-serving Social Democratic Parties in 
the Nordic states may provide an ideological basis for supporting humanitarian and 
peacekeeping missions” (Thorhallsson, 2012, p. 146) which are organised mainly by the 
UN. 
The geopolitical situation of the Scandinavian states also had a role why they could 
become norm entrepreneurs. Ingebritsen (2006b, pp. 275-276) emphasizes these states 
could have remained aloof from international engagements, that their decision to “enter 
into military alliances has been a post–Second World War development.” This reflects that 
these states have not had to balance between great powers’ interests; they could perform 
their policies relatively independent from the constraints to consider the changing 
balance of great power relations.  
Concerning their identities, even within the liberal world order, the Scandinavian states 
have become unique, not only because they are among the most developed countries. 
They have broad expertise in the field of mediation in conflicts, social solidarity and 
tolerance. However, it is debated why they have engaged this deeply in international 
relations. On the one hand, there is the argument that describes the level of development 
of these states as something rooted in their unique social institutions. The so-called Nordic 
model (elsewhere it is called the Scandinavian welfare state) is a significant foundation to 
implement effective social and environmental protection policies. This feature has a more 
considerable significance, because  
[t]he prominence of social democratic institutions with ideologies of social 
partnership and a preference for consensus in policy making enables these states 
to maintain consistency as they seek to export their model abroad – in 
environmental policy-making, peace-keeping and international aid policy. 
(Ingebritsen, 2006b, p. 276)  
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On the other hand, there is the argument that although these states are forerunners of 
policies that became mainstream among small states in the EU and in international 
society, these states, at the same time, are rather inward-looking and interest maximising 
(Wivel, 2016).  
Importantly, without the intention to deeply engage in international issues, the 
Scandinavian state model might still serve as a reference point in norms for states to 
improve their institutions and social systems; these countries influence international 
politics by their examples. In Scandinavia, the signs of high development are well known 
already: the level of corruption is usually low – these states have a high score on the 
Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme, 2016). Similarly, 
concerning sustainability, these states have excellent rankings (Furlong, 2015; US.News, 
2017). On the other hand, there are problems as well: the high ratio of suicide attempts 
and alcoholism are symptoms of problematic social solidarity. Nevertheless, the 
Scandinavian countries are economically strong: their GDP per capita is much higher than 
the average of the EU; therefore, the economic motives to join the Union were and still 
are much weaker than they were in the case of Italy or Portugal, for instance. The 
countries’ high GDP per capita allows these states human and financial resources to 
establish effective diplomatic systems. 
As mentioned, the ambitions of the states are also relevant regarding to possible norm 
entrepreneurship agendas. We have to emphasise that since 1812, the declaration of the 
Swedish neutrality in European affairs, these countries gave up their intentions to invade 
others. They were already defeated in warfare, which helped them to discover types of 
policies other than expansion. However, they intend to maintain a sort of influence in 
world affairs. The lack of expansionist intentions, together with their relatively limited 
area of colonies and their intentions to maintain influence, jointly contributed to an 
excellent track record. They have been perceived as small states without a colonial legacy 
and have been expected to be more neutral when mediating in the affairs of other, often 
developing, states (Thorhallsson, 2012, p. 150) than other Western states. Given the 
opportunities in mediation, these states have received positive feedback that has further 
strengthened their position. It takes time to develop an image, but experience also comes 
with time, necessary to gain initiative and leadership skills (Thorhallsson, 2012, p. 151). 
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The ability to focus on niche areas is essential; simply because of the small size of 
economic resources Wivel (2016) regards these states as great powers in specific fields. 
The cases discussed above show how important it is for small states to select issue areas 
(niches) for foreign policy, and then concentrate the resources on those niche areas. In 
one of his lectures, Wivel himself jokingly mentions Iceland as a soccer great power,22 but 
the sports analogy is right – it shows how effective any state can become once focusing 
on a dedicated area. Wivel also mentions Sweden as moral great power because of its 
track record to oppose great powers in issues involving the violation of international law.  
Concerning sufficient resources, we have to highlight that the good track record in 
negotiations did have a role, but the countries’ high GDP/capita ratio has also been a 
factor in many cases. The wealthy features of the Scandinavian states were also taken into 
consideration when their mediation counselling was needed, as in case of the Burundi 
country configuration. Burundi did express its preference for inviting wealthy Nordic 
states because in that case it was quite likely the mediating country would invest 
financially to support the country in concern (Tryggestad, 2014). Wivel (2016) also 
confirms, although with a bit of irony, that to be a successful niche player in global politics, 
you have to be rich.  
To be rich solely cannot account for the Nordic success. The strong bureaucracy can also 
facilitate the preparation process for specific policies. For example, before its 
appointment to be a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), Sweden constructed a database of the issues on the agenda corresponding to the 
positions of the different members. Iceland made a catalogue of issues and analyses of 
principal subjects of discussion in the UNSC, and Norway included its universities and 
research institutes to collect all relevant information (Thorhallsson, 2012, p. 153).   
 
2.6. Criteria to recognize norm entrepreneurship 
After presenting the features of norms, what role norms play in international relations, 
norm dynamics and what expectations we may have when states act as norm 
 
22 At the time of his lecture, 27 June, 2016, Iceland was playing against England in the Euro 2016 football 
tournament, and eventually defeated England.  
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entrepreneurs, it is possible to present the criteria by which norm entrepreneurs can be 
identified.  
In the literature on norm entrepreneurship, there are divisions over the questions relating 
various issues. First, it is debated whether an actor that has authority and legislative 
power over the addressees of the proposed norm may be regarded as a norm 
entrepreneur. Similarly, scholars do not have agreements whether norm entrepreneurs 
follow only their self-interest or pursue policies based on altruism, ideational 
commitments, or simply on the beliefs that the norm is appropriate for others too. It is 
not straightforward whether policies, that are performed domestically can become the 
basis for international norm promotion or whether the latter requires specific efforts too, 
namely the mobilisation of resources for international norm promotion. Furthermore, it 
is debated whether the norm entrepreneur should necessarily be the initiator of a specific 
policy to promote norms performing the policies during norm emergence and norm 
cascade, or can these policies be performed also during the internalisation phase of the 
process of the spread of norms. Finally, it is also relevant to note that it is discussed 
whether the distortion from a norm might undermine the credibility of an actor that could 
have been regarded as a norm entrepreneur in specific policy areas (Björkdahl, 2013). 
To overcome the difficulties of the different understandings of norm entrepreneurship, in 
this section, the thesis elaborates a system of criteria to recognise norm entrepreneurs. 
The system of criteria defines the following five questions to be answered to decide 
whether an actor has been norm entrepreneur:  
- Relevancy of entrepreneurship: Whether the actor has no jurisdiction or legislative 
authority over the domain of the given policy agenda;  
- Ideology: Whether the actor has regarded the promoted norm(s) as appropriate 
for others; 
- Efforts: Whether the actor has mobilised resources and put efforts into promoting 
the norm(s) internationally; 
- Leadership: Whether the actor has been the first, or has been among the leading 
actors, that recognised and promoted the specific norm(s) in the first two stages 
of the norm life-cycle, until the norm cascade; 
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- Consistency: Whether the actor has been acting consistently with the norm(s) – 
this has particular relevance for states.  
The first four criteria can be derived from the definition of norm entrepreneurship, which 
states that it is a policy agenda with which an actor intends to achieve social change; 
therefore, the actor mobilises resources to promote the norm actively. 
The first criterion is related to the linguistic origins of the concept, norm entrepreneur. 
The concept includes the French word ‘entrepreneur,’ what translates as the ‘undertaker 
of a project’ (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 45). The word ‘entrepreneur’ also implies certain risks of 
failing to achieve the goals of the project. For this reason, the first criterion of the system 
requires us to exclude those actors that have authoritative power over the addressees of 
the norm, because they have legislative rights in their capacities, they do not need to 
convince the addressees, simply they are capable of prescribing the required ways of 
behaviour.  
Concerning ideology, it is important to note first that there is no policy without a well-
elaborated ideology. More importantly, it is necessary to study the ideology to 
differentiate those policies which are defined only by the actor’s interests from those that 
the actor regards as appropriate for the community to adopt. Although norm 
entrepreneurs may behave according to their interests (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 
897), however, they also have ethical considerations and the logic of appropriateness has 
a role in their thinking; they will also regard the norm(s) as appropriate for others (for 
every actor) to adopt. Therefore, it appears to be essential to check the ideological 
considerations of the actor.  
Often policy actors initiate agendas which are in line with their self-interest and seemingly 
do not contradict the interests of others. These policies may even be shown to be 
beneficial for many actors. For example, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) initiated the agenda of oversupply during 2014, with the justification 
that the policy was to secure their market share in fossil energy, mostly against the share 
of the producers of shale oil (Baffes, Kose, Ohnsorge, & Stocker, 2015). The cheap crude 
oil may benefit the consumers too. However, the actor, OPEC, did not intend to present 
that policy as appropriate for others and, practically, the policy could not have been 
considered as such because the climate change policies would require the gradual 
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limitations of fossil fuel exploitation, and the policy of cheap-oil contradicts with these 
aims.  
Regarding the role of the ideological criterion, there are two relevant arguments. First, 
this component of the system of criteria is applicable to justify norm entrepreneurs as 
being the ‘good guys’ in world politics. Often, scholars (Checkel, 2012, p. e.g. ) mention 
that there are ‘bad norm entrepreneurs’ too. However, unlike the ‘good guys’, generally 
these ‘bad guys’ do not attempt to present their ideologies as appropriate for others.23 
The most obvious example for this is the ideology of the current Hungarian Prime 
Minister, Viktor Orbán, who performs his ‘illiberal’ policies based on the ideology that he 
should protect the Christian values – and by doing this, he ignores those people who 
follow different religions (24.hu, 2019). In the cases when the ‘bad guys’ attempt to show 
that their policies are appropriate for all actors, they fail. For example, the President of 
the United States, who officially declared that for him ‘America is the first’ (CNN, 2017), 
addressed the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2019. In his speech 
he described that he was responsible primarily for the wellbeing of the Americans and he 
recommended other state leaders that they should follow similar approaches (PBS 
NewsHour, 2019). Although Trump argued that following self-interested approaches 
would lead to the best outcome internationally, it remained unanswered why this would 
happen.  
Second, although the criterion regarding the actor’s ideology requires that the actor 
should show that the proposed norm is appropriate for all actors; this criterion does not 
include the requirement that norm entrepreneurs should be committed to ideals. 
Terrorists may be so strongly committed to ideals that they even sacrifice themselves. 
However, they do not want to claim that their aims are generally appropriate, meanwhile 
it is expected that norm entrepreneurs should prove the general appropriateness of the 
proposed norms.  
The third criterion is the observation of the actor’s efforts to promote the norm. Regarding 
norm entrepreneurship, this involves research into how the actor took part in the various 
 
23 Concerning the choice between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism (Erskine, 2016, pp. 241-244), 
the thesis recommends cosmopolitanism. This is the consistent choice with the definition of norms 
(section 2.1) which are standards of appropriate behaviour for all actors. The proposed norms should be 
perceived as universally good (appropriate).  
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stages of the norm life-cycle, especially during norm emergence and cascade, when norm 
diffusion reaches the tipping point. In the norm internalisation stage, it is not the norm 
entrepreneur that has the crucial role; rather it is the other actors that build up 
professional personnel in their diplomatic and organisational bodies to secure the 
compliance with the new norm(s).  
Norm entrepreneurs are actors that build up the norms by defining them and delineating 
what the norms involve. They are the actors that communicate the norm to the other 
actors in the community and persuade them to accept it. In the observation of the actors’ 
efforts, scholars need to identify these elements of the actors’ policies. However, it is 
problematic to decide whether the efforts can be regarded as sufficient enough for 
international norm promotion. We can use a method to decide whether the efforts are 
sufficient for norm entrepreneurship which is similar to the decision over the size of a 
state (we recognize a small state when we see one). We know if an agenda shows strong 
efforts to promote a norm when we perceive those efforts as such.24 It is a decision that 
should be made on a case-by-case basis, and the decision should be based on the 
researchers’ perceptions over the policy in concern.  
However, there are certain clues to help make the decision. The norm entrepreneur builds 
up the norm by defining it and delineating what it comprises. They are the actors that 
communicate the norm to the other actors in the community to persuade them to accept 
it. During this communication, they call attention to the issues the norm addresses and 
create the alternative perceptions to existing behaviour. They describe the 
appropriateness of the proposed norm and the possible interests in complying with it. The 
analysis of the communication implies the observation of the relevant rhetoric and the 
communication tools the actor (the possible norm entrepreneur) applies. Various treaty 
documents, resolutions and declarations including soft declarations, rules and standards 
established by international organisations, should be analysed. Furthermore, it is also 
 
24 There are philosophical publications that explain why the quantity of a variable (size of an actor or the 
extent of the efforts in a policy agenda) cannot serve as a basis for qualitative judgement. The argument is 
included in the paradox of the sorites. This paradox asserts that when we climb a mountain we can decide 
whether we are still very low compared to the top or whether we are very high from the base level. 
However, it is impossible to decide which is the level that is the border between being very low and very 
high. For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon see Weber (2010).  
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relevant to observe statements by leaders and personal interviews should be conducted 
too to access information that might be informal but not official.  
The analysis of the communication of the actors is only one side of the empirical analysis: 
it refers to the question of how to analyse. The other side is the possible measurement of 
the extent of the actor’s role in promoting the norm concerned (what to analyse). There 
are two elements to identify this: the extension and the intensiveness of the policies. The 
extension of the various policies refers to whether a niche or a broad area is addressed by 
the proposed norm. The intensiveness of a policy agenda refers to questions such as how 
often and by which instruments the actor promoted the norm. This measurement involves 
the analysis of the available resources, platforms and the frequency of the norm-
promoting policies (the budgets of the government and the various departments of the 
government devoted for the purpose). For example, in supporting a human-rights norm, 
we may expect the issue to be raised within the United Nations, as it is the largest 
international governmental organisation. In the UN, the procedures require various 
documents to be composed. In promoting a norm, to propose a resolution (being the 
subscriber of a proposed resolution) is different from voting for it. Composing an entire 
human rights treaty is also different – it has a broader scope than a resolution or a 
declaration, and, furthermore, to be among the actors who are drafting the new treaty is 
different from proposing amendments to improve it, or just voting for it.  
The fourth element of the analysis is to assess whether the actor has been the first to raise 
the issues related to the norm, or if the actor has been at least among the leaders to 
promote and possibly establish the new norm. It is important primarily because we need 
to identify at which stage the norm life cycle is in the time of the policy efforts of the actor. 
Even though an actor has ideological reasons to promote the norm in concern, and 
performs extensive and intensive efforts to promote them, these efforts may not be 
regarded immediately as norm entrepreneurship, because the norm might not be in the 
norm-emergence or the cascade phase of the norm life cycle, but may already be in the 
internalisation stage. 
This criterion may appear as a restriction, but I argue that once a norm is beyond the 
tipping point in its spread, then the efforts to promote the norm are facing a different 
environment and these efforts are qualitatively different than before the tipping point. 
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Those actors who have not yet adopted the norm concerned face an environment where 
the majority of the states create pressure for them to adopt the norm, similarly as in the 
‘spiral model’ presented in section 2.3. Nevertheless, the agency to promote the norm 
may be relevant after the tipping point too because states may have adopted the norm 
only hypocritically and they are not performing steps to institutionalise the norms, and 
because even though the state performs all steps necessary to implement the norm, there 
is a point after which the state cannot take responsibility for individuals’ action. For 
example, in the case of gender equality, the states have an educational role, but the 
responsibility to apply the norm eventually falls upon the individuals in the community.  
The fifth question has been derived according to the arguments of one of the most 
important scholars in norm dynamics. Björkdahl (2013, p. 334) describes that consistency 
of the state’s policies with the promoted norm and with the ideals and values that are 
embodied in the norm is critical, because any distortions from these ideational 
phenomena related to the promoted norm might dilute the credibility of the norm 
entrepreneur and eventually discredit the agenda of norm entrepreneurship. The 
requirement to check whether the policies and actions of the actor have been consistent 
with the promoted norm, ideals and values, are especially relevant in the case of states. 
As presented in section 2.4, states have resources to perform specific policies and 
legislative power. Therefore, we can expect that a state should unilaterally act according 
to the proposed norm and become a leader by example. Similarly, to filter out whether 
the given policies are partly or entirely based on hypocrisy, we have to analyse thoroughly 
the consistency of the actors’ policies (states have both domestic and international 
responsibilities). Although this requirement of consistency has been elaborated for states, 
this requirement can be employed to analyse other actors (e.g. individuals, NGOs). 
It is relevant to note, first, that if an actor acts inconsistently with the promoted norm that 
is a direct contradiction. In the analysis of (in)consistency such direct contradictions shall 
rule out the actors as possible norm entrepreneurs. For example, if a state promotes 
‘conflict prevention’ but at the same time initiates a war, it is not possible to consider that 
actor as norm entrepreneur in promoting ‘conflict prevention’. Second, when the policies 
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of the actor are inconsistent with the ideals and values embodied in the promoted norm,25 
the researcher shall decide on a case by case basis, because the inconsistencies are not 
direct contradictions. This decision is rather complex, because it is not possible to set an 
objective and scientifically elaborated limit for this kind of (in)consistency.  This is the case 
not just because “it would be unrealistic to expect any state – or supranational entity – to 
be entirely consistent in its application of norms, especially given the tensions between 
different norms, and the tensions between norms and practicalities in international and 
internal politics” (Headley, 2015, p. 302). This evaluation is difficult because this 
inconsistency is a relation between phenomena identified by the process tracing, 
discourse analysis and the use of counterfactuals (see later in section 3.3.),26 and 
therefore it is qualitative by nature, so it is not possible to quantify. 
The empirical case studies by scholars, for example Björkdahl (2013) and Burford (2016), 
who addressed these kinds of inconsistencies, left us with puzzling examples. Björkdahl 
(2013) presented the inconsistency between Swedish arms exports and the promotion of 
the norm of conflict prevention; however, Björkdahl did not discredit Sweden as a norm 
entrepreneur. We can add that the Swedish arms exports may also serve purposes such 
as peace-keeping, which in principle may support the idea embodied in the conflict 
prevention norm. For this reason, theoretically, Sweden`s credibility in promoting conflict 
prevention shall not be ruled out.27  
In another example, Burford (2016) described how Canadian policymakers attempted to 
overcome the inconsistencies between the applied nuclear deterrence strategy within 
NATO and the advocacy for nuclear disarmament. Although Canada has been a member 
of NATO since the establishment of the organisation in 1949, as Burford presented it, 
Canadian politicians could perform credible advocacy for nuclear disarmament. Burford 
(2016, p. 81) mentions the vast Canadian uranium reserves, but he does not analyse the 
 
25 Practically, this is the case when someone complies with the text of the law but violates the ’spirit of the 
law’.  
26 The evidence for inconsistencies is the contradicting relation itself between facts which are found 
during the research process (to see the methods see sections 3.3. and 3.4.). 
27 There are philosophical papers, for example by Weber, Badia and Girard (2016) that describes the 
inconsistent truth tables which include conflicting variables. In those truth tables, the addition of further 
information may increase as well as decrease the overall level of inconsistencies. It is because the added 
new pieces of information may resolve the conflicts between variables, however, they can alsocreate new 
ones. In our example, the piece of information that Sweden might have exported weapons for 
peacemaking purposes may resolve the inconsistency between confllict prevention and arms export.  
60 
 
possible inconsistencies between the Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy and the 
fact that Canada was the largest uranium producer and exporter in the world until 2009 
(World Nuclear Association, 2019b). The size of Canada`s uranium exports creates a 
similar inconsistency to the one between Swedish arms export and promoting the norm 
of conflict prevention. However, the Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacies were still 
regarded as credible by Burford, regardless of the inconsistencies with the application of 
nuclear deterrence as a NATO member state and the volume of uranium export. The 
possible pieces of information of why it is possible to accept Burford’s position are that 
uranium exports can serve nuclear power exploration only and the disarmament advocacy 
attempted to decrease the tensions between great powers in 1983 and to challenge 
NATO’s first use doctrine in 1997, therefore, the policy of nuclear deterrence would have 
changed radically. 
To decide whether the policy in concern is consistent may rely on public opinion, but this 
approach also shows problems. For example, on 5 April 2009, the then US President 
Obama announced a strong commitment to disarmament in his speech in Prague (The 
White House, 2009) which was credible for policy makers (D. Higgie, personal 
communication, May 24, 2018), even though the United States had been continuously 
developing its nuclear arsenal. However, in 1983, the Canadian Government had to 
abandon its assistance to the United States for testing nuclear-capable cruise missiles over 
Canadian territory after the general public became aware of the secret programme 
because it would have compromised Canada`s image of supporting nuclear disarmament 
(Burford, 2016, pp. 136-149).     
Common sense might also be an option to address these inconsistencies. It may be 
surprising that common sense can be understood as an analytical tool in political science, 
but Waltz (1979, p. 131) also recommended the application of common sense to count 
the number of poles in an international system: “The question is an empirical one, and 
common sense can answer it.”  
Although I recommend using the researcher`s perceptions over these kind of 
inconsistencies (between ideals and actual practices), similarly to the perception over the 
size of a state or the volume of the efforts in norm promotion, it is relevant to remain 
cautious. The length of time during which the actor was inconsistent with the ideals and 
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values embodied in the proposed norms are relevant. Furthermore, it is also worth 
checking, for example, what the identified inconsistencies inform us about the 
motivations of the actor. The motivation of norm entrepreneurs should have reference to 
empathy, altruism, and commitment to the ideals embodied in the norm. In cases when 
the inconsistencies show that the actors have no such references in their motivation, it is 
possible to conclude that the criterion to be consistent with the requirement of norm 
entrepreneurship is not met, even retroactively. However, we can also identify that the 
actors have changed their policy agendas so that another ideal, which is regarded more 
appropriate than the previous one, has appeared in the policies. In this case, the former 
policy agenda can be considered as norm entrepreneurship, and a new policy agenda has 
been implemented which may later result in another programme of norm 
entrepreneurship. 
The previously described recommendation is based on the experience that once actors 
commit themselves to ideals, these commitments are replaced by other commitments 
which are developments compared to the previous commitments. The new commitments 
are regarded as more appropriate than the previous ones. An example is Germany’s 
commitment to peace after the Second World War when Germany decided to develop a 
non-military character of the country. After German unification in 1990, the political elite 
started the reconstruction of German identity. During the debates over what roles 
Germany should play in the new world order, concerning security issues, the growing 
demand for peace-making and peacekeeping by those security institutions in which 
Germany participated made German politicians rethink the possibilities when German 
defence forces could be deployed (Asmus, 1995). However, due to the legacy of the 
German attitude to peace, it took four years for the German political elite to contemplate 
the issue (Zehfuss, 2002) and finally decide that Germany should prefer those resolutions 
that do not involve military interventions. Had Germany ceased its commitment to peace 
in another way that would have raised the questions whether policy commitment had 
been credible retroactively.  
Beyond the five questions described in the preceding paragraphs, it may be relevant to 
consider whether success is a criterion for determining the extent to which an actor has 
been acting as norm entrepreneur. However, I argue that unsuccessful policies can be still 
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regarded as norm entrepreneurship, in case they comply with the criteria described 
earlier: the actor is still promoting the norm, the actor’s ideology may reflect the 
appropriateness of the norm, the actor is performing its efforts during the emergence and 
the cascade of the norm, and the actor is behaving consistently; however, whether the 
norm is accepted is a different question. The majority of norm entrepreneurship agendas 
are not successful (Breuning, 2013), and Checkel (2012) specifically warns that scholars in 
norm dynamics are inclined to focus on the successful policies, creating a positive bias 
within the literature. For this reason, the criteria recommended here do not include 
whether the policy in concern has been successful. By using this system of criteria, the 
unsuccessful policies can also be recognized as norm entrepreneurship, alleviating the 
problems of creating further cases with positive bias to the existing literature.  
 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the most important theoretical aspects of small states acting 
as norm entrepreneurs. First, the concept of norms has been clarified. Given that the 
differentia specifica of norms is that they are standards, the primary role of norms is 
regulating the actors’ behaviour. It has been argued that all norms are regulative, and they 
are constitutive to identities only to the extent that the actors adhere themselves to the 
norms. However, the ways how actors define themselves and their role identities cannot 
be derived from norms. Norms answer the questions of ‘how’ actors should behave. The 
international system and the actors in the system mutually constitute each other because 
norms have roles in defining the system due to their regulating roles.  
Because norms are all regulative, once adopted, they have direct effects on the actors’ 
behaviour. Therefore, causal link can be identified between the adoptions of norms and 
policy outcomes. However, the causal link cannot be proven between the adoption of 
norms and the change in the actors’ interests for various reasons, for example due to 
hypocrisy. Nevertheless, the role of norms is vital regarding the entirety of the system: 
they educate actors to pursue their interests in ways when they consider others too. For 
this reason, it is essential to decipher how international norms develop.   
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There is no agreement among scholars about how normative development takes place. 
Norms can change through coercive ways and non-coercive processes. The non-coercive 
processes vary according to the agents’ actions. When the agent develops its identity and 
consistently (re)presents it in the international political environment then that may trigger 
normative changes. However, this change does not happen through conscious efforts. 
When there are conscious efforts performed by an agent, to inspire change in social 
norms, that agenda is the process of norm entrepreneurship.  
The process of norm spread is best described in the cascade model, which has three 
phases: norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation. The phases of norm 
emergence and norm cascade are separated by the tipping point. Norm entrepreneurs 
have an essential role in the first two phases of the process. They raise the issues to be 
sorted out by implementing new norms, and they mobilise resources to promote the 
norms so that increasing numbers of states adopt the new norm. Although norm 
entrepreneurs act according to their interests, they also have motives such as empathy, 
altruism and commitments to ideals. It is important to note, the process how norms 
become institutionalised practices from ideas, can be reversed, and norms can regress.  
The agents who may become norm entrepreneurs vary and scholars tend to agree that all 
sorts of political actors can play the role of a norm entrepreneur. Most often, individuals 
with organisational platforms are presented as norm entrepreneurs, but there are case 
studies which discuss states as norm entrepreneurs too. In the case of states acting as 
norm entrepreneurs, it is difficult to identify the motivation of altruism, empathy or 
commitments to ideals. However, it is possible to present them as norm entrepreneurs. 
The commitments to certain ideals can lead states to perform policies, which are an 
essential ground for them to become norm entrepreneurs. However, sometimes the 
rhetoric regarding a policy can present different motivations than the actual ones, so 
hypocrisy may be present. Therefore, it may be challenging to identify whether a policy 
agenda is norm entrepreneurship in the case of states.    
Section 2.5 discussed how small states behave in international politics and why it is 
theoretically possible for them to influence world politics. Although the structural view of 
the international system asserts that small states are system-ineffectual, this view applies 
fully to military terms only. Given the nature of how ideas emerge, small states can have 
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creative ideas to innovate both economically and socially. By their responsible economic 
policies, these states can have influence and control over their economic success and 
development, but by employing creative innovations they can further secure their wealth. 
In terms of social ideas and creativity, these states can become intellectual leaders, norm 
setters and norm entrepreneurs. To be successful in these aspirations, they need to 
cultivate their capabilities to persuade others, which is power over opinion, and part of 
the actors’ soft power. In terms of power over opinion, the size of an actor is not related 
to its success, and this has effects on its economic power capabilities too, because small 
states are less tied to the balance of military power, they may even have more 
considerable latitude to promote creative social ideas and norms. 
Finally, in this chapter, a system of criteria to recognize norm entrepreneurs was 
developed. The system of criteria include recommendations to analyse five areas of the 
policy domain to learn whether the actor has authority over the addressees of the 
promoted norm, the ideology of the actor, the efforts to internationally promote the 
norm, the possible leadership role of the actor and the timing of the policies in terms of 
the phases of the spreading of the norm, and the consistency of the actor’s policies with 
the promoted norm. This system will be used in chapters 5 and 6 to examine the question 
of whether New Zealand has been a norm entrepreneur in relation to nuclear-free policies 







3. Methodology: recognising norm entrepreneurs 
The thesis addresses two policy areas, New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy and the 
country’s international trade policy. The primary purpose of the study is to decide 
whether and to what extent New Zealand has been acting as a norm entrepreneur in these 
policy areas. The research question is empirical; however, due to those varying 
understandings or the concept of norm entrepreneurship which have been presented 
earlier, it is rather complex to answer. The research question requires answering all those 
questions that are composed in the system of criteria to recognize the norm 
entrepreneur, which has been elaborated in section 2.5. 
The thesis applies and illustrates how the system of criteria can be used in analysing norm 
entrepreneur candidates. Although the research question does not necessarily imply the 
use of the case study method, the findings of the analyses can be understood as 
comparative case studies. Moreover, to explore the details to answer the research 
question, the complexity of the research is equivalent to that of case studies. 
Nevertheless, the exploration of details requires the use of process tracing which is also a 
typical building block of case studies. 
First, section 3.1 discusses the main considerations of the research design. Then, section 
3.2 describes the case selection process. In the third section, the presentation of the 
relevant methods follows, and this section discusses why process tracing, discourse 
analysis and the use of counterfactuals are relevant for the study. Then, the fourth section 
presents the data generation process and the necessary evidence for the study.   
 
3.1. Research design 
To answer the research question whether and to what extent New Zealand has been 
acting as norm entrepreneur in nuclear-free policy and promoting free trade 
internationally, the thesis employs a system of criteria to judge policy agendas if they can 
be regarded as norm entrepreneurship. This system of criteria has been presented in the 
previous chapter, in section 2.5. In the analyses of the two policy areas, according to this 
system of criteria, the thesis seeks answers for the following questions:  
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- Relevancy of entrepreneurship: Does (did) the actor have jurisdiction or legislative 
authority over the addressees of the norm(s) domain of the given policy agenda?  
- Ideology: Has the actor regarded and presented the promoted norm(s) as 
appropriate for others? 
- Efforts: To what extent has the actor mobilised resources and put efforts into 
promoting the norm(s) internationally? 
- Leadership: Has the actor been the first, or has been among the leading actors, 
who recognised and promoted the specific norm(s) in the first two stages of the 
norm life-cycle, until the norm cascade? 
- Consistency: Has the actor been acting consistently with the norm(s)?  
Regarding the first question, whether the actor has jurisdiction or legislative authority 
over the addressees of the norm, it is essential to note here that New Zealand does not 
have this kind of authority in the policy areas of nuclear-free policy and international 
trade. All the addressees of these norms are states which are all independent from New 
Zealand. For this reason, this question is not examined in any further detail. Therefore, 
the empirical chapters are divided into four sections and these sections discuss the 
questions of ideology, efforts, leadership and consistency in detail.  
The thesis is a case study of a small state potentially acting as norm entrepreneur; and 
within that it comprises two comparative cases. Beyond the primary purpose of this 
research, to decide to what extent New Zealand has been acting as a norm entrepreneur, 
the second purpose of the research is to show how this system of criteria can be applied 
to assess certain policy agendas. Owing to the complexity of the questions within the 
criteria to recognize norm entrepreneurs, the study requires a case study approach. The 
research complies with the definition of case studies. First, because it is an ‘attempt to 
understand and interpret a spatially and temporally bounded set of events,’ and the 
analyses are ‘instances of classes of events and the examinations of these aspects of 
historical episodes to develop explanations that may be generalizable to other events’ 
(Levy, 2008, p. 2). Second, the research includes two case studies: the case study of New 
Zealand nuclear-free policies to promote the nuclear-free norm and the case study of New 
Zealand promoting the norm of free trade. For this reason, we can identify the subjects 
and objects (Thomas, 2011, p. 511) of the analyses. The subjects of the analyses, the cases 
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themselves are New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy after the Second World War and the 
country’s trade policy in the same period. The analytical frame, the object of the studies 
is norm entrepreneurship. However, to an extent, the research can be understood as 
historical study too, given the length of the periods in the analyses and because case study 
design is closely associated with historical studies (Burnham, Lutz, Grant, & Layton-Henry, 
2008, p. 64).    
To a certain extent the thesis is based on an outcome-centric research design. Outcome-
centric designs focus on the explanations of specific outcomes of policy agendas 
(Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 8). To show this it is sufficient to signal that the 
question of whether New Zealand has been a norm entrepreneur in nuclear-free policies 
and internationally promoting free trade stems from the recognition of the success of 
New Zealand and the country’s diplomacy in these policy areas and the research is also 
motivated by the question of why New Zealand has become well known in these policy 
areas.  
One of the advantages of case studies is that they allow the researcher to draw theoretical 
conclusions from the cases, they are applicable for generalisations. Concerning the 
difficulties in summarising the findings of case studies Flyvbjerg (2006, pp. 239-241) notes 
that case studies shall not be summarised, they should be read in their entirety. However, 
this entirety, the case itself is sufficient for generalisations. Since the analysis addresses 
various questions, the answers to these questions and the findings of the analysis whether 
New Zealand has been a norm entrepreneur in certain policy areas provide grounds to 
further theoretical inquiries. In the thesis I highlight two interrelated hypothesis tests 
based on the research and one comparative analysis of the two cases.  
The first hypothesis test is related to the question whether small states are independent 
in their foreign policy choices. The theory on small states discusses the risks and 
challenges for small states cautiously choose partners, making commitments towards 
great powers and forming alliances. Because the influence of great powers can either be 
waxing or waning, small states need to be careful in their choices with which great power 
they align in their policies (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 451). This creates the constraint for small 
states to balance among great powers’ interests. Regarding this argument of the literature 
on small states, New Zealand’s unique geographic location, the considerable distance 
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from possible conflict zones causes the country to be perceived as the least-likely case in 
terms of the presence of this constraint. Small states that are located in the great powers’ 
buffering zones are likely to be exposed to the constraint to choose their allies cautiously 
because the changing great power relations may eventually endanger their positions. In 
case New Zealand also has to face this constraint to balance between great powers’ 
interests, then we can draw the theoretical conclusion that small states cannot have 
entirely independent foreign policies because they always need to consider great powers’ 
interests too in their international dealings. And, concerning norm entrepreneurship, if 
small states need to consider the interests of great powers when elaborating their foreign 
policies, this constraint has far-reaching consequences because it limits small states’ 
potential to perform norm entrepreneurship programmes.  
While the first hypothesis test focuses on small states’ independence in foreign policy, the 
second hypothesis test is more closely related to norm entrepreneurship. Practically, the 
thesis itself is directly testing the hypothesis of the literature on small states whether 
these states can act as norm entrepreneurs. As described in Chapter 2, for small states 
acting as a norm entrepreneur is a foreign policy option to influence international 
relations. However, so far, the number of convincing case studies about small states acting 
as norm entrepreneurs is very limited1 and only the Scandinavian countries were 
presented as such. The limited number of case studies implies that for small states, the 
chance to become a norm entrepreneur may be minimal by various constraints. One of 
the arguments why Scandinavian states could become norm entrepreneurs was the 
states’ remote geopolitical location (Ingebritsen, 2006b, p. 275). Concerning remote 
geopolitical locations, New Zealand is in an extreme position, given that the country is 
situated probably the most far away from conflict zones. Therefore, regarding the role of 
geopolitical location, New Zealand is a so-called ‘most-likely’ case, where the probability 
of a small state becoming a norm entrepreneur can be the largest. In case New Zealand 
cannot be regarded as a norm entrepreneur then we can conclude that the option for a 
small state to become a norm entrepreneur is not viable even in the most protected area 
of the globe.  
 
1 During the research for the thesis, among the (more than 40) case studies on norm entrepreneurs, there 
were 9 discussing small states as norm entrepreneurs. 7 of these 9 were about the Scandinavian countries.  
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The thesis elaborates two case studies that are applicable for a comparative case study. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I discuss two sets of events, one within the nuclear-free policy and 
the other regarding international trade policy. The cases will likely provide observations 
that can be applied for generalisations about the most important patterns of a small state 
acting as a norm entrepreneur. 
 
3.2. The selection of policy areas for the case studies 
The primary purpose of the thesis is whether New Zealand has been acting as a norm 
entrepreneur. Concerning New Zealand’s foreign policy there are various policy areas that 
‘shine’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) and are held in high regard all of which may serve as a good basis 
for analysing norm entrepreneurship. Altogether, I have considered four policy areas as 
possible subjects for the research.  
First, we have to mention the country’s nuclear-free policies. Since the beginning of the 
1950s, when the US nuclear tests started to take place in the Marshall Islands, civilian 
pressure groups raised their concerns about the use of nuclear weapons, and scientists 
also expressed their worries (Holloway, 2011, p. 15). Between the early 1950s and the 
mid-1960s, the New Zealand Government intended to maintain the country’s 
relationships with its allies and did not perform antinuclear advocacy. After the French 
Government announced its intentions to carry out nuclear tests on Muroroa Atoll in 1966, 
the New Zealand Government started to participate in nuclear disarmament protests. For 
example, in 1973, New Zealand submitted a case against France at the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) to find a resolution to stop the French atmospheric tests. Because France 
refused to appear at the ICJ and went on with atmospheric testing, the New Zealand 
Government led by Prime Minister Norman Kirk (1972-74) sent a frigate, the Otago, to 
visit the test sites and raise international public awareness against nuclear tests 
(McKinnon, 1993, p. 189). The Fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) established the 
country’s nuclear-free status by banning nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable ships from 
New Zealand’s ports. The hard test of this policy took place in early 1985, after the USS 
Buchanan, a guided-missile carrier requested port entry to New Zealand. In February 
1985, the Fourth Labour Government denied the Buchanan’s request (Hensley, 2013, pp. 
102-104). The denial triggered a series of events concluding with the United States ceasing 
70 
 
the security obligations for New Zealand within ANZUS in 1986. Later in 1987, the New 
Zealand Parliament adopted the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms 
Control Act 1987 (Nuclear Free Zone Act), which was the legalisation of the policy 
(Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2013). Burford (2016, pp. 97-105) calls the period of the 
Fourth Labour Government as the internalisation of an antinuclear New Zealand identity 
by which New Zealand presented itself on the floor of world politics (Dalby, 1993; Hensley, 
2013, p. x). After the internalisation of the antinuclear identity, New Zealand continuously 
participated in nuclear-disarmament advocacy, and even the US diplomacy acknowledged 
New Zealand’s efforts against nuclear proliferation in 2008 when the then US secretary of 
state, Condoleezza Rice, visited New Zealand (Taylor, 2008). 
Second, New Zealand’s international trade policy shows significant achievements during 
the last decades. In 1983, Australia and New Zealand signed the documents to create the 
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) (Scollay, 
2018, p. 124). This agreement contained the facilitation of trading goods and services and 
the movement of capital investments and workforce among the countries (MFAT, n.d.-f). 
Therefore, based on these features, it created the first common economic market among 
states, because the European Economic Community created the Single European Market 
later, in 1986. Another significant achievement is the Singapore-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement that was signed in 2000 (MFAT, n.d.-h), and this was the first concluded free-
trade agreement (FTA) in the Asia-Pacific region (Scollay, 2018, p. 131). Furthermore, 
China agreed to make a FTA with New Zealand in 2004, which can be attributed to New 
Zealand’s concessions to China regarding the Chinese entry to the WTO. Later, New 
Zealand became the first developed country to sign a FTA with China in 2008 (MFAT, n.d.-
g; Scollay, 2018, p. 134). The signing of this agreement was a result of several years’ 
diplomatic efforts. New Zealand was the first state that had a bilateral accord on China’s 
WTO accession and the first state to recognize China as a market economy (B. J. Lynch, 
2007, p. 25). Beyond all these achievements, it is essential to mention that New Zealand’s 
trade experts are highly regarded. The United Kingdom, for example, hired a New 
Zealander, Crawford Falconer, to help with the post-Brexit trade negotiations (Wallace, 
2017) and as a recognition of New Zealand’s commitment to free trade, Mike Moore, the 
former Labour Prime Minister in 1990 was elected to be the Director-General of the WTO 
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for the period between 1999 and 2002 (Moore, 2010, 2017). Furthermore, the trade 
agreements are highly ranked; for example, the Singapore-Chile-New Zealand and Brunei 
Darussalam FTA (P4) which came into force in 2006 (MFAT, n.d.-j) provided the basis for 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) trade talks (C. Daniels, 2008). 
Third, New Zealand has a remarkable track record in promoting human rights. Alongside 
other small states, New Zealand played a critical role during the establishment of the 
United Nations to promote the incorporation of human rights into the United Nations 
Charter at the Conference at San Francisco, and the state also contributed to the 
elaboration of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (Aikman, 1998; 
McGregor, Bell, & Wilson, 2016, p. 12). Furthermore, the self-perception and the belief 
that New Zealand is a strong supporter and promoter of human rights both domestically 
and internationally was recently reinforced between 2002 and 2006 when New Zealand 
was facilitating the UN negotiations drafting the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) (McGregor et al., 2016, p. 12). New Zealand often co-sponsors so-called 
thematic approaches on the violations of human rights, for example, cases involving 
torture, involuntary disappearances, and detention without trials. Also, the state usually 
contributes to funding specific programmes such as to support the victims of torture or 
the rights of indigenous people. Besides, in the field of human rights, New Zealand often 
provides advisory services and technical assistance. (Fawthorpe, pp. 103-107). In practice, 
New Zealand has expressed its intentions to promote and secure human rights on many 
occasions. After 1990, all the 28 international deployments of the New Zealand Defence 
Forces (New Zealand Government, 2016, p. 20) were to serve humanitarian aims. 
Scholars, such as Jackie True and Maria Tanyag (2018), also mention that, based on the 
actual political practices, the country has developed an image of commitment to foster 
human rights internationally, given New Zealand’s bicultural and clean and green identity. 
Last but not least, it is important to acknowledge that the performance of New Zealand’s 
diplomats in human rights negotiations is also highly respected. The practice of 
delegations reflects thorough preparation: the texts and drafts are immaculate and the 
delegations are rhetorically active, and self-reflective (McGregor et al., 2016, p. 202).  
Finally, fourth, I have considered analysing the country’s environmental politics as a 
possible candidate for norm entrepreneurship. The reason for this was that the country 
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has a clean and green image (Ministry for the Environment, 2001). The country makes 
conscious efforts to protect the environment. The area of natural parks is significant. It is 
over 30% of the land territory of the country (IndexMundi, 2014). There are many 
important initiatives for environmental protection, such as the plans to create a marine 
reserve around the Kermadec Islands (Ministry for the Environment, n.d.), and more 
recently the ban of plastic bags from grocery stores (Ministry for the Environment, 2019). 
However, the image of ‘Clean and Green’ New Zealand is related to the nuclear-free policy 
(Kaefer, 2016), so the import of this analysis would be limited. For this reason, this option 
was dropped at the early stage of the research.  
We can differentiate three ways of case selection techniques: purposive, pragmatic and 
random (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Although there are at least four policy areas in 
New Zealand which may serve as a basis for analysing norm entrepreneurship (see above), 
this number is limited so the random sampling technique cannot be employed. The 
limitations of the thesis do not allow analysing all areas; for this reason, as in pragmatic 
case selection terms, I have reduced the number of analysed areas to two.  
According to the second purpose of the thesis, namely, to present how the system of 
criteria to recognise the norm entrepreneur can be applied to assess particular policy 
agendas, I have chosen to observe the antinuclear policy and the international trade 
policy. The decision was based on the motivation to show the differences in the actor’s 
(the New Zealand Government) motivations and ideologies in elaborating these policies. 
While the key motivations to perform the antinuclear policy are related to moral 
considerations and ideological commitments, the international trade policy appears to be 
a policy based on strong economic interests. Concerning the antinuclear policy, Norman 
Kirk expressed his orientation to morality and one senior member of his government, 
Frank Corner once outlined that Kirk “would prefer New Zealand not to be defended at all 
than to be defended by nuclear weapons” (cited by Burford, 2016, p. 110). On the other 
hand, before the research, New Zealand’s trade policy seemed mostly self-interested. The 
country can consume only about 5% of its agricultural production, which creates a strong 
motivation to seek export markets. For this reason, at first glance, the nuclear-free policy 
and the trade policy seemingly showed a significant difference in terms of the motivations 
and ideological considerations of the actor, so analysing the two policies may offer broad 
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academic import, especially with respect to the relevance of the second criterion in the 
analytical system, the ideology of the actor.  
Concerning the case selection for comparative case studies, scholars such as Shively 
(2011, pp. 107-109) warn that researchers should not select cases based on the 
dependent variable. For the thesis, the policy areas were selected also because they 
appear good candidates to be considered norm entrepreneurship. Therefore, the two 
cases may appear such as they were selected based on the dependent variable, which 
may be problematic. However, the outcome of the analysis of whether the policies are 
regarded as norm entrepreneurship was not known before the research and the main 
effects of the policies are also different. For this reason, the possible problem of selecting 
cases based on the dependent variable is largely alleviated. Thanks to this alleviation, the 
cases are ‘most-similar’ in terms of the policy actor and the period of the events. The 
independent variables, the two policy areas, nuclear-free policy and international trade 
policy, are the different variables only. It is possible to understand the two policy areas as 
they are related to different forms of power. The nuclear-free policies are related to 
security issues; therefore, it can be regarded as the policy area where military power has 
primacy. Meanwhile, free trade policy can be perceived as the policy area where 
economic power dominates international relations. For this reason, the thesis can bring 
insights in which arena small states can have a larger influential role – if at all – through 
norm entrepreneurship. 
 
3.3. Constructivist methods: process tracing, discourse analysis, and 
counterfactuals 
To improve the coherence and rigidity of constructivist research, Lupovici (2009) 
recommends scholars to apply process tracing, discourse analysis, and counterfactuals in 
their studies. To varying extents, this thesis applies all three methods. Among the three 
methods, in the thesis, process tracing is the most dominant and comprehensive. 
Meanwhile, during the research I did not perform systematic discourse analysis; however, 
some aspects of discourse analysis were applied. Similarly, the use of counterfactuals was 
not comprehensive either, but this method has roles in some specific research aspects.  
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By definition, process tracing is more than historical research, because it is not only the 
activity to investigate past events systematically to provide an account of happenings, but 
indeed a “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of 
research questions and hypothesis posed by the investigator” (Collier, 2011, p. 823). 
Scholars tend to emphasise that process tracing is the primary tool to analyse causal 
mechanisms (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 13), and case studies rely on process tracing to 
better understand the phenomena of interest (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 10). 
However, in this thesis, process tracing provides the ground to identify the key elements 
and critical junctions in policy agendas rather than describes the causal mechanisms 
between variables, because in the thesis the inquiry is outcome-centric. In this sense, I 
seek to find the reasons for specific policy outcomes, and in this research, I need to remain 
open to unlikely possibilities too. Therefore, in the thesis there is no presupposed causal 
link. In this sense, the thesis follows a descriptive approach besides illustrative purposes.   
As described in Chapter 2, norms are standards of appropriate behaviour and, as 
standards, they are ideational. Because of this, it is impossible to observe them; therefore, 
for constructivist scholars it is a challenge how to trace the process of the spread of a 
norm. As Wendt (1999, p. 5) describes, “the observation of the unobservable is always 
theory-laden.” However, during the phases of the norm life-cycle, there are phenomena 
that are observable. Therefore, it is possible to describe the process of the norm life-cycle 
with high accuracy. There is only one stage in the whole process when the norm is merely 
a thought in someone’s mind when it is impossible to trace it. However, if possible, the 
inventor of the norm can be interviewed about the time when he/she first started thinking 
about the norm, so it is possible to gather information about the initial stages too.  
If the interview is not possible, memoirs or people who could have had contact with the 
person involved in the invention of a norm may have memories about the first occasions 
when the inventor of the norm mentioned his/her idea of a new norm. If these people are 
not able to provide information, and the norm was not written in any form, it is impossible 
to trace it – the idea remained only a thought. Once a norm is discussed, and there is 
written conversation or open and documented debate about the norm, it is possible to 
follow the development of the conversation regarding the norm. 
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After the discussion about a norm is finished, there is a decision about the norm. It is at 
this point when a community adopts or rejects a norm. The decision can be documented 
too. After the decision to adopt the norm, there are steps to establish the norm into 
practice. The steps of the implementation can be traced as well. When the norm is 
implemented into practice, it becomes an applied norm, while until implementation, it is 
still an emerging norm. When the norm is applied, the behaviour of the actors does 
represent it. Also, more importantly, the behaviour that reflects the norm is traceable. 
So there is an important difference: the norm itself is not traceable, but the steps of the 
discussions regarding the norm, the decision, the steps to implement it, and the practices 
which represent the norm are all traceable. For this reason, process tracing can reveal the 
critical elements of those policies that aim to promote a new norm. To answer the 
research question, process tracing was applied to develop the main argument of the 
thesis. This technique provided the main body of information with respect to the 
questions about the ideologies of the actor, about the efforts to promote the norm, and 
about the status of the norm life-cycle, and process tracing was the key to identify those 
policy elements that may have been inconsistent regarding the norm promotion efforts.  
Besides process tracing, to answer specific questions of the research design, I applied 
some recommendations of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is the systemic analysis 
of talks and texts and it is associated with post-structuralism which claims that foreign 
policy is performed through discourses (Hansen, 2012). However, the post-structuralist 
view according to which foreign policy is performed through discourses is not acceptable 
because there are other steps as well in diplomacy. For example, there are common 
celebrations and undocumented, informal meetings. Nevertheless, analysing talks and 
texts is indeed an excellent tool to identify how the actors define their own identities, how 
they frame what is essential for them too, and how they ideologize policy actions. In the 
thesis, process tracing is mainly based on textual analysis which is supported by discourse 
analysis too. However, in the thesis, the central role of discourse analysis is to outline the 
perceptions of the actors in given situations and the ideological considerations behind 
various policy decisions.  
The method of counterfactuals is a tool that evaluates “theories through the exploration 
of events that did not happen” (Lupovici, 2009, p. 203). This is an analysis of questions 
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such as what would have happened if a particular event or case had taken place. This tool 
is useful in developing arguments too. In the thesis I used this method on various 
occasions. Most importantly, I applied it to answer questions regarding the ideologies of 
the actors in the policy areas of observation and to decide if the policies were consistent 
with the promoted norms. As described in the previous chapter, norm entrepreneurship 
is based on motivations like the actors’ commitments to ideals, altruism and empathy. 
According to these factors, it is possible to outline what an ideology behind a specific 
policy might include or what courses of actions the actors would perform. In case an 
ideology is not based on a commitment to certain ideals, on altruism or empathy, then 
the ideology can be described as inconsistent with the attributes of norm 
entrepreneurship.    
  
3.4. Source materials and data generation 
In the research, the primary goal was to find answers to the research questions and to 
identify the facts and the evidence that support the answers. The two main ways to gather 
information were analysing texts and conducting interviews so that I could outline the 
courses of events. Regarding the textual analysis, first I used the secondary literature, the 
relevant analytical papers, about New Zealand`s foreign policy to study the most 
important ideas of the explanatory factors of the country`s foreign affairs. Although the 
theoretical literature on documentary analysis suggests that it is not possible to get an 
unbiased view of certain political events through the study of the secondary sources 
(Burnham et al., 2008; Peräkylä, 2005), I believe that they are useful for two reasons. First, 
similarly to newspapers, these sources can reflect general public perceptions regarding 
various policies and they can provide contextual information (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 
194). Second, after a crosscheck in other secondary and primary sources, the events 
referred to in these sources can contribute to delineate the chain of events for the process 
tracing.  
Beyond the secondary sources, I also analysed primary sources: speech recordings (either 
printed or electronic), policy documents, legal documents such as domestic regulations 
and international treaty documents, and broadcasted interviews with public officials. In 
this activity, I perceived the texts as the tools of performing policies, but I did not fully 
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accept the poststructuralist view on public documents. Poststructuralists believe that 
foreign policy can be best understood by textual analysis because foreign policy is built up 
predominantly by discursive practices and these discourses construct identities (Hansen, 
2012). There are other practices, not just written communications.  However, it is 
acceptable that texts have roles in constructing identities, meaning and policies. The 
various forms of political communication are also actions which are structurally organised, 
and they create and maintain the intersubjective reality (Peräkylä, 2005, pp. 872-876).  
The crucial role of texts in this research was to provide pieces of evidence for policy 
developments. Therefore, the primary documents were perceived as facts in themselves 
(Burnham et al., 2008, p. 188) and also representations of facts. The texts point to events 
and phenomena in the policy area and analysing them helps the researcher to understand 
all those meanings and presuppositions that constitute the world of the policy actors 
(Peräkylä, 2005, p. 870). However, I maintained a certain distance from the primary 
sources, mainly because the meanings of their content are partially coded. However, in 
this analysis I could rely on my experience working at a Hungarian governmental agency 
between 2010 and 2015, when I was working at a government institute in Hungary, 
similarly to Björkdahl (2002, pp. 36-37) I had the chance to learn how to read policy 
documents and how to decipher the meanings in between the lines.   
To supplement the textual analysis, during the research, I have conducted interviews with 
important policymakers and professionals between 1 February and 30 June 2018. The 
interviews, as the theory recommends in the case of one-on-one interviews, were 
unstructured queries with open-ended questions (Fontana & Frey, 2005, pp. 705-708). 
The interviewees were selected to represent both leading parties, the National Party and 
the Labour Party in order to obtain sufficient information to synthesise most aspects 
available for the various policies. The permission to conduct interviews was approved by 
the Human Research Ethics Committee at University of Otago. Among the participants 
were a former Prime Minister, a former National Party candidate for Prime Minister, a 
former Minister for Disarmament, current officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, a former Chief Commissioner of the New Zealand Human Rights Commission and 
an academic, who was formerly a political activist. Moreover, three other participants 
contributed to the studies by providing essential pieces of information, but they decided 
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to remain anonymous. Although the overall experience with approaching New Zealand 
politicians is very positive and they are indeed kindly engaging with interested students 
for interviews, I had to face challenges with organising these events to discuss mainly 
open-ended questions. For example, former Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer was working 
abroad during the time of the interviews. Phil Goff, former Minister for Disarmament and 
Arms Control did not want to participate. And finally, former Prime Ministers, Mike 
Moore, Helen Clark and John Key did not respond to the requests for interviews.  
The interviews, in line with the expectations, provided valuable insights into the 
ideological considerations of the policymakers. Without the interviews, it would be 
impossible to obtain essential data regarding the background of the policy processes. 
Also, the politicians and officers could provide valuable insights into the processes of 
various diplomatic channels, such as the internal processes of the UN and the WTO. 
Furthermore, given the interviewees were open to discuss their impressions about other 
state diplomats’ intentions and arguments, the interviews also provided additional 
information about the norm life-cycles, both concerning nuclear disarmament and free 
trade policies.   
Although the interviews can be regarded as successful in elaborating the arguments, I 
faced the typical problems that might arise in interview situations. Because my mother 
tongue is not English, one of the expected difficulties, misunderstandings (Fontana & Frey, 
2005, p. 702) arose with a higher likelihood. For this simple reason, all the interviewees 
had the opportunity to read the texts to check the references for their arguments, and 
they could further clarify and supplement their arguments. Also, the response effects (the 
interviewees attempt to provide socially desirable answers) and the other possible error, 
the falsely recalled events (Fontana & Frey, 2005, p. 702) happened on several occasions. 
According to my prior experience as a journalist between 2004 and 2007, the response 
effects have particular relevance in case of politicians: regarding those events that may 
have harmful effects on their reputations, politicians create alternative explanations 
which cannot be traced. Therefore, the answers had to be assessed critically and 





Finding the answer for the research question, to what extent New Zealand has been a 
norm entrepreneur, requires analysing five areas of the policies in concern. These areas 
are the policy domain to learn whether the actor has authority over the addressees of the 
promoted norm, the ideology of the actor, the efforts to internationally promote the 
norm, the possible leadership role of the actor and the timing of the policies in terms of 
the phases of the spreading of the norm, the consistency of the actor’s policies with the 
promoted norm. Because the authority of New Zealand over other states in the 
international system is excluded, the empirical chapters that address the New Zealand 
nuclear-free policy and the state’s international trade policy are divided into four sections. 
The four sections address the ideology, the efforts, the leadership and the consistency of 
the actor concerning the given norms. 
Because the thesis has a purpose to show how the system of criteria to recognise norm 
entrepreneurs shall serve future researches, New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy and the 
state’s international trade policy were selected, because these areas may show significant 
differences in the actor’s ideologies. In this sense, the case studies serve an illustrative 
approach. However, the complexity of the questions makes it possible that the case 
studies themselves can provide bases for theoretical analyses too.  
The thesis comprises two hypothesis tests, and one comparative case study to analyse the 
effects of small states’ international advocacies. Owing to New Zealand’s unique 
geopolitical situation, as Mike Moore defined it as the ‘luxury of distance’ (cited by 
Catalinac, 2010, p. 332), New Zealand can be accounted as an extreme case. Therefore, 
the country is an excellent case to test whether small states have independence in their 
foreign policies. For the same reason, the country is also an excellent case to test whether 
small states can become norm entrepreneurs in which scholars, such as Ingebritsen 
(2006b) and Viwel (2016) argue that remote location has a role. Although it has been 
argued in section 2.5 theoretically that small states can influence global politics, the two 
cases bring essential insights to what extent small states’ influence through intellectual 
leadership and norm entrepreneurship can affect international relations.  
For the analyses, the methods of process tracing, discourse analysis and the tool of 
counterfactuals were selected. The data generation included the reading of secondary 
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and primary sources. During the research, it was possible to conduct seven interviews by 
names with politicians and experts and three anonymous interviews.  
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4. New Zealand as a foreign policy actor 
New Zealand’s diplomacy is highly regarded among experts. The Portland Soft Power 30 
rankings (2019) published by the USC1 Center on Public Diplomacy lists New Zealand 
among the best countries in the World. The World Happiness Report (Helliwell, Layard, & 
Sachs, 2019) also ranks New Zealand in an excellent position. Although these qualitative 
ratings always contain arbitrary measures to assess the countries’ governmental and 
diplomatic capabilities quantitatively, New Zealand`s foreign policy has important 
features to analyse. 
In this chapter, New Zealand’s foreign policy behaviour is described and I analyse to what 
extent the state’s foreign policy matches the predictions and recommendations of small 
state theory. First, I describe New Zealand’s self-perception, then I present the factors 
which influences the country’s foreign policy. In the final section (4.5), I analyse why the 
country’s ambitions can provide a good background for norm entrepreneurial politics.  
The analysis suggests that New Zealand is active internationally, and the country prefers 
multilateral platforms to pursue its interests. New Zealand’s performance on these 
platforms shows the country is a good international citizen which is committed to the 
rules based international order. Nevertheless, New Zealand’s political features, such as 
biculturalism and the country’s ambitions to establish an internationally respected 
identity also provide good examples for other states to follow.   
 
4.1. The New Zealand identity and the country’s mission 
New Zealand is a relatively young country. The first inhabitants of the country were 
Melanesian Moriori (King, 2003, pp. 35-45) followed by the Polynesian Māori who 
migrated to New Zealand about 800 years ago (Patman, 2005, p. 7). After the European 
discoveries,2 whalers, missionaries and traders arrived in the first decades of the 
nineteenth century and paved the way for settlers from the United Kingdom. New Zealand 
as a nation was constituted by the Treaty of Waitangi on 6th February 1840 (Archives New 
 
1 University of Southern California 
2 Abel Tasman reached the shores of New Zealand on 13 December 1642. He is considered to be the first 
European explorer of New Zealand (New Zealand History, n.d.-a).  
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Zealand, n.d.). Both the origins of the state and its historical path shaped New Zealand’s 
identity as a foreign policy actor.  
Regarding the state’s origins, the first and most important feature of the New Zealand 
identity is the indigenous-settler biculturalism (MacDonald, 2018, p. 70), in which Māori 
and Pakeha live together in the country as equal cultures. This foundation of the state was 
laid down in the Treaty of Waitangi. The bicultural character of the country provides New 
Zealand with specific sensitivity and affinity to address the issues of equality of individuals 
or cultures. The equality of individuals and cultures is the main principle behind human 
rights. Although there were violations of the Treaty by the British Crown and Māori people 
have faced severe social deprivation until recently (Bureau of Democracy, 2010; McGregor 
et al., 2016; NewsHub, 2018a), after 1972, with the ratification of the first UN Human 
Rights Treaty and the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) (United Nations, n.d.), New Zealand made specific efforts to 
mitigate Māori deprivation. The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975 by the Treaty 
of Waitangi Act 1975 (Waitangi Tribunal, 2018) and reparations were paid to Māori iwi 
(The Office For Maori Crown Relations, 2019, p. 10).  
Owing to the specific sensitivity of New Zealand for equality, the state took a pivotal role 
in drafting the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples (Patman & Iati, 
2018; True & Tanyag, 2018). Tolerance towards cultural and other differences stemming 
from bicultural origins has had relevant social and foreign policy implications. For 
example, besides English, the mother tongue of the descendants of the Anglo-Saxon 
settlers, Te Reo Māori became the second official language of the country in 1987 
(MacDonald, 2018, p. 70). As a representation of the inclusive social attitude in New 
Zealand, in 1996, sign language became New Zealand’s third official language (United 
Nations, 2008). It is possible that the number of official languages may increase further. 
Although 74% of the population was still British in 2013, as the Asian economic region has 
become more important globally, New Zealand has experienced Asian and Polynesian 
migration in the recent decades (Butcher, 2018, pp. 83-84). The changing demography of 




New Zealand’s temperate climate attracted settlers from the mother country, Great 
Britain, and it allowed extensive sheep farming  which was a significant component of the 
economy until 1987 when dairy farming began to take over (Stringelman & Peden, 2008). 
The recent report of the Ministry for Primary Industries (2019, p. 2), the Situation and 
Outlook for Primary Industries presents that in 2018, the volume of dairy exports was 
16,655 million New Zealand Dollar (NZD), which is a significant part of the country’s GDP 
total of 300 billion NZD (Statistics New Zealand, 2019a). Dairy farming is relevant to the 
nation’s food security (Rowe, 2015), therefore any international developments that affect 
the industry have foreign policy implications as well. In April 2016, during the domestic 
debates of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), Labour’s Trade and Export 
Growth Spokesperson, David Clark questioned the Chief Negotiator for the TPPA. The final 
question he raised was whether there had been any bottom line for dairy (New Zealand 
Labour Party, 2016).    
There is another specific of the New Zealand identity which is related to farming: the 
‘Number 8 wire mentality’3 which is also called ‘Kiwi ingenuity’. This concept refers to 
creativity, a `can do attitude` in practical matters, to think simply to solve matters. The 
most likely origin of this phenomenon is the early settlers` isolation from England, where 
the settlers had to travel for spare parts for their tools (Motovated PE, n.d.). However, 
there were other factors that facilitated the ‘Kiwi ingenuity.’ The settlers, who took the 
courage to travel this far from England, had an adventurous attitude, and they were 
motivated to find ways to provide for themselves. Local Māori, especially in the South 
Island, were happy to trade skills as well.  
This creative mind-set resulted in various Kiwi inventions, such as bungy jumping, electric 
fences or the egg beater.4 The first object which could fly from the ground was invented 
by a New Zealander, Richard Pearce, who  constructed a machine that was heavier than 
air and could take off from the ground, in March 1903. The nuclear physicist Ernest 
 
3 No. 8 wire is the standardized name of the 4 mm diameter wire which is used to build fences  around 
sheep farms.   
4 The list of the inventions based on ’Kiwi ingenuity’ is fairly long. Here, I mention one which is rarely 
included in those lists, the Lydiard training method for runners. Arthur Lydiard trained himself on a trial 
and error basis and developed a system for training athletes which emphasizes the relevance of aerobic 
training. His methods resulted in gaining various Olympic gold medals, such as Peter Snell in 1960 and 
1964 or John Walker in 1976 (Nobuya, 1999).  
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Rutherford was also born in New Zealand. This innovative approach also appears in New 
Zealand`s diplomacy. Recently, for example, between 2002 and 2006 New Zealand 
diplomats had a pivotal role in drafting the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) after the negotiations got stranded at the drafting committee, given 
that the outcome of the first meeting was only to go on with the negotiations (MacKay, 
2016, p. 80). 
Historically, on 21 May 1840, British sovereignty was proclaimed over all of New Zealand. 
In 1841 New Zealand became a colony in its own right and was a Dominion  from 1907, 
when the country became independent in foreign policy. However, defence issues were 
coordinated with the United Kingdom until 1947. From that time, New Zealand, as a 
country has been independent, given that since the ratification of the Statute of 
Westminster in 1947, the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act, the New Zealand 
Parliament has sovereignty over military affairs, foreign policy and domestic issues. After 
1947, only the head of the state was common with the United Kingdom, because New 
Zealand is a constitutional monarchy, whose monarch is Queen Elizabeth II. 
New Zealand is a long-standing, `uninterrupted democracy` (MFAT, 2019c, p. 2). 
Importantly, New Zealand was first heard of in world politics by the domestic 
development of democratic institutions, when female suffrage was introduced in 1893.  
New Zealand was hailed as the first country in the world to grant women the right to vote. 
Dame Millicent Garrett Fawcett, one of the leading feminist politicians in Great Britain, 
“hurrahed loudly when the success in New Zealand was announced”, and another 
feminist, Catherine Wallace from Australia, also expressed her gratitude to the New 
Zealand suffragists for their patience and endurance to achieve their goal, the 
achievement of which  provided hope for women all around the world struggling for 
emancipation (Grimshaw, 1972, p. 95). Ever since then, the democratic institutions of the 
country make it relevant for state leaders to promote democratic principles and 
institutions in international forums, for example, at the United Nations. 
New Zealand’s first engagement in international relations occurred in 1899 when the 
country sent ten contingents of troops to the Boer War in South Africa. During the First 
World War, together with Australia, the country sent its army to the European 
battlefields. The two countries formed the Australia New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) in 
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December 1914. The armies were stationed first in Egypt under the command of a British 
Lieutenant General, William Birdwood. Anzacs were first in combat on 25 April 1915 at 
Gallipolli (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2005). The battle is often regarded as an 
event that triggered nation-building in New Zealand. After the war, New Zealand signed 
the Versailles Treaty and joined the League of Nations (McGibbon, 2018, p. 44).  
The origins of the settlers and the dependency on Great Britain during the colonial period 
between 1841 and 1907, and then, the joint military operations during the world wars 
paved the way to create a military alliance with Great Britain and Australia, as well as with 
the other so-called Anglo-Saxon nations, USA and Canada. Initially, the military alliances 
defined trade relations too. However, after February 1942, when Singapore was defeated 
by the Japanese Army, New Zealand realised that the country could no longer rely on 
Britain for its security and had to find other ways for defence (McMillan, 1987, p. 6). After 
the British bid to enter the European Economic Community in 1961, New Zealand realised 
it had to develop an independent foreign policy which required designing new elements 
in political, defence and trade relations as well. 
Beyond the elements derived from the historical origins of the country (biculturalism, 
farming, Kiwi ingenuity), the democratic institutions and the settlers’ Anglo-Saxon bonds 
in defence cooperation, the independent New Zealand identity in foreign policy has a 
specific aspect, the aspirations to base international relations on morality. Indeed, ethics 
and morality are recurring topics in the public discourses over foreign policy in New 
Zealand. Academics often discuss morality concerning the country’s diplomacy too and 
their lists of historical examples are reasonably long. Among the issues that are discussed 
as part of the morality of New Zealand’s foreign policy, is the country’s adherence to the 
rules-based international order which has the strongest tradition. 
The First Labour Government in the 1930s believed that its foreign policy, which focused 
on maintaining collective security through the League of Nations, was a ground for a moral 
foreign policy (Patman & Iati, 2018, p. xxxv). In the 1970s, the relevance of morality in 
foreign policy became apparent in the views of the Labour Prime Minister, Norman Kirk. 
He expressed how morality played an essential role in performing foreign policy: “I believe 
to base our foreign policies on moral principles is the most enlightened form of self-
interest. What is morally right is likely to be politically right” (cited by Locke, 1992, p. 307).  
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The country’s refusal to join the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in 2003 (Young, 2003) to invade 
Iraq was a case by which New Zealand strengthened its image as a supporter of 
international rules and ethics, given that there was no United Nations approval for the 
military operation performed by the traditional allies of New Zealand, the United States 
and Great Britain. In the same year, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phil Goff 
emphasized this as well in the opening speech for the 2003 Otago Foreign Policy School: 
“It is a key tenet of New Zealand foreign policy that our long-term security lies best in a 
world of ethically based rules” (Beehive, 2003). 
More recently, the broader public as well as academicians, such as Alexander Gillespie 
(2016), welcomed the truth-telling approach of New Zealand’s foreign policy at the end 
of 2016 when the Security Council of the United Nations approved a resolution 
condemning Israel for creating settlements on occupied Palestinian territories. New 
Zealand was among the four countries that submitted and co-sponsored the resolution. 
The most recent volume of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade`s Strategic Intentions 
2019-2023 highlights New Zealand`s values which can be derived from biculturalism and 
the affinity for morality: “We draw strength from our diversity. We honour and respect 
others. We do the right things” (MFAT, 2019c, p. 4).   
Importantly, the intentions to express New Zealand’s independence and New Zealand 
identity were emerging since the 1930s, because from then onwards, there was a strong 
desire in the country to redefine the Kiwi identity. The desire for the redefinition focussed 
mainly on replacing the colonial mentality that was based on the intention for a more 
autonomous development, for more independent ways of thinking. The intentions 
appeared in arts and in literature. Artists wanted to modify the common perception, 
namely, that New Zealand was a “dispensable part of the British colonies” (K. Clements, 
personal communication, 28 November 2017). Others also emphasised the conscious 
efforts of New Zealanders to become independent, and the poet and historian Keith 
Sinclair also expressed this, indirectly referring to the conscious intent: “political 
independence was not an emotional issue” (cited by McKinnon, 1993, p. 6).  
In another way, to emphasize social diversity in New Zealand and in the world, while at 
the same time to emphasize the relevance of the New Zealand identity, the essay, ‘Fretful 
Sleepers’ published by Bill Pearson in 1952 also raised concerns about the ‘oppressive 
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egalitarianism’ in New Zealand, an attitude that caused the society’s unwillingness to 
recognize the “value of the full diversity of human nature” (Anderson, 1977, p. 393). In 
this sense, the recognition of diversity would help the New Zealand society to grow up 
from being a British colony. The intention to redefine the Kiwi identity appeared in 
economic thinking too: for example, there was research conducted on the options of how 
to substitute the British imports (K. Clements, personal communication, 28 November 
2017). 
Eventually, the nuclear-free policy became the platform by which New Zealand, both as a 
society and a foreign policy actor expressed the New Zealand identity (the details of the 
policy are described in chapter 5). Nevertheless, politicians were consciously seeking 
those methods by which they could emphasize New Zealand’s independence. For 
example, one of the reasons why in 1973 New Zealand, under Prime Minister Norman 
Kirk, submitted a case against France at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to find a 
resolution to stop the French atmospheric tests separately from Australia (Australia also 
submitted a case) was to express that New Zealand was independent in foreign policy 
decisions, not just a partner to Australia (Templeton, 2006, p. 199).  
One of the most important early agendas in foreign policy, which still has implications for 
New Zealand’s foreign policy and at the same time expressed full independence in 
diplomacy, occurred during the negotiations to establish the United Nations. At the San 
Francisco Conference concluding in April 1945, then Prime Minister Peter Fraser 
expressed the view that the organization of the United Nations should remain open to all 
sovereign states and he opposed granting accession only to so-called peace-loving states. 
Fraser’s ideas outlined the UN as a global, supranational organization in a sense that all 
the jurisdictions and the prescriptions of the UN should be compulsory for the members, 
and to force the decisions of the UN, the organization should be capable to command 
physical forces (Templeton, 1995, pp. 13-14). This idea was significantly different from the 
British ideas about the role of the new organizations, because the British argued for a 
network of regional organizations only. Most importantly, Fraser opposed the veto of the 
great powers (Templeton, 1995, pp. 13-20). This opposition had a long-lasting effect and 
even today, New Zealand diplomacy would prefer to cease the veto power of the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council.   
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It appears though that the enthusiasm to define New Zealand’s identity has been 
decreasing. At the end of 2015 and in early 2016, New Zealand held a flag referendum to 
decide whether the public wanted to change the official flag of the country. The initiation 
for the referendum came from the then Prime Minister, John Key (TVNZ, 2016), who 
believed New Zealand might need to better distinguish itself from Australia. Eventually, 
56.6% of the voters preferred to keep the original flag with the British Union Jack and the 
Southern Cross (Elections New Zealand, 2016). Explanation for the unsuccessful flag 
change may vary; however, during the campaign criticism was rising about the high costs 
of the referendum, which amounted to 26 million NZD, and the public could not be 
convinced to change the flag to express the desired main message of the Flag 
Consideration Project about a ‘progressive and inclusive’ nation (Young, 2015). 
It is likely that after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, New Zealand society was 
more intensively engaged with domestic economic issues. Prior to the GFC, in New 
Zealand, after the introduction of liberal economic reforms, income inequalities grew 
significantly between 1985 and 1995 (Patman & Iati, 2018, pp. xxix-xxx). In an 
economically challenging environment, New Zealand tends to focus on domestic issues, 
because the ‘Kiwi dream’ which is ”[S]omeone to love, somewhere to live, somewhere to 
work and something to hope for” (Little, 2017), appears impossible. Not surprisingly, the 
then opposition Labour Party, after the flag referendum reiterated the aims of the ‘Kiwi 
dream’  and according to the campaign slogan, “a home of your own, a stable income and 
time with family and friends” is desirable (Trevett, 2016). 
Finally, regarding New Zealand’s identity, it is important to mention that the country is 
exceptional in terms of thinking in long-term missions and to address global problems. In 
section 2.1, I argued that state mission statements are rare. However, New Zealand is a 
counterexample. Although the state does not have a written constitution5 so there is no 
official ‘mission statement’ for New Zealand, there have been initiatives which aimed at 
similar purposes. In the 1980s, the nuclear-free policy (see later in details in chapter 5) 
 
5 Two general laws, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and the Human Rights Act 1993 
(HRA) attempt to create a frameork which is similar to written constitutions. However, these Acts are not 
entrenched regulations, a simple majority of the Parliament can modify them (Hayward, 2015, p. 138; 
McGregor et al., 2016, p. 208). Meanwhile in countries where there exists a written constitution, the 
modification of those Acts usually requires a two-thirds majority or a referendum.  
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brought about a civic initiative: The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Committee 
elaborated an idea of ‘positive neutrality.’ This idea would promote New Zealand as a 
peacemaker, and the plan included the establishment of storage for essential records to 
keep them safe in case of a nuclear war (McMillan, 1987, p. 74).     
Furthermore, there are academics such as Peter Cozens, who raise the issue of long-term 
planning. During the 50th Otago Foreign Policy School, in June 2015, for example, he 
criticised the former speakers because they had not mentioned plans for the next fifty 
years. Cozens (2018) outlines why a long-term vision is necessary that would define New 
Zealand’s role to explore the 4th largest exclusive economic zone, and what morals shall 
be implemented in those visions. Although the idea is not concrete, this approach is 
necessary to creatively define New Zealand’s identity for the future.  
Finally, we need to cite the current Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, who believes that 
“climate change is her generation’s nuclear-free moment” (Ewing, 2017a). In that 
campaign speech, Jacinda Ardern specifically mentioned the role which the work to 
comply with emission requirements would mean for New Zealand’s identity: “New 
Zealand has an opportunity to shape its identity by making the transition to reduced 
emissions.” Because New Zealand needs to purchase carbon-dioxide quotas for 14 billion 
NZD to comply with the Paris Agreement (Ewing, 2017b), the Prime Minister’s aims are 
very ambitious and require long-term planning and commitment. However, this ambition 
may further shape New Zealand’s identity. In this respect it is telling how many people 
have marched the streets of New Zealand`s largest towns on 27 September 2019. 
Journalists estimated the number of protesters to reach 170,000 altogether (Forrester, 
2019).  
 
4.2. Elements of small state foreign policy behaviour 
In section 2.4 the key arguments of small state theory have been presented. The 
arguments show how self-perception regarding the size of a state defines the state’s 
foreign policy behaviour. In the case of a country perceiving itself as small, the state seeks 
protection through alliances. Within the alliance politics, the mixed multilateral approach 
is preferred for maximum comfort with respect to security and for the balance of 
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negotiating rights among the members of the alliance. Because of the lack of significant 
military power, these states emphasize the importance of international law, and their 
diplomatic tools have mainly rhetorical (soft power) components. Within this emphasis 
on the rhetorical elements of foreign policy, the references to international norms are 
often used and intellectual leadership in elaborating international politics is also an option 
for these countries. 
With respect to New Zealand’s self-perception, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s 
Strategic Intentions 2016-2020 provides details, presenting New Zealand as “a small 
country with wide-ranging international interests” (MFAT, 2016, p. 7). These views are 
reflected in the recent Strategic Intentions 2019-2023 where the document defines New 
Zealand as a small state (MFAT, 2019c, p. 3). Based on this self-perception, small state 
theory suggests that New Zealand is interested in mixed multilateral alliances. Regarding 
military and security alliances, the theoretical suggestion is correct, with a specific 
condition. This specific condition is that the great power ally within the military and 
security alliances has changed over time.  
The first military cooperation (although not a formal alliance) New Zealand joined was the 
Australian New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) which was subordinated to Great Britain, 
and in this sense, Great Britain was the first great power ally for New Zealand. However, 
it was not formally a member of ANZAC which was established at the beginning of the 
First World War. Although the Australian-New Zealand armies were controlled by Great 
Britain, the two countries regard ANZAC as their emblematic alliance, and attribute this 
to an ANZAC spirit, as a traditional symbol of Australia and New Zealand, that represents 
a very strong strategic partnership in the Southern Pacific region. In this view, Australia 
and New Zealand are “bound together by geography and history, by shared values, beliefs 
and interests,” and through the close relationships between peoples, the countries “have 
a tradition of mutual commitment to each other’s security” (Burton, 2003). This mutual 
commitment to each other’s security helped New Zealand to strengthen its alliance with 
Australia during the 1990s, and to create the Closer Defence Relations (CDR) in 1993 
(Burton, 2003).  
During the battles of the Second World War, the ANZACs co-operated with the US troops 
in the Pacific region to contain the Japanese imperial army. This cooperation created the 
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basis of a stronger military alliance among the United States, Australia and New Zealand. 
Between 1949 and 1955, the United States established a web of military treaties (NATO, 
SEATO, etc.) to oppose the threats arising because of the strength of the Communist Bloc, 
especially the Soviet Union (Office of the Historian, n.d.). Among these treaties, Australia, 
New Zealand and the US signed the ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Zealand, United States 
Security Treaty) in 1951 that established mutual assistance for the partners in case of 
emergency situations6 (Department of External Affairs, 1952). New Zealand also signed 
the Manila Pact in September 1954 (New Zealand History, n.d.-b) which established the 
South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1955. New Zealand was a member of this 
alliance until it was dissolved in 1977.   
While, New Zealand’s security cooperation with the US was strengthening after the 
Second World War, Great Britain remained an important partner. After 1945, consultative 
arrangements were set between Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand to defend the 
South-West Pacific Area and Malayan Area (ANZAM). After Malaysia gained independence 
in 1957, Great Britain established the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA); 
however, ANZAM continued to exist between Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain. 
In 1971, both ANZAM and AMDA were replaced by the Five Power Defence Arrangements, 
in which Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Malaysia and Singapore grouped to secure 
peace in the South-West Pacific region and to counter the march of communist regimes 
in Indochina (Tan, 2008).  
Although in 1986 the United States renounced its obligations towards New Zealand within 
ANZUS (Hensley, 2013, p. 267) and, consequently, New Zealand no longer has a great 
power within the state’s military alliances, the mixed multilateral approach of alliance 
politics in general is still relevant. This is because the intelligence alliance, the so called 
‘Five Eyes’ (Cox, 2012, p. 2), of which New Zealand has been a member since its initial 
stage, since the Second World War, is a significant platform for New Zealand to have a 
great power, namely, the United States, within the alliance network.   
We can trace the state’s preference for multilateralism in both main political parties’ 
policy principles (McCraw, 1998). The right-wing National Party regards participation in 
 
6 The Treaty’s third section describes these events; however, the content of the assistance is not 
straightforward.   
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international organisations as important for securing New Zealand’s interests. It was 
apparent during the government led by Jim Bolger between 1990 and 1997 which 
campaigned for and won a seat for New Zealand in the United Nations Security Council in 
1992. The Labour Party’s appeal to international organisations and multilateralism is even 
more obvious in the party’s support for the League of Nations after the first Labour 
government was elected in 1934, and ever since the founding of the United Nations. 
Sometimes, Labour’s attachment to the UN is stronger than to the former allies such as 
the US. For example, in 1991, New Zealand did not participate in the Gulf War because 
the intervening troops were not under the UN’s command, and the UN did not express a 
specific demand towards New Zealand. 
Concerning the importance of multilateralism, it is essential to mention that Helen Clark, 
Prime Minister between 1999 and 2008, often used the term ‘international community,’ 
for example, in a speech to the NZIIA’s 70th anniversary in 2004 (Clark, 2004). In that 
speech she also expressed her commitment to international organisations, such as the 
United Nations. The role of multilateralism also appears in New Zealand’s trade policy. As 
Helen Clark (cited by McCraw, 1998, p. 22) asserted, New Zealand’s security is best 
achieved by maintaining good trade relations with their close partners in the Southern 
Pacific region. 
The rule of international law is also very important for New Zealand, in line with the 
predictions of small state theory. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Strategic 
Intentions 2016-2020 lays this out clearly: as “a global trading nation, we seek to advance 
our interests through a robust international rules-based trading system, as well as by 
negotiating high-quality and comprehensive bilateral and regional trade agreements” 
(MFAT, 2016, p. 7). This point illustrates how a small trade-dependent nation is interested 
in promoting the rule of law internationally, which indirectly includes the promotion of 
the norms to align with these rules as well. Scholars also highlight that “as a small and 
successful democracy with genuine worldwide interests [New Zealand] possesses a vital 
stake in a world organised on the basis of fairly applied law” (T. O`Brien, 2005, p. 27), and 
New Zealand’s attitude to fairly applied law may lead to possible restrictions of trade 
relations with those countries that do not fulfil their international treaty obligations 
(Clark, 2004).  
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Regarding the use of rhetorical tools and soft power instruments, small state theory also 
applies to New Zealand. To illustrate this, we can delineate the case of the South China 
Sea debate. From the middle of 2015, New Zealand politicians, Gerry Brownlee, Minister 
of Defence and Murray McCully, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, raised their legal 
concerns about China building artificial islands in the South China Sea. In the speeches, 
the officials clarified New Zealand’s opinion, which was a preference for the rule of 
international law (Capie, 2016). The speeches on the South China Sea debate presented 
New Zealand as a principled actor in global politics so that when, in April 2016, the then 
Prime Minister, John Key, visited China to discuss trade issues, before his visit, Chinese 
media releases warned him not to mention or raise concerns about the South China Sea 
debates. But John Key asserted that New Zealand’s position on the problem had not 
changed, New Zealand did not want to take sides in the debate, and New Zealand believed 
the parties should deal the dispute based on international law and respect the decision of 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Kirk, 2016). The Chinese attacks were 
not surprising, given that China, on more than one occasion, first in January 2013, later in 
December 2014, expressed in a position paper that China would not accept the decision 
of the Tribunal. Meanwhile, Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, and John Key 
issued a joint statement in February 2016 about the South China Sea debate that further 
clarified New Zealand’s opinion (Capie, 2016). 
Those elements of New Zealand`s foreign policy behaviour that are also predicted by the 
small state literature – namely the references to international norms in rhetoric, and the 
role of intellectual leadership in elaborating international politics as options for these 
countries – are related to norm entrepreneurship. Two policy areas, nuclear-free politics 
and trade politics are analysed in the next two chapters. However, concerning intellectual 
leadership, it is relevant to note here that New Zealand’s diplomacy within the UN has 
been active since the establishment of the organization. New Zealand often co-sponsors 
so called thematic approaches on the violations of human rights, for example, cases 
involving torture, involuntary disappearances and detention without trials. Also, the state 
usually contributes to funding specific programmes such as to support the victims of 
torture or the rights of indigenous people. Besides, in the field of human rights, New 
Zealand often provides advisory services and technical assistance. As a commitment to 
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facilitating human rights, New Zealand cosponsored a resolution in 1991 to organize a UN 
conference on human rights that took place in 1993 in Vienna, and, furthermore, New 
Zealand provided help with organizing the conference (Fawthorpe, 1995, pp. 103-107).  
 
4.3. The significance of sheer size and geopolitical location  
According to small state theory, as presented in section 2.5, there are seven factors that 
influence small states’ foreign policy behaviour: the sheer size, the economic and social 
development, the regime type, the culture of the country, the politicians’ ambitions, the 
efficacy of the bureaucracy and the geopolitical proximity to conflict zones, which is 
related to the constraint of balancing among the interests of great powers. In this section, 
I show how the size of the country and its geopolitical location shape New Zealand’s 
foreign policy.  
With respect to sheer size, New Zealand, by statistic measures, is a relatively small 
country. The population of the country is less than 5 million: 4.944 million people lived in 
New Zealand as of 28 November 2019 according to Statistics New Zealand’s online 
population clock (Statistics New Zealand, 2019b). More importantly, the government 
perceives the country as a small state as described in the previous section. The size of the 
economy is 300 billion NZD, which is about 188-190 billion USD. The size of the army is 
also limited, at about 9,000 personnel (Global Firepower, 2017), but according to the 
recent Defence Capability Plan 2019, the target is to decrease the personnel to 6,000 
people by 2035 (Ministry of Defence, 2019, p. 13).  
The military spending of New Zealand is surprisingly high in comparison with possible peer 
states. There are three groups to compare New Zealand`s military budget with: the most 
similar states, that are relatively protected in terms of their proximity to great powers` 
buffering zones; the most different states, which are close to the buffering zones; and 
finally, the allied countries, whose alliance membership may have effects on military 
spending. 
Among the allied countries of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), 
implemented in 1971, which first served as a defence alliance for new states after the 
colonial disengagement of Great Britain and now still has relevance mainly in 
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counterterrorism, New Zealand has the lowest military spending (SIPRI, 2017; World Bank, 
2017) as a percentage of GDP (see Figure 2). However, when these figures are compared 
with countries in the great powers’ buffering zones such as those in Central and Eastern 
Europe, New Zealand’s military spending is surprisingly high (see Figure 3). One 
explanation for this is the relative economic underdevelopment of these European 
countries behind New Zealand, a status that does not allow them to spend more on the 
military. However, according to the data in the case of Estonia, a newly independent 
country after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, military spending has been increasing 
recently and shows the country’s exposure to military threats that may arise from an 
aggressive Russia.  
Figure 4 presents the military spending of New Zealand and some Western European 
countries. These countries are away from the great powers’ buffering zone. Among these 
countries, New Zealand’s military spending is relatively high, especially when compared 
with Belgium or Ireland. Given that Ireland is also an island country, this state is the most 
similar to New Zealand; therefore, Ireland’s low military spending suggests New Zealand 
regards security as more important. However, the contour of these charts is slightly biased 
because New Zealand often participates in peacekeeping operations that demand fairly 
high defence expenditure, and the coastline of New Zealand is fairly long. It should not 
come as a surprise that New Zealand’s peace movements took Ireland as an example to 
promote New Zealand’s independent and non-aligned foreign policy (K. Clements, 
personal communication, 28 November 2017), especially because Ireland is not a member 




Figure 2: The military spending of the countries in the Five Powers Defence Arrangements 
 
Source: World Bank, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
Figure 3: Comparison of military spending of New Zealand and states in great powers’ 
buffering zone 
 





































































































































































































































































Source: World Bank, SIPRI 
Although the military spending of New Zealand is higher than its geopolitical location 
might justify, still, the country has realized that its military capabilities are practically 
insignificant. For all these reasons, to achieve and improve security, New Zealand seeks 
to establish alliances. The state attempts to remain inclusive in forming alliances. Beyond 
the traditional allied countries, the Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, Great 
Britain and the United States) New Zealand has been establishing defence cooperation 
with other partners as well. Among these countries, Japan and South Korea are the most 
important. Meanwhile, the countries in the South-East Asian region, especially in the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have an increasing role: “New Zealand 
actively participates in ASEAN-initiated mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) and the East Asia Summit 
(EAS)” (ASEAN, 2015, p. 2). Finally, as a representation of common cultural values, New 
Zealand has ‘enduring links’ with Europe through the partnership status with NATO. 
































































































































and/or economic threats, New Zealand’s foreign policy is constrained to employ soft 
power tools. These elements were presented in the former section.  
Concerning the significance of geopolitical location, it is crucial to highlight that New 
Zealand is in an extreme geopolitical situation. The country is surrounded by the sea and 
the closest country, Australia, is almost 2,000 km away from the New Zealand’s shores. 
New Zealand’s geopolitical location provides the country with the highest degrees of 
freedom among the small states to elaborate foreign policy. The great powers are (and 
have been) all located mainly in the Northern Hemisphere. None of the major wars 
affected the country directly, since the consolidation of the settlers’ state in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the territory and the population were not exposed to military 
attacks by another power. The benefits of this extreme geopolitical location result in a 
specific perception of threats. However, the geopolitical location does not make New 
Zealand entirely independent, the country faces the influence of great powers, and the 
constraint of balancing between great powers’ interests is also relevant.  
Regarding the perceptions of threats, the threat to become a warzone appeared from 
time to time. It was in the Second World War when possible warfare came closest to New 
Zealand. At the beginning of 1942 the Japanese air force bombed Darwin, an Australian 
city (National Archives of Australia, 2018). During 1942, New Zealand troops were fighting 
the Japanese army on the Solomon Islands, the closest point to New Zealand. During the 
Second World War, Germany laid mines to important harbour entries near Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch (Burford, 2016, p. 68). 
The possibility and the threat of New Zealand becoming a warzone was greatest at the 
time of the Second World War. However, after 1945, this military threat by a great power 
sweeping through the Pacific was decreasing but remained the most important factor in 
forming security politics in the years following the Second World War. The situation 
changed after the mid1960s, and by the 1980s, the threat was not perceived among the 
general public. As discussed in the next chapter, this was a factor why New Zealand’s 
politicians adopted the public’s view on opposing nuclear armaments (Kennaway, 2000), 
and the unique geopolitical situation, also called the ‘tyranny of remoteness’ (T. O`Brien, 
2005, p. 25), was one of the most decisive factors for New Zealand implementing the 
nuclear-free policy during the 1980s.  
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The importance of the geographical location of New Zealand is recognized both by 
policymakers and academics. However, there are new kinds of threats and “New 
Zealand’s relative geographic distance from other countries no longer affords the 
protection it once did” (New Zealand Government, 2016, p. 28). This does not mean that 
New Zealand might become a warzone or the great powers’ buffering zones might have 
extended so that by now New Zealand has become part of them. However, the 2016 
Defence White Paper mentions two threats that might endanger New Zealand’s territory, 
namely, terrorism and cyberattacks (New Zealand Government, 2016, p. 29). The more 
recent Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 further clarifies the possible threats, 
outlining how the international order has come under pressure since 2016. The document 
describes the challenges posed by the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the 
nuclear developments in North Korea, the territorial disputes in Asia, the increasing 
unilateralism and economic protectionism, growing illiberalism, international organised 
crime, and climate change which may also impact New Zealand (New Zealand Defence 
Force, 2018, p. 16).  
Among these threats, economic protectionism is the most relevant. Trading interests and 
the free access to markets, in order to explore business opportunities, have also important 
aspects in New Zealand’s foreign policy, and the option of losing access to markets 
because of the separation of trade links and defence relations is also regarded as a threat. 
The first time when this was perceived as a threat occurred during the debate over the 
Defence White Paper 2010 (New Zealand Government, 2010). The document outlined that 
although the international trade volumes with emerging countries and great powers (like 
China) had been overthrowing the trade with the Anglo-Saxon partners, the 2010 Defence 
White Paper suggested military cooperation only with the traditional allies. However, 
some academics, for example, Ayson (2011), raised their concerns that a balanced 
approach might have been better, especially because the most important trading 
partners, such as China and the other Asian countries, had not seemed to be militarily 
aggressive.  
The concerns regarding the separation of trading and defence partners showed how New 
Zealand has to face the constraint of balancing among great powers` interests regardless 
the fact that New Zealand’s geopolitical distance to the great powers’ buffering zones is 
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an extremity among the small states. The presence of this constraint that New Zealand 
also has to balance between great powers’ interests has an effect whether the country is 
capable of performing norm entrepreneurship programmes: if the state has to consider 
the interests of great powers in elaborating foreign policy, that means limits to project 
the country’s values and interests internationally.  
There are several pieces of evidence for the argument that New Zealand has to balance 
between great powers’ interests. First, it is relevant to note that in elaborating trade 
policy, the country intends to avoid choosing between sides in trade negotiations 
especially between China and the United States as one of the interviewees of the thesis, 
Vangelis Vitalis (personal communication, 16 April 2018) mentioned. Second, these 
concerns of separating military and trade partnerships were later thoroughly considered 
in the elaboration of the 2016 Defence White Paper. On the one hand, that document 
outlines the importance of defence cooperation with the traditional Anglo-Saxon allies, 
such as Australia and the United States. This approach led to improve cooperation with 
the United States, and two strategic documents, the Wellington Declaration in 2010 
(Stuff.co.nz, 2010), and the Washington Declaration (United States New Zealand Council, 
2012) demonstrate this. The engagement with Great Britain and Canada also has an 
important element in New Zealand defence strategy.  
On the other hand, in the 2016 Defence White Paper, China is also mentioned as a 
strategic partner. Although the content of the strategic partnership is mainly political and 
economic, New Zealand also participated in military exercises with China (New Zealand 
Government, 2016, p. 33). With this, New Zealand attempted to mitigate its Anglo-Saxon 
orientation in defence relations while its trade links became Asia-Pacific oriented. 
However, the question arises whether and to what extent would New Zealand’s 
participation in military exercises with China create doubts about the country’s 
commitment to Western values, such as human rights, because the military exercises may 
legitimise the authoritarian Chinese regime. 
This behaviour, attempting to maintain friendly relationships with competing great 
powers (‘having a foot in two camps’) is a typical element of a small state’s foreign policy, 
given that this shows how carefully the country has to balance between the leading 
powers of the world. Although analysts may argue that the recent Strategic Defence Policy 
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Statement 2018 does not include this language of `strategic partnership`, the document 
does make strong references to China:  
China is of central strategic importance in the Asia-Pacific and globally, and New 
Zealand continues to build a strong and resilient relationship with China. Defence 
and security cooperation with China has grown over recent years, supported by a 
range of visits, exchanges and dialogues (New Zealand Defence Force, 2018, p. 14). 
Furthermore, China`s growing confidence (New Zealand Defence Force, 2018, p. 17) and 
increasing presence in the South Pacific region create increasing concerns for New 
Zealand whether the state can independently pursue its interests (Bracewell-Worrall, 
2019). The South Pacific region, as a close realm, has significant ties to New Zealand; 
within the South Pacific, New Zealand has a special relationship with Samoa, and 
constitutional obligations to the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. Besides, after these 
island states became independent in the 1960s, these islands were no longer 
administered by friendly Western powers, such as Great-Britain or France. New Zealand 
realised the strategic importance of these island states and took an interest in the 
economic development of the countries (McMillan, 1987, pp. 7-8) so that diplomatic 
relations could strengthen. With China`s abundant financial aid to these countries, for 
New Zealand, these relations might appear to be detrimentally affected.  
Finally, it is crucial to note that China’s influence on New Zealand appears to be larger 
than the Asian country’s growing presence in the South Pacific or China’s stake in New 
Zealand’s export suggest. Concerning this, it is relevant to note that the influence of 
Chinese soft power raises further questions. Recently, there have been publications which 
showed that China provided financial assistance for New Zealand politicians (see for 
example Brady, 2018). During 2019 it has been reported that the National Party received 
a donation of 150,000 NZD (Nippert, 2019) from a Chinese businessman. Even the former 
Labour Prime Minister, Helen Clark expressed her worries about this sort of ‘money 
politics’ that may influence New Zealand policy making (Walls & Jancic, 2019). What is 
even more problematic is that it is not only the National Party which is accused of 
receiving Chinese donations, allegations claim that the Labour Party has received Chinese 
donations too (see for example Fisher, 2018). The possible Chinese interference in New 
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Zealand politics is already taken seriously as recent political debates suggests (Rouse, 
2019). 
 
4.4. The effects of social development and the culture on foreign policy 
As it was presented in section 2.5, the available resources, a strong bureaucracy and the 
capability of focussing on niche policy areas were among the most important factors that 
facilitated the Scandinavian states to become norm entrepreneurs. This section observes 
how the level of economic and social development and the culture of the country 
influence the elaboration of New Zealand’s foreign policy. The analysis serves the purpose 
of checking whether New Zealand has sufficient resources, a strong bureaucracy that is 
able to focus on niche areas which are preconditions of a small state to become norm 
entrepreneur.   
First and foremost, it is crucial to emphasize that New Zealand regards itself as a wealthy 
nation that feels responsibility for assisting developing countries. This responsibility is 
based on the aspiration of the state to be recognized as a good and influential global 
citizen. This self-declared determination has a strong influence on the topics and issues 
New Zealand foreign policy addresses. Free trade, democratic and human rights, 
humanitarian issues in general, the questions of war and/or peace, the rule of law, 
education and cultural cooperation, and indigenous rights are among the most important 
topics. To illustrate this, it is relevant to show that the promotion of sustainable 
development in developing countries (MFAT, 2015a, p. 35) appears as an indicator of 
success in strategic foreign policy documents. Regionally, these policies concentrate on 
the Pacific islands. Over the recent years, the Pacific Region has become even more 
important, and the most recent ten-year goals aim at improving economic wellbeing in 
the Pacific, a well-governed Pacific and New Zealand’s recognition as a preferred partner 
in the Pacific (MFAT, 2019c, p. 23).7  
 
7 Beyond the responsibility to assist developing countries, it is also relevant to note that the economic 
transparency of the government, including that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is 
outstanding. Most of the policy documents include economic case studies and/or analyses of the 




Regarding the preconditions of norm entrepreneurship, it is crucial to note how efficient 
the country’s bureaucracy is, which is also reflective of a high level of economic and social 
development. According to the OECD statistics, on average, among the OECD member 
states, the government employs 21.3% of all employees, while in New Zealand, this 
proportion is much lower, only 13.4% (OECD, 2015). However, out of 144 countries within 
the World Economic Forum’s efficiency rankings, New Zealand is 17th (World Economic 
Forum, 2018, p. xi). Therefore, as a factor in foreign policy making, the efficacy of the 
bureaucracy is strong and robust, which suggests successful diplomacy.  
With respect to the robust bureaucracy, reliability and effectiveness are the most 
important features. Concerning reliability, it is important to mention that the government 
officials use the ‘Cabinet Manual’ (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017) 
which defines the legal status of the Prime Minister, the various ministers, the 
governmental institutions and the decision-making processes within the governmental 
organizations. Because of the strict procedures, the work process and time requirements 
of the bureaucracy are predictable. A proposal should go through the various stakeholders 
in a regulated manner, which may be regarded as time-consuming, but eventually it is 
limited as well. As one of the anonymous interviewees expressed, in contrast to Japan 
where a proposal can be accepted only when an executive leader says yes to it, and, 
therefore, it may take a long time, the processes of the New Zealand administration are 
standardized.  
Regarding efficiency, the ministerial bodies often employ independent contractors whose 
salary requirements are higher, but their working culture is much more productive than 
that of the official bureaucrats. There are other opinions too, regarding the roles of 
independent contractors. Although they have roles in expert positions, scholars such as 
Buchanan (2010) underlined the role of an elite group that has a decisive influence on 
forming New Zealand’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, the robust bureaucracy has an 
important role in elaborating creative solutions for the diplomatic corps, and chapter 6 
shows what role the bureaucracy has had in forming trade policies. 
Concerning professionalism in international relations, first it is important to note that 
many of the articles and publications on foreign policy are reflective of high standards and 
quality in elaborating New Zealand’s foreign policy. For example, these theoretical 
104 
 
publications (like T. O`Brien, 2005, p. 25) discuss the requirements of defining the 
acceptable level of risks and threats for small states. Others, such as Steadman (2006), 
emphasise the possible threats to food supply and the risks of piracy, and highlight the 
importance of a balanced goal setting and appropriate budgeting in defence spending, 
such as avoiding interventions overseas, with the exception of mediation. But there are 
abundant papers discussing terrorism (Greener-Barcham, 2004; T. O`Brien, 2005; 
Steadman, 2006) and the possible best approach to those threats (Nichols, 2006). 
Nevertheless, New Zealand is one of the few OECD member states that does not have a 
peer-reviewed journal on foreign policy.  
The efficiency of the bureaucracy and the tradition to employ highly-skilled experts are 
related to the state’s historical and cultural roots what we can call the Westminster-style 
governmental institutions and decision-making processes. An important element of this 
system is the bureaucracy with clear responsibilities and controls. That is also the reason 
the why the Treaty of Waitangi has the settlement of governance in the first section:  
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the 
separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the 
Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without 
reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation 
or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to 
exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole sovereigns 
thereof. (Ross, 1972, p. 156) 
Although in New Zealand’s constitutional system there is no written constitution, the 
democratic traditions serve as checks and balances so that these restrain governments 
from abuse of power.   
There is a geopolitical element, isolation, which contributed to establish strong and 
efficient governments in Anglo-Saxon countries. Among the Anglo-Saxon nations it is only 
the United States that has continental borders with another non-Anglo-Saxon nation, with 
Mexico. Other than that, they are isolated. This isolation provides them a special sense to 
international relations, namely, they can behave in a semi-attached way to international 
politics. This ‘splendid isolation’ allows them to choose freely in their international affairs. 
Although the term is attributed to 19th century Great Britain (Kissinger, 1994, p. 97), the 
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first President of the United States, George Washington also warned the Americans to 
stay away from the Europeans ‘murky’ affairs.  
This semi-detached behaviour was allowed because of the distance from continental 
Europe. Any security threats that have arisen to Great Britain or to the United States did 
not directly affect its land area first; the countries have time, although limited, to consider 
how to react to great power dynamics. This extra amount of time is beneficial for at least 
two reasons.8 First, the Anglo-Saxons are able to elaborate ideologies, narratives, which 
provide the bases for their (re)actions to specific developments in the power dynamics. 
Second, the extra time to elaborate their policy responses is also necessary to convince 
the public opinion about the planned policy steps.  
The Anglo-Saxon heritage, the geopolitical location, and the time given by the 
geographical isolation, when combined with the New Zealand’s efficient bureaucracy, the 
experts and the ‘Kiwi ingenuity’ provide New Zealand with a special attribute. The state is 
skilled to quickly adapt to all kinds of policy developments in the world. A good example 
of how well New Zealand is able to explore the time given in a situation is the domestic 
discussion of the UDHR during the foundation of the United Nations. The New Zealand 
Government asked a special Human Rights Commission including various government 
officials and academics to collect their recommendations for the draft that was sent to 
the UN member states’ governments in 1947 (Aikman, 1998, p. 3; Fawthorpe, 1995, p. 
97). All this domestic work showed how many resources the New Zealand Government 
could quickly mobilise. The efforts eventually paid off, given that New Zealand was able 
to play an important role at the Paris Session of the UN General Assembly, when the New 
Zealand delegation emphasized that economic and social rights are also important besides 
the civil and political rights (Fawthorpe, 1995, p. 98) and these became elements of the 
Declaration. 
Similarly to the diplomatic efforts in the composition of the UDHR, during 2002 and 2006, 
when New Zealand took a leading role in the elaboration of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), domestic opinions were also channelled into 
 
8 I argue there is a third consequence of the isolation which is psychologic by nature. In every political 
situation, the leaders are aware that they always have time to elaborate a response to any policy 
challenge, they don’t need to rush through possible options and decide without thorough consideration.  
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the composition of the policies of the New Zealand diplomacy. The Minister for Disability 
Issues, Ruth Dyson asked for funding to include Disabled Peoples’ Organizations in the 
process of preparation and a disabled person, Robert Martin, who represented an NGO 
for disabled peoples, became a member of the New Zealand delegation (McGregor et al., 
2016, pp. 118-121). Later on Robert Martin had a large influence on the text of the 
covenant, such as on Article 19 that discusses the role of the people in the community 
(McRae, 2014, pp. 146-151). 
The cases show how New Zealand diplomacy can perform efficient policies focussing on 
niche policy areas, even after the intensification of the flow of information after the 
invention of the Internet in the 1980s, and the intellectual recognition of accelerated 
globalization in the period between the mid-1980s and early 1990s. These processes 
changed the ways politicians perceive the world and how diplomacy should be performed. 
The recent Strategic Intentions of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
is also prepared with this globalization awareness, the operating environment of the 
Ministry is the ‘global environment’ (MFAT, 2019c, p. 10).  
 
4.5. The ambitions of the politicians and the society 
The small states theory suggests that the politicians’ ambitions are relevant factors in 
performing the states’ foreign policies. Furthermore, the Scandinavian paradigm cases of 
norm entrepreneurship (in section 2.5) show countries can have goals that are based on 
their cultural approach, such as their social solidarity which is exported through their 
international aid policy, or their attitude towards nature and natural resources that results 
in the composition of important ideas such as sustainability. In New Zealand, both factors 
– the politicians’ ambitions and the society’s values and self-designation – provide a good 
basis for norm entrepreneurship. 
Concerning the politicians’ ambitions, it is essential to emphasize that these do have 
important roles in forming foreign policy of the country, and the Prime Ministers’ 
ambitions decide how actively New Zealand diplomacy behaves in international 
organizations. There are scholars, for example, Capie (2006), who analyse the way that 
former Prime Ministers, Robert Muldoon, David Lange  and Helen Clark, influenced New 
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Zealand’s foreign policy. Helen Clark, for example, after her Prime Ministership, had good 
chances to become Secretary General of the United Nations, her campaign being quite 
strong; however, retrospectively she admits that there were no real chances of getting 
the job, mainly owing to the preferences of the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council (Clark, 2018). According to a Radio New Zealand interview series with former 
prime ministers (Moore, 2017), there is a politician among the state’s prime ministers who 
is highly regarded internationally. Michael Moore, the former General Director of the 
World Trade Organization (between 1999 and 2002), had various achievements such as 
the recognition of China by the WTO (Moore, 2017). The current Labour Prime Minster, 
Jacinda Ardern also shows strong ambitions, for example, she initiated to strengthen the 
international regulation over the social media platforms (Tova O'Brien, 2019) to control 
the spread of terrorist and violent content.  
Regarding the aims of the society, beyond the creative ideas to define New Zealand’s 
identity as an actor to facilitate the countermeasures against climate change (described 
in section 4.1), it is important that during the large part of the twentieth century, as 
Kennaway (2000, p. 21) argues New Zealand wanted to behave as a good ally first for 
Great Britain, then, after the Second World War, for the United States and Australia, and 
for the states participating in the FPDA (Australia, Great Britain, Malaysia and Singapore). 
Furthermore, as presented earlier in section 4.4, the state acknowledges a specific sort of 
responsibility towards developing countries to promote sustainable development in those 
countries (MFAT, 2015a, p. 35) which is represented in the policy indicator of success 
based on the recognition of New Zealand as a good and influential global citizen.  
These intentions are still present but they have already profited the country when New 
Zealand became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council during 2015 and 
2016. “[New Zealand is] an active, constructive, and well-respected member of the global 
rules based system”, which was shown by the country’s election to be a Non-Permanent 
Member of the UN Security Council for 2015-2016 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MFAT, 
2016, p. 7). The continuing efforts to maintain New Zealand’s identity as a good global 
citizen are also presented in the Strategic Intentions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade 2016-2020: “[New Zealand] a member of an international community and we seek 
smart solutions to global challenges, with particular focus on climate change, resource 
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stewardship, and counterterrorism and radicalisation within a world of increasing 
instability” (MFAT, 2016, p. 7). More recently, the aims also include New Zealand’s role in 
a larger region, in the Asia Pacific. The recent Strategic Intentions of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019 – 2023 outlines this aim: the Ministry attempts to 
“[E]mbed New Zealand as an active and integral partner in building Asia-Pacific 
architecture in support of regional stability and economic integration” (MFAT, 2019c, p. 
20). 
The ambitions also have a specific feature which is quite rare in the case of a small state, 
namely, a close region – the Pacific Island countries have a special focus in the state’s 
foreign policy. These states (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu) can also be understood as a 
region of integration or an ‘Arc of Instability’ (Headley, 2012), at least in one sense that 
the security and well-being of the region are both affecting New Zealand’s security and 
well-being (MFAT, 2015b, p. 14). The Defence White Paper 2016 (New Zealand 
Government, 2016, p. 11) is even more specific with respect to the relevance of the 
region:  
Government’s highest priority for the Defence Force is its ability to operate in New 
Zealand and its Exclusive Economic Zone, followed by the South Pacific and the 
Southern Ocean. The Defence Force must therefore be prepared to operate 
independently, or lead operations, in these areas.  
Further, the Defence Force contributes to and, where necessary, leads operations in the 
South Pacific (New Zealand Government, 2016, p. 37). As Murray McCully, former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs described, during New Zealand’s membership in the United Nations 
Security Council in 2015 and 2016, one of the priorities of New Zealand diplomacy was to 
raise the issues of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (McCully, 2018). The majority, 
close to 60%, of New Zealand’s overseas development assistance payments goes to these 
island countries (MFAT, 2015b, p. 5) and 7 of the 14 non-Operational Military Activities 
have been performed in the region (New Zealand Government, 2016, p. 21). The current 
government reinforced these aims: the Ministry’s goal is to “Promote a stable, prosperous 
and resilient Pacific in which  New Zealand’s interests and influence are safeguarded” 





In this chapter, New Zealand’s identity and the country’s general foreign policy behaviour 
have been discussed. New Zealand’s identity is unique at least in three aspects. First, New 
Zealand is a bicultural society where the indigenous Māori and the Anglo-Saxon settlers 
are recognized as equal cultures, and this bicultural background provides New Zealand 
with a special sensitivity for human rights issues internationally. Second, the geographic 
endowments of the country facilitate extensive farming, and the isolation of the country 
created a specific condition: long supply routes for spare-parts for agricultural machines, 
therefore, the settlers had to find creative ways to resolve problems. This environment 
gave birth for a creative, can do attitude, the ‘Kiwi ingenuity’ which appears in diplomacy 
as well. Third, New Zealand’s politicians have a sense for morality in foreign policy, 
therefore, whenever possible, the references to morality appear in New Zealand’s 
international relations. Beyond these features of the New Zealand identity, we can 
experience intentions to creatively define New Zealand as an actor that facilitates global 
solutions.  
Concerning foreign policy elements, the analysis has shown how New Zealand perceives 
itself as a small state, and how this perception forms the state’s foreign policies. In 
general, New Zealand’s foreign policy behaviour is in line with the assumptions of small 
states theory, as the country seeks military alliances and it prefers mixed-multilateral 
alliances. Among these, until the mid-1980s, the Australia, New Zealand, United States 
(ANZUS) alliance was the most important, but after the implementation of the nuclear-
free policy in 1984, New Zealand has participated in alliances with middle powers, such as 
Australia. The state also has a preference for international organisations, showing strong 
attachment to the rule of international law and the norms of peaceful resolution of 
conflicts. Although military expenditure is relatively high compared to peer states, the 
most important tool of foreign policy is rhetoric.  
With respect to the most important factors that shape small states’ foreign policies, I 
described the role of sheer size, economic and social development and the type of the 
democratic regime. Regarding the ambitions of individual politicians, the culture of the 
country, the efficacy of the bureaucracy and the state’s geopolitical proximity to conflict 
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zones, New Zealand can be regarded as unique among small states. There are many 
politicians, for example, Peter Fraser, Helen Clark or Mike Moore, who have had strong 
ambitions to participate in world affairs and influence global politics. The culture of the 
society is based on the Anglo-Saxon heritage. The bureaucracy is robust, and, 
geopolitically, New Zealand is the most distant state from any of the possible conflict 
zones, due to which the country is relatively well protected among small states.  
The robust bureaucracy that is capable of focusing on niche policy areas and the 
geopolitical location, which provides the state with a large latitude, allow New Zealand to 
perform an influential foreign policy. However, the state is not entirely independent in 
forming foreign policy as the concerns over the growing Chinese influence illustrate. 
Similarly, as demonstrated, the ambitions to perform globally relevant policies are present 
in New Zealand’s foreign policy intentions. These appear to be the prerequisites for a state 
to become norm entrepreneur. In the next two chapters I examine whether New Zealand 
has acted as a norm entrepreneur in nuclear-free and international trade policies.  
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5. New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy 
New Zealand has come a long way in terms of political development since the early 1940s. 
As presented in the previous chapter, during the Second World War, the country was a 
British dominion that had independence in its foreign policy, but its defence policy was 
tied to Great Britain. After the ratification of the Statute of Westminster in 1947, New 
Zealand became independent in defence policy as well. However, the ties remained strong 
with England. It was during the 1960s and early 1970s when the state realised how 
necessary it was to develop an independent foreign policy that was no longer reliant on 
England. By the mid-1980s New Zealand presented itself on the floor of world politics with 
its nuclear-free policy (Dalby, 1993; Hensley, 2013, p. x).  
The development of the nuclear-free policy that became the emblematic case of 
expressing the New Zealand identity is underpinned by the country’s perceptions towards 
nuclear issues. These perceptions took an even larger road until they became the basis of 
a crystallized nuclear-free identity. During the Second World War, to assist the war against 
Japan in the Pacific, New Zealand participated in the developments of ‘superweapons’ 
such as the tsunami-bomb, or Project Seal (Templeton, 2006, p. 63) and the atomic bomb, 
or the Manhattan Project (Burford, 2016, p. 93). After the Second World War there were 
inquiries how New Zealand could establish an experimental atomic reactor, but these 
plans were eventually cancelled (Templeton, 2006, p. 48). From the 1960s onwards, New 
Zealand perceived no significant risks of a great power sweeping through the Pacific to 
eventually reach the country’s shores. At the time, New Zealand participated in the 
Vietnam war by sending an artillery battalion (McMillan, 1987, p. 23). It was at this time 
that many New Zealanders started considering the United States as a militaristic state (K. 
Clements, personal communication, 28 November 2017). Then, in the mid-1980s, the 
country established its nuclear-free identity after the Labour Party won the New Zealand 
elections on 14 July 1984 (NZ History, n.d.).  
Labour’s victory occurred after a campaign in which one of the main topics was to create 
a nuclear-free country (TVNZ, 2017). The Labour Party promised to implement a policy 
with which New Zealand would become nuclear-free. In practice, the policy meant the 
ban of nuclear-powered ships from New Zealand’s ports, and the ban of those ships which 
were able to carry nuclear weapons, unless they had demonstrated there were no nuclear 
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weapons on board. The hard test of this policy took place in early 1985, after the USS 
Buchanan, a guided-missile carrier requested port entry to New Zealand in January. In 
February 1985, the New Zealand government denied the Buchanan’s request (Hensley, 
2013, pp. 102-104). The denial triggered a series of events concluding with the United 
States ceasing the security obligations for New Zealand within ANZUS in 1986.  
Later, in 1987, the New Zealand Parliament adopted the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, 
Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987 (Nuclear Free Zone Act), which was the 
legalisation of the policy (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2013). The Nuclear Free Zone Act 
is unique, at least from two aspects. First, the Act prohibited the presence of nuclear-
powered vessels in the territory of New Zealand beyond the ban of nuclear weapons. 
Second, the Act included the establishment of an advisory committee to the government 
on nuclear disarmament issues. This committee, the Public Advisory Committee on 
Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC), is the only such organization in the world 
(Dewes, 2005, p. 110).  
Furthermore, beyond the unique features of the Nuclear Free Zone Act, there was another 
aspect, by which the New Zealand nuclear-free policy is exemplary. In 1985, New 
Zealand’s nuclear-free policy was performed unilaterally, leading to the state being 
ousted from the ANZUS military alliance; later, however, the state intentionally avoided 
entry into military alliances in which any of the members had nuclear weapons (M. Hobbs, 
personal communication, June 21, 2018).   
The Act and the policy of the Fourth Labour Government were preceded by a more than 
three-decades-long series of protests against the testing of nuclear weapons. Technically, 
the Fourth Labour Government kept its election promise by enacting the nuclear-free 
legislation, which was triggered by those long protests against nuclear weapons and the 
activities of pressure groups in the country. But, symbolically, the nuclear-free policy 
represents much more for New Zealanders. This is because the elaboration and the 
performing of the policy coincided with the shift in New Zealand’s security regime, when 
a formerly dependent state grew up and achieved an independent security state after a 
transitional period between 1973 and 1990 (Mayell, 2004, p. 368). The nuclear-free policy 
is also regarded as the representation of New Zealand’s independence, given that this 
policy was introduced even against the intentions of New Zealand’s traditional allies, such 
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as Great Britain and the United States (McKinnon, 1993, p. 11). Also, given the 
international context of the nuclear-free legislation, especially the opposition of the 
United States, New Zealand did earn some ‘sense of new identity and pride as an 
independent small state’ (Dewes, 2005, p. 109). Others, for example, True and Tanyag 
(2018, p. 244), regard this policy as one with which New Zealand punched above its 
(relative military and economic) weight in global politics. 
The policy was critically relevant for the New Zealand public as well. For example, in 1986 
there were more than 350 peace and disarmament groups active (Burford, 2011, p. 61). 
Given the unique nature of the nuclear-free legislation, the expression of independence 
that happened as a confrontation with traditional allies, and the intense public interest in 
the policy, it is no wonder that the policy is strongly linked to the New Zealand identity. 
The members of the nuclear-free movement, for example, are aware of this conscious 
effort to form a nuclear-free New Zealand (30 Years Nuclear Free, 2017). Scholars also 
regard the nuclear-free policy as one that became central to New Zealand’s identity 
(Capie, 2006, p. 30; Hensley, 2013, p. x) and the policy has been an important symbol to 
express New Zealand’s independence in foreign affairs (Catalinac, 2010, p. 327 and 333).  
Since the early 1990s the public discourse and media coverage of nuclear issues have been 
decreasing (Burford, 2011, p. 61). Between 2008 and 2017, although the Key government 
was unequivocal about the policy, it appeared as though it become mute and empty, and 
scholars, for example, Clements (2018, p. 230), also mention that the peace movement 
shifted its attention to other issues such as indigenous rights. Maybe this was the reason 
Jacinda Ardern, the leader of the new Labour government elected in 2017, emphasized 
after her oath as Prime Minister that she believed New Zealand could do more on the 
issue of nuclear non-proliferation. She also asked her team to analyse what actions New 
Zealand could take (NZN, 2017).  
Academic interest in researching the nuclear-free policy is also high. At the establishment 
of the nuclear-free policy, there were many surprising developments in the policies, and 
because of these surprising events the period of the Fourth Labour Government is one of 
the most researched topics among IR scholars regarding New Zealand’s foreign policy. 
Although the National Party’s leader, Robert Muldoon, warned that the ban on nuclear-
powered and nuclear-capable ships from entering New Zealand’s ports would result in the 
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end of ANZUS (TVNZ, 2017), the Lange government did implement the policy. Because of 
the implied risk of New Zealand’s exit from ANZUS, the implementation of the policy is 
often considered to be surprising by scholars such as Catalinac (2010) or Capie (2006) 
because this was an event that contradicted New Zealand’s security interest and showed 
that New Zealand’s foreign policy can differ from what a realist approach would suggest. 
Furthermore, the government led by David Lange did not want to exit ANZUS; they 
strongly hoped to find a solution because the ANZUS alliance was popular in New Zealand 
(Catalinac, 2010, p. 319; Hensley, 2013, p. 186). However, when the United States 
eventually expressed that with respect to ANZUS, the US and New Zealand ‘part company’ 
(Hensley, 2013, p. 267), this still came as a surprise to the Lange government.  
In this chapter, I address whether New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy can be regarded as 
norm entrepreneurship. There are several reasons why the question is relevant: the 
unique feature of the nuclear-free legislation, the international reception of the policy 
that largely affected the geopolitical discourses globally (Dalby, 1993), the policy’s strong 
link to New Zealand’s identity, and the high scholarly interest in this policy. The inquiry 
into whether the New Zealand antinuclear policy has been norm entrepreneurship 
focuses on four areas, in line with the considerations outlined in Chapter 2. First, it is 
important to observe whether the actor believed the policy was appropriate for others. 
This can be traced in the various ideological considerations that defined the policy. 
Second, the inquiry includes the analysis of whether the state was mobilising resources 
and what efforts the state performed to internationally promote this idea of living 
nuclear-free. Third, the analysis consists of an examination of whether the policy actor 
was the first in the world (or at least among the leading actors). Finally, the inquiry also 
focuses on the policy consistency, either domestically or internationally, because the 
possible distortions from the promoted norms weaken the norm entrepreneurship 
agenda. In this section, it will be discussed why the promotion of the ban on nuclear 
propulsion, and the unilateral exits from existing military alliances reliant on nuclear 
weapons, were not covered in the policy.  
To elaborate the analysis, in this chapter I first define the nuclear-free norm. Then I 
describe the main elements of the ideology of the nuclear-free movements in New 
Zealand that presents whether the movements believed living nuclear-free would be 
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appropriate, not only for New Zealanders but for others as well. The third section outlines 
the most important policy elements with special respect to the promotion of the 
antinuclear (nuclear-free) norm. In the fourth section, I present the international 
awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons, showing that New Zealand was not the first 
actor to develop and promote the norm of nuclear-free living. Finally, I present the 
consistency of the policy and signal whether any inconsistency appears that weakens the 
norm and, at the same time, the credibility of the actor and the policy. As I demonstrate 
in the following sections, although New Zealand was not the first to develop the norm, 
the ideology behind the nuclear-free policy, all the efforts that the various governments 
made since the mid-1980s and the consistency of the policy show the policy can be 
regarded as norm entrepreneurship. 
 
5.1. Defining the nuclear-free norm 
In the thesis, the nuclear-free norm is defined as the standard of appropriate behaviour 
which requires a state to organize its society in a way that it abstains from the use of 
nuclear technologies and does not even store materials that are fuels for such 
technologies. Nuclear technologies are defined as the ones that utilise nuclear fission or 
nuclear fusion. Scholars use the concepts of antinuclear policy and nuclear-free policy 
interchangeably. However, the term ‘nuclear-free’ will be preferred to using the attribute 
of ‘anti-nuclear’ because it better describes New Zealand’s policies in concern.  
Nuclear technologies can be applied to create arms and to generate power (electricity). 
By the definition described here, the nuclear-free norm prohibits the use of nuclear 
weapons, either for testing or in war. Beyond the ban on the use of nuclear weapons, 
being nuclear-free also requires the prohibition of nuclear-explosive devices on certain 
territories as well. A nuclear weapon-free zone is a realisation of this requirement defined 
by the nuclear-free norm. The Nuclear Free Zone Treaties, such as the Antarctic Treaty 
(UNODA, n.d.-a), the South-Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, also known as the Rarotonga Treaty 
(Papadimitropoulos, 1988) or the South-American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Tlatelolco 
Treaty) (UNODA, n.d.-c) created nuclear weapon-free areas where nuclear weapons 
cannot be stored or used.  
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Furthermore, the nuclear-free norm also requires that actors ban the presence of nuclear 
power generation either in power plants or in vessels with nuclear propulsion. This is a 
strong method for risk prevention because the chemical and physical reactions in a power-
generation device are designed so that explosions as in a nuclear bomb cannot happen, 
but still, owing to human negligence, there may be accidents causing radioactive 
contamination. The most known case for human negligence causing accident with severe 
radioactive contamination is the accident at the Chernobyl Power Plant in the Ukraine, in 
April 1986.  
The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act established the full nuclear-free norm, because 
nuclear propulsion is banned as well. In this sense, New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy is 
the most advanced in the world. Concerning the legislation in New Zealand, scholars such 
as Burford (2016, p. 102) emphasize that the Act does not ban the establishment of 
nuclear power plants, regardless of the common belief in New Zealand that it does. 
However, the main principle behind the ban of nuclear-propelled vessels is the limitation 
of possible risk of radioactive contamination. Therefore, the establishment of nuclear 
power plants is practically (or would be)  prohibited in New Zealand as it is difficult to see 
how political consent would be provided for the establishment of nuclear power plants 
when the logic of their operation is the same  which nuclear-propelled vessels use.  
It is relevant to clarify the relation between nuclear disarmament and the nuclear-free 
norm. Nuclear disarmament is not a norm, it is a policy agenda, efforts to reduce the use, 
the quantity, the damaging power and the readiness of the concerned weapons. 
Therefore, nuclear disarmament can refer to the ban on the use of nuclear weapons and 
the storage of such weapons. For example, regarding the ban of the use of nuclear 
weapons, it is relevant to mention the Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty which prohibits the 
tests of nuclear explosive devices in the atmosphere, under water and in space (UNODA, 
n.d.-b). Concerning the nuclear deterrence strategies, the ‘No first use’ concept should 
also be regarded as an example of the limitation of the use of nuclear weapons in military 
operations. In terms on the ban on storing nuclear weapons in a given territory, 
disarmament policies typically aim at the limitation of nuclear warheads, although the 
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty required the United States and the Soviet 
Union (today Russia) to completely eliminate those weapons. 
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Nuclear disarmament can also affect the utilisation of nuclear power generation because 
during the enrichment of nuclear power plant fuels a tipping point may be reached after 
which nuclear fuel is capable of becoming the core of a nuclear explosive device. 
Therefore, the control of nuclear power generation programmes is significant in nuclear 
disarmament, although the subject of these observations is not nuclear weapons, only 
devices capable of power generation.    
 
5.2. The ideology of the actor: from peace movement to the 
government  
In this section I present why the ideology behind New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy can 
be regarded as evidence the policy has been norm entrepreneurship. The approach of the 
New Zealand governments towards the nuclear-free norm developed over time and 
eventually the Fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) established New Zealand’s 
nuclear-free identity by the adoption of the Nuclear Free Zone Act in 1987. Concerning 
norm entrepreneurship, the crucial element of the ideology is that it included the aim of 
promoting global peace, the worldwide ban on nuclear testing, and a planned support to 
countries that would decide to follow New Zealand’s policy. Although the Fourth Labour 
Government emphasized the policy was not meant to be exported, the support of the 
New Zealand public for the policy was based on the hope that the country would serve as 
an example for other states as well (McMillan, 1987, p. 74). 
Regarding the development of the New Zealand governments’ approach to the nuclear-
free policies, it is relevant to note that in 1957, Keith Holyoake, who later became Prime 
Minister (1960-1972) announced that New Zealand would not acquire or store nuclear 
weapons. This announcement showed his understanding of the antipathy of the New 
Zealand public against nuclear weapons (Templeton, 2006, p. 511). Later on, even in the 
1980s, this announcement served as an argument for the National Party to prove that 
New Zealand had been nuclear-free since 1957, after Holyoake’s commitment which was 
reaffirmed in 1963 (Kevin P.  Clements, 1988, p. 127). Importantly, however, in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, the National government’s decisions about nuclear issues were reactions 
to public concerns, such as the rejection of nuclear energy in 1971 and the ban on nuclear-
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powered vessels from New Zealand’s ports (Locke, 1992, p. 308) rather than policies 
based on self-initiation. 
The leaders of the Labour Party were more radical in nuclear politics. In section 3.2 it was 
already mentioned that Norman Kirk preferred not to defend New Zealand by nuclear 
weapons. Kirk was a strong supporter of disarmament, either nuclear or conventional. In 
his Hiroshima Day address in 1964 in Christchurch he expressed the aim of complete 
disarmament (Locke, 1992, p. 307). Kirk’s policy also included support for a UN Assembly 
draft resolution declaring nuclear weapons to be violations of the Charter and calling for 
the end of all nuclear testing (Templeton, 2006). Although initially he intended to create 
a nuclear weapon-free Southern Hemisphere, given that France was conducting 
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in the early 1970s at Muroroa, he realized this aim 
was too ambitious, and the Third Labour Government started focusing on the 
establishment of the Nuclear Free Southern Pacific (Locke, pp. 308-310).  
Although the Third Labour Government led by Norman Kirk was ambitious in nuclear-free 
policies, it was the Fourth Labour Government which created the nuclear-free New 
Zealand identity. This is the government that is regarded as the one which took the 
courage to oppose a great power within the ANZUS alliance and stood up for the country’s 
sovereignty by banning nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable ships.  
The Labour Party Manifesto for the 1984 elections included all the relevant aims of the 
nuclear-free policy. The Labour Party intended to renegotiate the ANZUS Treaty so that 
New Zealand could implement an unconditional ‘anti-nuclear’ stance, an unfettered right 
to actively promote a nuclear weapons-free South Pacific, an absolutely equal partnership 
within ANZUS, and a guarantee of the complete integrity of New Zealand’s sovereignty 
(Kevin P.  Clements, 1988, p. 128). The Labour Party also planned to withdraw from 
nuclear alliances, but the Party cancelled the plan after a public opinion poll had been 
released, on 10 September 1984 (Templeton, 2006, p. 394).  
The ideology that underpinned the planned policy was originally developed by the New 
Zealand peace movements in the 1950s and the Labour Party had adopted this ideology 
by 1984. There were two important elements in New Zealand’s political history that 
facilitated the birth of the ideology of the peace movements. The first element, the more 
general one, was the aspirations of New Zealand’s society to (re)define New Zealand 
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identity, especially after the country officially became independent in 1947. As mentioned 
in the introduction of this chapter, the nuclear-free policy is strongly tied to New Zealand’s 
identity and the policy became an important element of the expression of independence 
for New Zealanders. However, the nuclear-free policy itself did not aim to represent the 
New Zealand identity; it is not the identity that defined the policy agenda, it is rather the 
other way round. The nuclear-free policy provided a platform to present New Zealand as 
an actor in global politics, and in this sense, the policy became the representation of the 
identity.  
The second element, the direct and main reason to develop an ideology and to organize 
the peace movements in New Zealand, were the US and British nuclear tests, especially 
those at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands during the early 1950s (K. Clements, personal 
communication, November 28, 2017). Witnesses and the aborigines living nearby on 
those islands when the tests began in 1952 claimed that the bombs’ effects were 
massively devastating (Locke, 1992, p. 160). There was one test visible also from New 
Zealand. David Lange saw one nuclear blast on ) July 1962 from Otahuhu, which is about 
half an hour’s drive from Auckland (Lange, 1990, p. 10), and this test later became known 
as the high-altitude Van-Allen Belt test (Templeton, 2006, p. 99).1 The visible test had an 
impact on New Zealand society and the public became suspicious about the use of nuclear 
technology. 
Importantly, there was no single organization for the peace movement. There were many 
civilian initiatives such as the New Zealand Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (NZCND) 
which was established in 1959 (Locke, 1992, p. 164), the Religious Society of Friends 
(Quakers) and the Peace Squadron (an organised group of sailors, surfers and other 
volunteers to block nuclear ships’ entry to New Zealand). However, their nuclear-free 
ideologies were very similar. The building blocks of the ideologies were the common 
beliefs over the destructive and poisonous nature of nuclear technologies (both weapons 
and power generation), the trust in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the perception 
that the USA was a militaristic power, and the option that New Zealand could play a 
leading role in nuclear disarmament.  
 
1 Some sources claim that it was a failed missile test in June 1962 (Stuff, 2014). 
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From these building blocks the movement composed straightforward policy 
recommendations. Beliefs about the devastating effects of nuclear technologies defined 
the NZCND’s policy statement in the late 1950s. This statement expressed the will that 
the New Zealand government should not acquire or use nuclear weapons, that New 
Zealand should not be defended by these weapons, that New Zealand should withdraw 
from SEATO and ANZUS, that New Zealand should play an important role in nuclear 
disarmament, and that the state should promote the cessation of nuclear tests worldwide 
(Locke, 1992, pp. 165-168). Additionally, they specifically intended to ban the use of 
weapons in the Southern hemisphere, and the peace movement elaborated the slogan, 
“No bombs south of the line!” – the Equator. For example, this was the slogan of the 
petition in 1963 when the NZCND collected 80,238 signatures (Dewes, 2005, p. 106; Locke, 
1992, p. 180). This petition was the largest after the one for the female suffrage 
movement. The main aim of the petition was to call for a Southern Hemisphere Nuclear-
Free Zone.2 The aspiration to exit nuclear alliances returned by the 1980s when the peace 
movement emphasized that the nuclear-free policy, independence from the USA and 
neutrality would be a viable option. Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland were the model 
cases for New Zealand, therefore exiting ANZUS was explicitly among the peace 
movement’s aims.3 
With respect to peaceful resolution of conflicts and peaceful resistance, the effects of 
Māori culture were dominant. As authors such as Dewes (2005, p. 105) and Szabo (1991, 
p. 74) describe, the movement used the ideology of one of the Māori tribes for peaceful 
resistance; as both authors mention even “Mahatma Gandhi emulated the non-violent 
direct actions of Te Whiti-o-Rongomai and Tohu Kākahi  at Parihaka during the Taranaki 
Land Wars,” which raised the enthusiasm of Greenpeace activists for disobedience. The 
non-violent ways were inherited by the Peace Squadron to block ships’ entries into the 
ports during the 1970s. They purposefully and consciously used sailing ships, kayaks, 
 
2 Although the government considered the petition, practically no further action followed the discusion 
(Templeton, 2006, pp. 115-116). 
3 By 1984 it was not only the Labour Party that was considering the exit from ANZUS. Smaller parties, such 
as Social Credit, promoted the concept of ‘armed neutrality.’ The view of Social Credit included that one 
year’s military training would be compulsory for all men, but the country should withdraw from ANZUS. 
Another party, the New Zealand Party, regarded Switzerland, Sweden and Costa Rica as possible models of 
neutrality for New Zealand (McMillan, 1987, p. 14).  
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canoes, rubber craft, boats or small yachts. The slogan “mine the harbour with [our] 
bodies” (Newnham, 1986, p. 6) was part of their ideology and intentions. 
The rather negative perceptions of the USA emerged during the 1960s. After the 1950s, 
the peace movement focussed on South-East Asia, namely, the Vietnam War, and the 
slogan of “No war in Vietnam” became the strongest in the 1960s (K. Clements, personal 
communication, November 28, 2017). This period proved to be crucial regarding the 
nuclear-free policy because this was the period when New Zealanders started perceiving 
the United States as a more militaristic state than the Soviet Union. During the second 
half of the 1960s, the peace movement’s focus returned to New Zealand and the Southern 
Pacific when France started performing nuclear tests at Muroroa. Although geographically 
Muroroa is far away from New Zealand, similarly to the Marshall Islands, symbolically 
Muroroa was close because it was ‘below the line,’ namely, the Equator. During the early 
1970s, it was the French nuclear tests that generated continuous public opposition against 
nuclear technologies; then, after 1975, the key element that triggered further protests 
was the regular American warship visits.  
The extension of nuclear-free ideology to oppose nuclear power generation occurred 
during the 1980s and was encouraged by Helen Caldicott’s visit in 1983 (K. Clements, 
personal communication, November 28, 2017). She was known to be one of the most 
influential scientists who opposed the exploitation of nuclear energy (Kevin P. Clements, 
1988, p. 399; The Real Truth About Health, 2017). That year, Helen Caldicott held a lecture 
in Auckland that significantly influenced the New Zealand public (The Peace Foundation, 
2016). Therefore, as a secondary consideration, the campaign against the exploitation of 
nuclear energy was also included into the peace movement’s policy recommendations. 
The ideological considerations – the beliefs about the devastating nature of nuclear 
technologies, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the negative perceptions of the USA and 
the belief that New Zealand could play a leading role – were all incorporated into the  
Labour Party’s Manifesto for the 1984 elections:  
- Intention to renegotiate the ANZUS Treaty so that New Zealand could implement 
an unconditional ‘anti-nuclear’ stance. 
- An unfettered right to actively promote a nuclear weapons-free South Pacific.  
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- An absolutely equal partnership within ANZUS, and a guarantee of the complete 
integrity of New Zealand’s sovereignty (Kevin P.  Clements, 1988, p. 128).  
The Labour Party also planned to withdraw from nuclear alliances however; this was later 
abandoned. What is relevant for the thesis is that after the extension of the ideology so 
that it also referred to the limitation and restriction of the use of nuclear power 
generation, the ideology started to become the basis of the full nuclear-free norm. In this 
sense, the New Zealand peace movement became the protest group with the most 
advanced anti-nuclear ideology in the world. Furthermore, politicians on the left wing of 
the Labour Party did intend to play a moral leadership role internationally (see the quote 
from Helen Clark in section 1.1) and they believed that New Zealand could play a leading 
role in establishing a Nuclear-Free Southern Pacific. During my interview with him, Kevin 
Clements (personal communication, November 28, 2017) described that the peace 
movement had considered the possible export of the policy. Contemporary 
commentators, such as McMillan (1987, pp. 16-17) also acknowledged that, to an extent, 
the Labour Manifesto for the 1984 elections included the international promotion of the 
policy. Considering these arguments, the ideology of the actor complied with the 
requirements of norm entrepreneurship, because the policy was meant to be promoted 
for others too, reflecting the belief that it was appropriate for others. 
However, New Zealand’s domestic nuclear-free legislation and foreign policy started to 
diverge after the elections in July 1984. Domestically, the Fourth Labour Government 
implemented the nuclear-free norm. In terms of the established policy it is relevant to 
mention that the policy excluded nuclear weapons and propulsion from New Zealand 
territory (the ship ban was a consequence of this). Besides, the government signalled that 
New Zealand did not want to be defended by nuclear weapons, and the policy 
incorporated the view that nuclear weapons are not relevant for the South Pacific. The 
defence policy that followed was an emphasis on conventional armed forces. However, 
regarding international affairs, the policy communication noted that the policy was not 
pacifism, and most importantly, politicians emphasized that the New Zealand case was 
not intended to be an example for others (McMillan, 1987, p. 77). This was surprising 
because the international promotion of the nuclear-free norm would have been a logical 
continuation of the domestic policy, especially because in 1986, 92% of the New Zealand 
123 
 
public favoured the idea of the government promoting nuclear disarmament within the 
UN and 88% supported the promotion of nuclear-free zones (Dewes, 2005, p. 109). 
Although, later, New Zealand did support nuclear disarmament advocacy, the limitation 
of nuclear power generation has not been among the aims of this foreign policy.  
Scholars have varying views why the divergence in domestic and foreign policy occurred. 
Those scholars who argue that the Fourth Labour Government did not intend to promote 
the policy internationally point to David Lange’s consistent communication. The main 
evidence for this scholarly view is that after the Labour Party was elected in July 1984, the 
Prime Minister, David Lange emphasized on countless occasions that the New Zealand 
way might not be applicable for other states. For example, in Geneva in March 1985, he 
explained:  
We do not say to any country in the world, do as New Zealand does. All we say is 
that when the opportunity is given to any country to pursue a serious and balanced 
measure of arms control, then that country has a duty to all of us to undertake 
that measure. (Lange, 1990, p. 117) 
This cautious approach was later summarised in the commonly used phrase that the policy 
was “not for export” (McMillan, 1987, p. 74). The cautious approach, the soft warning not 
necessarily to follow New Zealand’s steps is reflected for example in David Lange’s most 
important speech, which was delivered at the Oxford Union debate in March, 1985, about 
the argument ‘That all Nuclear Weapons are Morally Indefensible’. On the one hand, 
Lange expressed the view that nuclear weapons are morally unjustifiable:  
I hold that the character of nuclear weapons is such that their existence corrupts the 
best of intentions; that the means in fact perverts the end. I hold that their character 
is such that they have brought us to the greatest of all perversions, the belief that this 
evil is necessary when in fact it is not… (cited by Newnham, 1986, p. 56)   
On the other hand, Lange emphasized New Zealand’s specific conditions:  
The South Pacific is not the North Atlantic. Nuclear weapons cannot be removed from 
Europe simply by dismantling the NATO arsenal; do that, and the other nuclear arsenal 
will still be here. But in the South Pacific there is at this moment the chance to turn 
away from the inhuman logic of nuclear weapons, to stand aside from the irrationality 
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of the arms race and the doctrines of nuclear confrontation… (cited by Newnham, 
1986, p. 56)  
Other politicians also confirmed Lange’s view. These politicians composed their messages 
in a very subtle way to proclaim the proud stance of New Zealand on the one hand, but 
on the other hand to include a warning for others. Mike Moore, for example, emphasized 
the unique geographic locations of the country and that others could not afford that 
policy:  
In a way, there is no cost to New Zealand in its foreign policy. What if you’re wrong? 
Who’s going to get hurt? If you’re wrong in Thailand, or Australia, someone will get 
hurt. There’s no boat people arriving on our shores. We have the luxury of distance. 
(cited by Catalinac, 2010, p. 332)  
An anonymous interviewee for Catalinac (2010) also pointed out the unique opportunities 
and attempted to warn others not to follow the New Zealand way, saying that “[in 
Australia] you can’t afford to be a smart ass. You have to be right. Because if you’re wrong, 
there’s a huge penalty” (cited by Catalinac, 2010, p. 332).  In a similar vein, Margaret 
Wilson, who was the President of the Labour Party when the antinuclear legislation was 
introduced, distanced the New Zealand government from other states that might decide 
to implement nuclear-free zones in their territories: “we weren’t out to change the world, 
that wasn’t our purpose. We were out to say that this is the stance that were taking, if 
you would like to take it please do, but that’s your decision” (cited by Catalinac, 2010, p. 
333). 
The scholarly view that argues that the Fourth Labour Government did not intend to 
promote the policy internationally can be counter-argued. The thesis argues that the 
foundation of the ideology had been a basis for norm entrepreneurship but the policy that 
would have stemmed from that ideology, the international promotion of the norm was 
blocked by the United States and other external factors. Because of the blocks, the New 
Zealand politicians attempted to find out explanations, including an alternative ideology, 
to justify why they did not promote the policy. To prove this, the following paragraphs 
present the evidence.  
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First, it is crucial to note that the members of the Lange government appeared to be aware 
that the policy had a serious contradiction. The contradiction was that David Lange and 
the other quoted politicians emphasized that there was no strategic reason for nuclear 
weapons in New Zealand (Kevin P. Clements, 1988, p. 401) because nuclear weapons had 
no role in defending the South Pacific region, but this argument left the question open 
why those weapons would have a role elsewhere (McMillan, 1987, p. 75). David Lange 
attempted to resolve the contradiction. In his memoirs he wrote that the abbreviated 
form of the policy, ‘not for export’, “without its accompanying invitation to look for 
alternatives to deterrence, it became a nonsense” (Lange, 1990, p. 118). However, this 
explanation by Lange is again problematic, because any alternatives to deterrence implies 
exiting nuclear alliances and becoming nuclear weapons-free or nuclear-free.   
Second, in 1984 the Labour Party was not uniform regarding the nuclear-free policy. The 
right wing of the party was focusing on economic reforms and they intended to introduce 
those liberalisation measures that later became known as Rogernomics; meanwhile, the 
left wing of the party were interested in the nuclear-free legislation. The establishment of 
a nuclear-free New Zealand was the campaign promise during the snap-election process 
in July 1984, and the government had to stick to this promise. Importantly, however, the 
nuclear-free policy was part of a bargain between the right wing of the Labour Party and 
the left wing (Hensley, 2013, p. 30). In exchange for the nuclear-free legislation, the left 
wing of the Labour Party had to allow the right wing to introduce the liberalisation 
measures. David Lange, and most members of the government whose views were 
presented earlier in the quotes above belonged to the right wing of the party. During the 
interview for this thesis, Kevin Clements (personal communication, November 28, 2017) 
confirmed there had been such a bargain. The fact that the nuclear-free policy was part 
of a bargain within the Fourth Labour Government shows that the Prime Minister and his 
close partners were not the strongest advocates of the policy. This allows the presumption 
that they could be more easily influenced by external factors, such as diplomatic pressure 
by other states. 
The apparent external pressure is the key argument to prove that the New Zealand 
government was blocked, and they could not promote the policy internationally. The 
block was the United States’ opposition to the policy and this opposition gradually 
126 
 
precipitated the leaders of the Labour Party, both from the left wing and the right wing. 
In 1984, when the leaders of the new government, first and foremost the Prime Minister 
met international partners, they realized the pressure against the policy and that there 
was no room for that ambitious policy. So they decided only to introduce the policy 
domestically. The first event when the external pressure to block the export of the policy 
might have happened was in July 1984 when George Shultz, then US Secretary of State, 
visited New Zealand. Because the Labour Party’s intentions would cause problems within 
ANZUS, Shultz wanted to meet the incoming Labour Prime Minister, David Lange, on 17 
July 1984 (Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training, 2015). During the meeting, Lange 
expressed his intention to elaborate a solution to maintain ANZUS while implementing 
the nuclear-free stance. The possible solution implied that with the permission of the New 
Zealand Prime Minister, access to the country’s ports would be granted for nuclear-
capable ships. Although no one remembered precisely what was said during the meeting, 
Lange allegedly elicited an understanding from Shultz that economic sanctions would not 
be imposed on New Zealand (McMillan, 1987, p. 96). 
After this meeting Lange consistently emphasized the ‘not for export’ approach. He was 
also advised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade that it would not be wise to 
challenge the nuclear deterrence policies in the West, and European leaders also told him 
not to argue against nuclear weapons in their countries (McMillan, 1987, p. 75). However, 
it took a while for the intentions of the ‘not for export’ approach to reach everyone in 
New Zealand diplomacy. It is likely that the New Zealand diplomatic corps understood the 
policy as it was meant to be promoted: Burford (2016, p. 16), for example, refers to 
Kennedy Graham, a New Zealand diplomat, who was delegated to Geneva to the 
Conference on Disarmament. Kennedy has told how in late 1987 he received explicit 
instructions from his superiors in Wellington to stop promoting New Zealand’s nuclear-
free policy. The wording of the reference, “to stop promoting” is important. This shows 
that initially, the policy had already been promoted by the country’s diplomats.  
In a recent publication, Clements (2018, p. 223) provided details in a lengthy footnote 
about threats by US diplomacy to stop the possible ‘export’ of the policy. One threat was 
delivered by the US Ambassador, Paul Cleveland, during a dinner. Cleveland asked 
Clements to inform Helen Clark (then the Chair of New Zealand’s Foreign Affairs Select 
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Committee) and Fran Wilde, Member of Parliament, that the possible export of the 
antinuclear policy, especially to Japan and to Mexico, would result in neutralisation. When 
Clements asked what ‘neutralisation’ would mean, the answer was simply: “Death.” It is 
quite difficult to understand what the US Ambassador meant by this: was it a death threat 
against the two prominent Labour politicians or did it mean that New Zealand would 
suffer, for example through trade sanctions?  
Regardless of the content of the threat, it is essential to note that Helen Clark and Fran 
Wilde belonged to the left wing of the Labour Party, and they were possibly the strongest 
promoters of the nuclear-free policy. They both signed an advertisement of other New 
Zealanders which was published in The Washington Post during the 1984 US election 
campaign. The advertisement asked the Reagan administration not to pressurize New 
Zealand on the nuclear-free stance (McMillan, 1987, p. 108). Beyond this, after 14 July 
1984, Helen Clark was appointed to be the chair of the Select Committee preparing the 
draft of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Although the Labour Party intended to 
promote a nuclear weapons-free South Pacific, the final version of the draft which later 
became known as the Rarotonga Treaty (signed on 6 August 1985) left the question on 
port entries to the countries within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The South Pacific 
countries could decide individually whether they would allow nuclear-propelled or 
nuclear-capable ships into their ports. This was disappointing for members of the left wing 
of the Labour Party (Templeton, 2006, pp. 324-326). The disappointing content of the 
treaty might have been the consequence of the threats coming from the US diplomacy. 
Nevertheless, it appears Helen Clark remained active on nuclear-free issues after the 
signing of the Rarotonga Treaty, given that Paul Cleveland was appointed to be the US 
Ambassador to New Zealand on 10 January 1986, so the threat Clements described was 
delivered after the signing of the Rarotonga Treaty.    
In the aforementioned publication Clements (2018, p. 223) argues that the threats caused 
New Zealand not to ‘export’ the policy:  
The United States chose to limit the damage from the New Zealand challenge to 
its deterrent strategy by insisting on Alliance obedience and allied opposition to 
such movements (the New Zealand peace movement) in other parts of the world. 
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This meant that successive New Zealand governments chose the cautious path and 
did not actively promote New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy externally.  
During the interview for the thesis, Kevin Clements confirmed the threats. As he expressed 
it, the New Zealand Government was tied down by American diplomacy, and had the 
Government made further steps towards the export of unilateral nuclear-free policy, 
trade sanctions would have been implemented (personal communication, November 28, 
2017).  
For all these reasons, it is demonstrated that the original ideology of the Fourth Labour 
Government served as a base for norm entrepreneurship (the international promotion of 
nuclear-free life). However, the government changed this, and the official stand remained 
the ‘not for export’ approach. This was likely caused by the US diplomacy which blocked 
New Zealand’s intentions. 
  
5.3. Extensive efforts: The evolution of the nuclear-free policy   
The proceedings of the policy can be separated into three periods. The first period starts 
at the end of the Second World War and ends in 1984. This period was characterized by 
the activities of domestic and international pressure groups that caused public opinion to 
increasingly oppose the use of nuclear weapons and the ship visits by the United States, 
visits which might have brought nuclear weapons and propulsion into the country. 
Nevertheless, it would not be fair to claim that only the protests groups performed efforts 
against nuclear weapons. Successive New Zealand governments were indeed worried 
about the radioactive fallout and attempted to keep nuclear tests away from the Pacific 
Region, or at least, in locations which were distant from New Zealand.   
The second period of this policy occurred between 1984 and 1990, when the threshold 
events took place. New Zealand’s nuclear-free identity was established, the period was 
dominated by state diplomacy and legislation. It was not only the policy that became 
implemented but also the commitments of the political parties to this policy  (Burford, 
2011, p. 61) were highly relevant. This commitment made it possible for the nuclear-free 
policy to become a characteristic taken for granted by New Zealand. The third period 
started at the beginning of the 1990s, since the state supported the aims of many Non-
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Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and, also, stepped up for nuclear disarmament 
internationally. This is the period in which the policy became well established in New 
Zealand’s diplomacy.  
In this section, I present the most important efforts that were performed by the New 
Zealand governments and owing to which the policy can be regarded as meeting the third 
criterion of norm entrepreneurship, performed efforts to mobilise resources to promote 
the norm. 
 
5.3.1 Before 1984: increasing public support for the policy 
The New Zealand antinuclear movement was evolving along with international 
antinuclear movements (Locke, 1992). The most important phenomenon in this period 
was that civil organizations and activists were protesting against the use and proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. Mainly because of this pressure, and to a lesser extent by self-
initiation, New Zealand governments took numerous steps for nuclear disarmament to 
create a nuclear-free country and a nuclear weapon-free zone in the region. The most 
extensive efforts were performed by the governments led by Keith Holyoake (Prime 
Minister in 1957 and between 1960 and 1972) and the Third Labour Government, led by 
Norman Kirk and Sir Wallace Rowling4 between 1972 and 1975.  
By the late 1950s there were already protests against testing. The trigger to protest 
against the tests was the UK’s and the US’s tests mainly on the Bikini Atoll at the Marshall 
Islands (K. Clements, personal communication, November 28, 2017). Initially, the New 
Zealand navy was helping the British forces to carry out their tests (Operation Grapple), 
as in the case of the British H-bomb test on the Christmas Islands in 1957, when the New 
Zealand navy sent two frigates to patrol the surrounding seas. These navy operations were 
performed according to the policy of ‘Where Britain goes, we go’ (Locke, 1992, pp. 158-
161). In this sense, the government’s policy was not yet either promoting or opposing the 
tests, and nuclear disarmament was not a focus. Practically, norm entrepreneurship was 
not present in the government’s policy in any aspect. However, during 1955 and 1956, 
there was intensive correspondence between the British government and the New 
 
4 Sir Wallace Rowling was commonly known as Sir Bill Rowling. 
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Zealand government to decide the location of the tests so that the possible radioactive 
contamination would be limited in New Zealand (Templeton, 2006, pp. 72-73) 
Witnesses and aborigines living near those islands of the tests starting in 1952 claimed 
that the explosions were devastating, and scientists also expressed their worries in their 
manifesto in 1955 (Holloway, 2011, p. 15). The claims of the witnesses and the victims of 
radiation inspired local political initiatives in New Zealand. Among them, one of the most 
important was by the Quakers who organised a petition in 1956 (signed by 83 academics 
and church people) and in the next year they performed a door-to-door petition in 
Auckland gaining 7,500 signatures (Locke, 1992, p. 160). That year, there was also a 
parliamentary debate about the use of nuclear weapons, but the government regarded 
the alliances with states with nuclear weapons (ANZUS, SEATO) as necessary for New 
Zealand’s security (Locke, 1992, pp. 160-161). Apart from the government’s reluctance to 
change the official approach to nuclear weapons, the Quakers’ movement got support 
from other groups such as from the ‘No More War Movement’ which was established in 
the 1920s (Locke, 1992, p. 75), from the Council of Women, from the Federation of 
Labour, and from the National Council of Churches (Locke, 1992, p. 161). Although the 
Quakers’ petition gained support from MPs as well and the Ministry for External Affairs 
“felt obliged to consider all aspects,” eventually the government did not change its 
approach regarding nuclear tests and in the UN voted against Indian and Japanese 
resolutions calling for a stop to the tests (Templeton, 2006, pp. 84-85). 
After the first British H-bomb test, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was 
launched in Great Britain, and in 1957 the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) 
was established in the United States, and these events further encouraged the protesting 
activists in New Zealand. Their conventions adopted the name New Zealand Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (NZCND) in 1959 (Locke, 1992, p. 164). NZCND was unique in its 
approach given that the campaign targeted the existing government and wanted to build 
up public support for its goals; meanwhile, other CNDs, such as those of the British or the 
Australians targeted mainly the Labour parties (Locke, 1992, pp. 165-168). 
As described in section 5.2, the New Zealand peace movements focussed on the Vietnam 
War in the 1960s. However, after the establishment of NZCND, the pressure on the 
government was already high enough to stand up against nuclear weapons. In 1963, the 
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National Government led by the Prime Minister Keith Holyoake5 made the first (although 
rather small) step to promote nuclear disarmament by voting for the UN Partial Test-Ban 
Treaty, an act that can be regarded as the first moment the state was exercising efforts to 
promote the nuclear-free norm. Nevertheless, between 1957 and 1963, after the British 
H-bomb tests were completed, the New Zealand Government articulated its opposition 
to nuclear tests. But, when the Soviet Union exploded the largest bomb ever (the Tzar 
Bomb, equivalent of 50 megatons) on 30 October 1961, New Zealand abstained from the 
voting in the UN to stop nuclear tests (Templeton, 2006, pp. 86-94).  
After the peace movement’s attention became strong against nuclear weapons when the 
French nuclear testing started in 19666 at Muroroa and Fangataufa (the secondary test 
site in case Muroroa was saturated by radioactive contamination), the government was 
under increasing pressure to promote more policies against nuclear weapons.7 One of the 
significant moments of this movement was when, in 1968, a Christchurch-based student 
publication, Canta, composed a special Omega8 edition that stirred an intense debate in 
New Zealand over whether the state should allow the establishment of any of the Omega 
stations in New Zealand’s territory, because that might have pushed New Zealand to 
become a target during a possible nuclear war (McKinnon, 1993, p. 188). As a response to 
the pressure groups in the international arena, the Holyoake Government, alongside 
Australia and the US, supported the UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, 
another element of the state making efforts to promote the norm against the use of 
nuclear weapons. Also, the policies of Arthur Calwell, the leader of the Australian Federal 
Labour Party, who composed the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the Southern Hemisphere 
described later in section 5.4, were reiterated by the Holyoake government, yet, there 
were no further steps made in the late 1960s. These events were the preliminaries to the 
 
5 Some scholars, for example, Burford (2011) argue that the Labour Party has stronger links to the 
antinuclear policy. However, the first steps by the New Zealand government to promote nuclear 
disarmament were performed by a government led by Keith Holyoake, a politician from the National 
Party. His governments between 1960 and 1972 consistently supported the moves in the UN and in other 
forums towards nuclear disarmament. 
6 Between 1966 and 1974, France executed 44 atmospheric nuclear tests (Dewes, 2005, p. 106). 
7 The government was very cautious at first to express its opposition to the French nuclear tests. In 1962, 
it was reported that France was finding an alternative test site in the South Pacific to replace the Saharan 
region. New Zealand’s cautious approach was due to the negotiations with the European Economic 
Community about a preferential deal (Templeton, 2006, p. 108).  
8 Omega was an American navigation system (McKinnon, 1993, p. 188). 
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creation of the Southern Pacific Nuclear Free Zone that came to life only after the 
Rarotonga Treaty in 1985 (Dewes, 2005, p. 106), and this work can also be accounted an 
element of norm entrepreneurship performed by the state.  
By 1970 the Holyoake government realised the public pressure against French nuclear 
tests in the Pacific and attempted to raise the issue in every international forum available, 
including the South Pacific Forum. The Forum specifically asked New Zealand to convey 
the South Pacific opposition to France. After Keith Holyoake’s resignation in February 
1972, the new Prime Minister John Marshall attempted to highlight the dangers of nuclear 
testing. At the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, together with 
Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, Peru and the Philippines, New Zealand co-
sponsored a statement condemning nuclear tests. Similar statements were composed at 
the SEATO conference and at the UN General Assembly to condemn all nuclear tests 
(Burford, 2016, pp. 116-119).   
Earlier, in 1971, a further step was made by the Holyoake Government that also can be 
regarded as part of a policy of norm entrepreneurship to establish the nuclear-free norm: 
the government technically banned nuclear-powered US warships from entering New 
Zealand ports.9 This was again a reaction to public concerns about nuclear radiation, a 
reaction that led the government to analyse the risks of the use of nuclear energy. In 1968, 
a sub-committee of the New Zealand Atomic Energy Committee was established for the 
analysis (Templeton, 2006, p. 350). The conclusion of the analysis was the rejection of 
nuclear energy (Locke, 1992, p. 308). However, it was not obvious at first glance at the 
recommendations of the committee which included the requests for the ships to shut 
down their reactors while in ports and the demand that the US take liability for any 
nuclear contamination (Templeton, 2006, p. 351). The ship ban was executed by the 
government, and Holyoake informed the US administration that “it would not accept visits 
by nuclear-powered vessels until the United States agreed to accept liability in the event 
of accident and/or widespread contamination” (Hensley, 2013, p. 6; McKinnon, 1993, p. 
190). Although in 1974 the US government accepted this liability, the ships could not enter 
 
9 During the ship ban, nuclear capable ships could still visit New Zealand’s ports (McMillan, 1987). 
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New Zealand ports. The ban was lifted only when a new National government was elected 
in 1975 (McKinnon, pp. 190-191). 
As a further element of supporting the nuclear-free policy, and as a government response 
to the pressure from public opinion, a draft UN resolution aimed at banning all sorts of 
nuclear tests in June 1972 was sponsored by the Holyoake Government. Holyoake built 
up a coalition with eight other supporting countries (co-sponsors). The resolution was 
passed by the UN General Assembly (Locke, 1992, p. 297). The final way in which the 
Holyoake government performed a significant antinuclear policy was when it voted for 
the UN Seabed Arms Control Treaty in 1972 (Locke, 1992, p. 308).  
In order to make the anti-nuclear sentiment an issue in the 1972 election, NZCND in 
Auckland launched another petition to which it gathered 81,475 signatories (Dewes, 2005, 
p. 107). After election, the Labour Party formed a government and, between 1972 and 
1974, during the prime ministership of Norman Kirk, the government brought about 
important new agendas to promote nuclear-free life, namely, opposition to testing, and 
the idea of the ban of nuclear weapons from the Southern Pacific. Kirk was a strong 
supporter of disarmament, either nuclear or conventional.10 He did not pursue a cautious 
approach towards France to save the trade relations arguing that “it was no use being the 
richest cancer case in the hospital” (Templeton, 2006, p. 159). 
Kirk was the Prime Minister when in 1973, together with Australia; New Zealand 
submitted a case against France at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to find a 
resolution to stop the French atmospheric tests. France refused to appear at the ICJ and 
went on with atmospheric testing, and as a response to this refusal, Kirk sent a frigate, 
the Otago, to visit the test sites and raise international public awareness against nuclear 
tests (McKinnon, 1993, p. 189). Eventually, France announced it would give up 
atmospheric testing and went on with underground tests; therefore, the ICJ did not rule 
any jurisdiction (Dewes, 2005, p. 107).  
Kirk raised the issue of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the UN in 1973. However, it 
became clear quickly that a comprehensive test ban was unacceptable for the nuclear 
 
10 Burford (2016, p. 110) regards Kirk as a norm entrepreneur because his policies were backed by 
‘normative convictions.’  
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weapons states (Templeton, 2006, pp. 197-198). Kirk’s government announced that it was 
considering the option to propose the creation of a South-Pacific Nuclear Free Zone via a 
UN resolution (Dewes, 2005, p. 107; McKinnon, 1993, p. 190). After Kirk’s death in 1974, 
his successor, Wallace Rowling, continued his efforts, and in 1975, at the summit of the 
South Pacific Forum, the Forum considered the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone as 
desirable. Based on the decision of the Forum, Fiji and New Zealand together submitted 
a draft resolution to the NPT (McKinnon, 1993, p. 190), an umbrella organisation of the 
UN under which nuclear weapons-free zones were established. The resolution was passed 
by the UN General Assembly in October 1975 (Newnham, 1986, p. 8), but after the defeat 
of the Third Labour Government in the election in November that year, no further steps 
were made to create that zone. This was because the new Prime Minister, Robert 
Muldoon, started a new security agenda which included the removal of the ban on the 
entries of US ships to New Zealand ports (Locke, 1992, p. 316). Therefore, the Rarotonga 
Treaty, the South-Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty eventually came to fruition 
only in 1985, when the Muldoon Government was replaced by the Fourth Labour 
Government. 
In the second half of the 1970s, with the Prime Ministership of Robert Muldoon, the public 
support for the antinuclear policy was growing. This was partly a reaction to Robert 
Muldoon’s dictatorial leading style which was represented in more cases, most 
importantly by the Springbok Tour in 198111 and the regular visits of nuclear-propelled 
and capable US warships (K. Clements, personal communication, November 28, 2017). 
The Peace Squadron organized protests against the vessels entering New Zealand’s ports. 
All these visits triggered intense Peace Squadron protests as Newnham (1986) described. 
These visits still happened and were often regarded as tragic (Locke, 1992, p. 316) because 
the warships and submarines were able to reach the ports. With these visits and the 
oppression of the Peace Squadron protests, Muldoon was practically emphasizing who 
was in control of the country. This arrogant policy was strongly opposed by much of the 
public and the antinuclear sentiment strengthened (K. Clements, personal 
communication, November 28, 2017). There were protests also in larger cities as well as 
 
11 The Springboks were the South African rugby team that visited New Zealand in 1981. The key debate 




at sea. Local communities and neighbourhoods started declaring themselves nuclear-free 
zones to which schools and councils also joined (Dewes, 2005, p. 108).  
There was another aspect of opposing nuclear technologies, because after the oil shocks 
of 1973, the Muldoon government commissioned a study to discuss the use of alternative 
energy sources to replace fossil fuels. In this study, the possible building of a nuclear 
power plant was also researched. As a response to the announcement of these studies, 
Greenpeace activists founded the Campaign for Non-Nuclear Futures (CNNF) in March, 
1976. In order to express their opposition to the consideration of the use of nuclear 
energy, the CNNF members started collecting signatures for a petition called Campaign 
Half Million in June 1976 and by October that year they had amassed 333,078 signatories 
(Szabo, 1991, p. 75).  
Between 1976 and 1982, polls showed significant, but not majority (33%-39%) support for 
opposing ship visits (McKinnon, 1993, p. 192), but by 1983 the opposition to the ship visits 
had increased to 72%  (New Zealand History, n.d.-c). At this point, it is relevant to note 
that although the Muldoon Government is usually regarded as the one which generated 
the opposition to nuclear-capable and nuclear-propelled ship visits, this Government was 
still consistent in opposing the nuclear tests. For example, within the UN, the Muldoon 
Government was cooperating with Australia to achieve results in elaborating the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Templeton, 2006, p. 306). 
By 1984, the nuclear-free policy had gained a new momentum which eventually led to the 
replacement of the Muldoon Government. In that year, the Labour Party introduced a bill 
to Parliament to prohibit nuclear weapons from New Zealand. This bill was supported by 
some members of the National Party  including Marilyn Waring M.P., who signalled that 
she would not support Prime Minister Muldoon in the case of voting on the visits of 
nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels (Newnham, 1986, p. 55). On the voting, 
Marilyn Waring and Mike Minogue voted for the bill. It was not accepted only because 
two Labour MPs voted against it (McMillan, 1987, p. 11). Because Muldoon did not want 
to govern carrying a risk of a vulnerable majority in defence issues, he dissolved the 
Parliament and called a snap election on 14 July 1984 (Dewes, 2005, p. 108). Therefore, 
indirectly, it was the nuclear-free policy that led to the snap-election. Nothing confirms 
the relevance of the nuclear-free stance in 1984 more strongly than the fact that during 
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the televised leaders debate, the incumbent Prime Minister and the challenger, David 
Lange, devoted 12 minutes of the roughly 57 minutes timeframe to security issues and 
ANZUS (TVNZ, 2017). Usually, these debates are rather inward-looking, and foreign policy 
issues are rarely discussed. Prior to the election, 66% of the population were living in 
locally declared nuclear-free zones, and according to polls, 58% opposed US ship visits, 
while this figure was lower in 1978, when 51% of the population still supported the US 
ship visits (Dewes, 2005, p. 108). 
 
5.3.2 The threshold events between 1984 and 1990 
The period of the Fourth Labour Government between 1984 and 1990 was the threshold 
of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy. It appears to be simple to think that what happened 
was only due to the Labour Party, which had campaigned with the promise to make New 
Zealand a nuclear-free country, kept its campaign promise and by the end of the first 
three-year term, that codified the 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament 
and Arms Control Act. But importantly, with the Act that became law on 8 June 1987, the 
government defined New Zealand’s conditions of the norm of living nuclear-free 
(Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2013). Therefore, the legislation and the nuclear-free 
policy of the Fourth Labour Government are both very important regarding norm 
entrepreneurship.  
In practice, the Fourth Labour Government exercised the nuclear-free policy immediately 
when it came to power. The policy meant the ban on nuclear-powered ship visits to New 
Zealand’s ports and the ban on nuclear-capable vessels that did not declare whether they 
carried nuclear weapons. However, the policy contradicted the United States navy’s policy 
according to which it would neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons 
on vessels. Because the Labour Party’s intentions would cause problems within ANZUS, as 
it was described in section 5.2, the then US Secretary of State, George Shultz, met the 
incoming Labour Prime Minister, David Lange, on 17 July 1984 (Association for Diplomatic 
Studies & Training, 2015). During the meeting, Lange expressed they would elaborate a 
solution to maintain ANZUS while implementing the nuclear-free stance. The possible 
solution implied that with the permission of the New Zealand Prime Minister, access to 
the country’s ports would be granted for nuclear-capable ships.   
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Shultz’s concerns were growing since early 1980s when the Labour Party’s stance on the 
issue of ship visits became firm, and meanwhile the governing National Party would 
continue the ship visits on a regular basis, the Labour Party wanted them to occur only on 
special occasions (Templeton, 2006, pp. 378-379). Furthermore, the Labour Party 
intended that there would be no nuclear weapons carried into New Zealand’s ports which 
was unacceptable for the US because  they did not want to compromise their neither 
Confirm nor Deny policy (Kevin P. Clements, 1988, p. 401).  
Other countries within the Western Alliance pursued nuclear-free policies, such as 
Iceland, Norway and Japan. These countries had certain ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ type 
solutions to overcome the issues: they did not ask – and the US did not tell – whether 
nuclear weapons were carried on board. Additionally, there were announcements that 
these countries were nuclear weapons-free and the US – at least rhetorically – respected 
these states’ stance. There were crucial differences in New Zealand compared to these 
states which explained why the ‘don’t ask – don’t tell’ formula was not applicable for New 
Zealand. First, New Zealand did not perceive military threats in the beginning of the 1980s, 
while the other countries did. Second, and most importantly, the leaders of the Labour 
Party were members of the generation that spent their childhood in the 1960s, when the 
peace movement started considering the US as a militaristic power, and this generation 
could not trust the US leaders (McMillan, 1987, pp. 64-70).  
The hard test of the policy was when the nuclear-capable guided-missile carrier, the USS 
Buchanan, requested entry to New Zealand in January 1985.12 Because the Prime 
Minister, David Lange, was away from New Zealand and it was not possible to make 
telephone contact with him, the Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, had to make 
the decision. Palmer was an academic lawyer (Campbell Live, 2015) who approached the 
problem in a legally precise way. Therefore, he could not conclude other than from the 
information given to the cabinet, which was not fully convincing, whether the ship carried 
nuclear weapons (Hensley, 2013, pp. 99-104), so the most likely outcome of the decision-
making process was the government asking for more information and/or another ship to 
visit. The access to the USS Buchanan was denied. 
 
12 There are scholars, such as Hensley (2013, pp. 98-104) who argue that Lange knew more details about 
the USS Buchanan. In November, 1984 Lange met US generals to choose the ship to ask for entry in 1985. 
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Because of the denial, the annual meeting of ANZUS that year was cancelled, and New 
Zealand ceased to get information from US intelligence. Although these adversities were 
looming as a threat for New Zealand to be excluded from the military alliance, the nuclear-
free norm was strengthened and presented internationally on 1 March 1985, when the 
Oxford Union Debate on the motion “That all Nuclear Weapons are Morally Indefensible” 
took place and David Lange was the lead speaker for the pro-argument. That speech is 
regarded as David Lange’s best speech, and he won the debate (Newnham, 1986, p. 56). 
The government was consistent in elaborating the policy, but by the middle of 1986, the 
ANZUS annual meeting was coming. In June 1986, George Shultz and David Lange met 
again, and then Shultz became aware that Lange’s government could not elaborate a 
solution to maintain ANZUS. After their meeting, Shultz announced that the US would 
suspend its obligations within ANZUS towards New Zealand (Hensley, 2013, p. 267).   
After New Zealand’s ousting from ANZUS, the New Zealand parliament voted for the New 
Zealand Nuclear Free, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987, a codification of the 
nuclear-free norm. The Act codifies Lange’s original intentions which aimed to remain 
within ANZUS, but at the same time, to ban nuclear warheads and nuclear propulsion from 
New Zealand. The Act prohibits the acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and the 
stationing and testing of such devices. Furthermore, the law also prohibits the presence 
of biological weapons in New Zealand (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2013). As an 
important element of the legislation, as it was mentioned earlier, the 1987 Nuclear Free 
Act established PACDAC, an advisory committee to the government on nuclear 
disarmament issues which is unique in the world (Dewes, 2005, p. 110). This organisation’s 
official responsibility is to provide advice to the Prime Minister, to the Minister for 
Disarmament and Arms Control and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 
implementation of the Nuclear Free Act, and other related issues on disarmament that 
the organisation consider relevant (Burford, 2011, p. 60). Although there are debates 
recently whether this committee is still relevant (see Burford, 2011, pp. 60-61), it has an 
independent budget (M. Hobbs, personal communication, June 21, 2018).  
Regarding the possible visits of nuclear-capable ships, the Act sets the rule that it is the 
Prime Minister’s responsibility to decide whether such a vessel can have access to New 
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Zealand’s ports. With this option, Lange hoped to remain within ANZUS. Article 9 of the 
Act includes these clauses:  
(1) When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the entry 
of foreign warships into the internal waters of New Zealand, the Prime Minister 
shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to 
the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and 
security interests of New Zealand. 
(2) The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the internal 
waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that 
the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into 
the internal waters of New Zealand. (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2013) 
Although the prohibition of the exploitation of nuclear energy is not mentioned in the Act, 
the New Zealand understanding of living nuclear-free includes this. First, Article 11 of the 
Act prohibits the entry of nuclear-powered ships to New Zealand’s ports (Parliamentary 
Counsel Office, 2013), mainly because of the exploitation of such energy. Furthermore, 
public opinion is most likely still strong in opposing the use of nuclear energy, but, we 
have to admit that there are no recent polls about the preferences of nuclear energy.  
Concerning New Zealand identity and norm entrepreneurship the policies of the Fourth 
Labour Government are highly relevant. Regarding the formation of New Zealand identity, 
it is crucial that by 1990 the policy was adopted by both large parties, Labour and National. 
With respect to the National Party’s perception of the policy, Jim Bolger (personal 
communication, 16 May 2018) described that initially, the National Party was concerned 
about the introduction of the nuclear-free policy because it put New Zealand security and 
defence alliances at risk. However, by 1990, when the National Party won the election, it 
became clear that New Zealand society wanted to retain the nuclear-free status. Jim 
Bolger, as the leader of the opposition in 1987, during a visit to Great Britain already 
hinted that in case the National Party won the elections that year, there would be no 
overnight changes to the nuclear-free policy (Templeton, 2006, p. 498).  
Regarding norm entrepreneurship, the international implications of the policy have been 
important. During the ANZUS crisis between 1984 and 1986, the global political 
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environment was dominated by the Cold War, and in the beginning of the 1980s, with the 
Reagan administration, the arms race between the superpowers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, further intensified. In 1983, the US administration announced the 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), one that was supposed to create a shield against hostile 
intercontinental missiles in space. Beyond the SDI, in 1983, the United States started an 
implementation programme and placed mid-range (Persching) missiles into Europe, 
mainly in West Germany. The SDI programme and the placement of Persching missiles in 
Europe caused anxiety within the Soviet regime. The international public experienced 
tensions between the superpowers. Because of the experienced tensions, at the time 
when the Fourth Labour Government was elected, the end of the Cold War was not 
envisaged at all, and the superpowers were confronting each other. The nuclear arms race 
was very intense, and in the 1980s, the number of nuclear warheads was increasing 
exponentially so that in 1986 it reached its all-time record with more than 60,000 
warheads (chart presented by Holloway, 2011, p. 21). Therefore, the unity of American 
military alliances, such as NATO and ANZUS, was very important for the US, and the US 
could not let any diversion from the practices of the alliances. In this sense, the ANZUS 
debate was a globally important case for the US. The Lange Government dared to 
establish the nuclear-free policy in these international conditions, an act showing a strong 
commitment towards the nuclear-free norm that can be recognised as a very important 
element of norm entrepreneurship.  
However, during the ANZUS debate, there were signs of détente. In March 1985, Mikhail 
Gorbachev was elected to be the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. He 
announced the policies of perestroika (the reform of communism) and glasnost (openness 
– in effect freedom of speech). Alongside these, he initiated disarmament talks and 
unilaterally stopped nuclear testing. At the end of 1985, the President of the United 
States, Ronald Reagan, and Gorbachev met in Geneva and started negotiations on 
disarmament, and, immediately, the easing of the relations could be felt (Holloway, 2011, 
p. 20). Although there was no breakthrough agreement until December 1987, when they 
signed the agreement on disarmament of mid-range nuclear-powered missiles, the two 
leaders started building up trust towards each other. 
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In June 1986 George Shultz announced that the US would no longer hold its obligations 
within ANZUS towards New Zealand. It is quite possible that the US administration was 
convinced that the Soviet Union would not start a nuclear war. Therefore, the risks of 
possible nuclear warfare were already decreasing. We may never find out what sort of 
possible global scenarios existed in George Shultz’s mind to conclude that he would intend 
to keep New Zealand as a friend but ‘no longer ally’. There may have been options if non-
nuclear capable US ships had been allowed to visit New Zealand. Or, in the case of trade 
sanctions having been mentioned, New Zealand might have turned back from declaring a 
nuclear-free status. As a bottom line, practically, we can agree that the mere fact that the 
US did not implement trade sanctions meant New Zealand was allowed to unilaterally 
implement the nuclear-free status. 
The fact that New Zealand implemented the nuclear-free policy unilaterally caused 
geopolitical discourses within the Western Alliance to consider the option to become 
nuclear-free. The fear of the US strategic thinkers that New Zealand’s example might have 
been followed by other states, such as Australia, Japan or Mexico (which has been called 
the ‘Kiwi disease’) was indeed present (Dalby, 1993). As an element to block other states 
to follow the New Zealand way, the US used harsh rhetoric and relatively strong 
countermeasures (end of intelligence for New Zealand, ousting from ANZUS). The 
message of US diplomacy was clear: “New Zealand had to pay dearly for its actions if the 
integrity of the Western alliance was to be maintained” (Kevin P. Clements, 1988, p. 401). 
Other analysts argue that the US overreacted New Zealand’s unilateral steps to establish 
a nuclear-free country, and the fear of the spread of the ‘Kiwi disease’ might have been a 
misjudgement (McMillan, 1987, pp. 106-107). Nevertheless, New Zealand’s steps in the 
1980s indeed showed that a small state’s policies can influence intellectuals to compose 
similar policy recommendations, a small state is not ineffectual. Finally, regarding norm 
entrepreneurship, the policy became a case of leading by example. New Zealand 
implemented the nuclear-free norm domestically but the country was not allowed to 




5.3.3 The nuclear-free status in New Zealand’s foreign policy   
In 1990, the Fourth Labour Government was defeated at the elections, and this coincided 
with the end of the Cold War. That year brought about a new international security regime 
that modified the great powers’ perceptions on nuclear disarmament issues. The most 
important characteristic of the post-Cold War security regime is ambiguity, because the 
nuclear disarmament process and proliferation have been present at the same time. With 
the change of the global political context, the New Zealand nuclear-free policy remained 
consistent; however, it is important to signal that the main focus of the policy after 1990 
has been the continuous support for nuclear disarmament. Also importantly, the New 
Zealand public’s attitude on nuclear issues and disarmament did not change significantly, 
and the political debates did not lean to favour nuclear armaments and technology, yet 
the creation of new nuclear-free zones outside New Zealand was not raised. In this sense, 
the norm that was established in New Zealand was only partly promoted internationally.  
With respect to the changing international context, it is important to note that there were 
significant political campaigns for nuclear disarmament and the nuclear weapon states 
also made significant steps. In July 1991, for example, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START I) was signed by the US and the Soviet Union (Freedman, n.d.), or more recently, 
in 2010, the United States and Russia signed a new strategic nuclear arms control 
agreement (Howlett, 2011, p. 395). Furthermore, there are other attempts to control the 
trade of all those materials that are necessary components of nuclear weapons. Examples 
are the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) defined to control the transfers of 
technology to deliver nuclear weapons (Howlett, p. 392) and the planned international 
agreement of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that is to prohibit the trade of 
highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the two main components of nuclear weapons 
(Kimball & Reif, 2018). However, there have always been concerns relating to the viability 
of all these treaties about whether they can bear significant results (Howlett, 2011, p. 
393), and new nuclear weapon states (India, Pakistan) appeared as well. For all these 
reasons, the period after the end of the Cold War is mixed regarding nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament because there are results in treaties but also there are 
concerns emerging.  
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New Zealand’s politicians experienced the same ambiguity in international relations 
regarding nuclear arms. As Jim Bolger (personal communication, May 16, 2018), New 
Zealand Prime Minister between 1990 and 1997, expressed it, it was understood as a good 
development after 1990 that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia retained the 
Soviet nuclear capabilities, because the control the ex-Soviet arsenal remained under one 
state’s responsibility. This showed there were considerable efforts made on nuclear non-
proliferation, and the possible danger of nuclear warfare faded. But, at the end of the 
1990s, new nuclear powers emerged. Although South Africa abandoned its nuclear 
programme in 1993 (see also Howlett, 2011, p. 395), India and Pakistan performed nuclear 
tests in 1998 and, furthermore, that was when it became known that Israel had obtained 
nuclear weapons, but it was uncertain when exactly it had. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, the ambiguity remained. Although the number of nuclear 
warheads decreased significantly from the late 1980s, when the number of such warheads 
reached 60,000, as Marian Hobbs (personal communication, June 21, 2018), Minister for 
Disarmament between 2002 and 2005, has warned, the damaging power of the nuclear 
arsenals was still increasing at that time. Besides, the nuclear weapon states were 
focusing on non-proliferation rather than disarmament. Importantly, the non-
proliferation efforts were also selective, because with respect to Israel, Pakistan and India, 
the Western nuclear weapon states were more forgiving than in the cases of Iran and 
North Korea. Similarly, Phil Goff (2006), who served in various ministerial positions 
between 1999 and 2008, expressed in a paper the view that the disarmament process had 
a pause in the first decade of the twenty-first century, mainly owing to the lack of political 
will.  
Internationally, both in the private sector and in the public sector, there have been 
numerous initiatives to promote nuclear disarmament. As Rydell (2011, p. 31) presents, 
there have been at least 10 private initiatives (Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, Abolition 
2000, Appeal for US Leadership for a Nuclear Weapons-free World, Middle Powers 
Initiative, Global Zero, Hoover Plan, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 
International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear catastrophe, Blix Commission, 
and NGO Response to Blix Commission). Among these plans, probably the Hoover Plan 
was the most relevant, when in 2006, George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and 
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William J. Perry, composed a paper for nuclear disarmament (Perry, 2011, p. xvii). There 
were 10 public initiatives as well (Sarkozy Letter to Ban Ki-moon, Five Point Proposal by 
Ban Ki-moon, Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, 
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Norwegian 
Initiative, NPT 13 steps adopted at 2000 NPT Review Conference, Nuclear Disarmament 
by the Nonaligned Movement, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office “Lifting the 
Nuclear Shadow”, Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World by the New Agenda Coalition, 
and the Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons by 
Japan). Although New Zealand participated in some of these initiatives (Abolition 2000, 
Middle Powers Initiative, and the New Agenda Coalition), it was Canada and Australia not 
New Zealand which played the crucial role to organise those agendas.  
Regardless of the public and private initiatives, the nuclear-weapon states’ attitude 
towards the process is the decisive factor in nuclear disarmament. With respect to this, 
the ambiguity appears to remain. For example, in 2009, the then US President Barack 
Obama announced a strong commitment to disarmament in his speech in Prague, on 5 
April (The White House, 2009), but in 2017, the new President, Donald Trump, has 
increased defence expenditure and plans to expand it further, although the proportion 
spent on nuclear weapons is not known (Korb, 2018). There are recent positive signs for 
disarmament as well; for example, the Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty that was 
adopted by the United Nations on the 7 of July, 2017 (MFAT, 2017a). With respect to the 
chances of successful disarmament, the current New Zealand Ambassador for 
Disarmament, Dell Higgie (personal communication, May 24, 2018), has highlighted that 
whilst movement towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is dependent on 
the views of possessors and above all of the US and Russia, that does not stop political 
processes, such as the Humanitarian Consequences Initiative, or a legal development such 
as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, from having impact (whether 
supported by the nuclear weapon possessors, or not).  
In the ambiguous international political environment, New Zealand’s nuclear-free stance 
became a strong element of the state’s foreign policy. However, at the beginning of the 
1990s, the governing National Party was still considering the return to the US alliance and 
to modify the Nuclear Free Act (Burford, 2016, p. 165). By 1993, the National Party 
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realized that the public support for nuclear-free legislation was so strong that any 
modification would bring more harm to the party than anything else (Reitzig, 2006, p. 
134). After the National Party realized the importance of the nuclear-free stance, the first 
step to promote the nuclear-free approach was the New Zealand government’s support 
for the World Court Project (WCP) in 1993 and 1994. In 1994 the WCP achieved a 
breakthrough when the United Nations General Assembly asked for an advisory opinion 
from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legal status of the threat and use of 
nuclear weapons (UN resolution 49/75 K). It was initiated by Harold Evans (Burford, 2011, 
p. 66), and Kate Dewes was another important member of the World Court Project. 
Eventually, New Zealand was one of the two Western-allied countries that voted for the 
UN resolution calling for an advisory opinion on the use and threats of nuclear weapons 
in December 1994 (Disarmament and Security Centre, 1999).  
Although the New Zealand support for the WCP is an element of promoting the norm of 
nuclear disarmament and as such it can be understood as an effort in a norm 
entrepreneurship agenda with regards to a nuclear-free life, it is important to mention 
that UN resolution 49/75 K (United Nations, 2018) was not sponsored by New Zealand 
(the extent of a norm promoting effort would be larger in the case of the actor being a 
sponsor of a proposal). The draft resolution gained support through the mechanism of the 
World Health Assembly, in which the World Court Project had a significant influence, and 
it was adopted by the UN General Assembly only in 1994, when the Non-Aligned 
Movement sponsored it (Dewes, 2005, pp. 110-111). New Zealand could have acted more 
to promote the nuclear-free policy, such as by sponsoring the resolution. But New Zealand 
eventually voted for it at least, together with only one other Western-allied state, namely, 
San Marino (Burford, 2011, p. 67).  
One of the next elements in supporting the nuclear-free policy internationally took place 
during 1995, when France started nuclear testing again in the South Pacific. New Zealand 
cooperated with Australia to convince ASEAN to publish a statement for the end of testing 
(Burford, 2016, p. 180). Besides, the New Zealand government, owing to strong civil 
society protests, applied to reopen the 1973 ICJ Tests case, in spite of the fact that MFAT 
officials advised the government not to. On 23 February 2000, the New Zealand 
Parliament passed a unanimous resolution to call all UN member states to fulfil their 
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obligations to conclude negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament, citing the NPT 
Article VI obligation, as reaffirmed by the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion (Burford, 2011, p. 72). 
The text was exactly the same as that which Harold Evans, a British born New Zealand 
journalist, sent to all New Zealand MPs in April 1998.  
In August 1996, New Zealand and South Africa signed a memorandum of Cooperation on 
Disarmament and Arms Control, and Prime Minister, Jim Bolger called the nuclear weapon 
states to commit themselves to nuclear disarmament (Burford, 2016, pp. 180-181). 
Another move to promote nuclear disarmament happened in 1997, when Australia, 
following the ICJ Opinion, initiated the Canberra Commission (Burford, 2011, p. 68). In 
that commission, Australia wanted an unequivocal commitment from the Nuclear 
Weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. New Zealand was inspired by this 
Australian initiative, and the state made an identical claim in its working paper to the NPT 
Preparatory Committee. This claim was very similar in its goals to the unequivocal 
commitment to nuclear disarmament that was raised by Australia. This proposal later 
proved to be vital in the establishment of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), a group of 
seven countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden). 
In the NAC, New Zealand played an important role and this group of countries was decisive 
in the NPT Review Conference in 2000. One of the NPT Main Committee’s subsidiary 
bodies was led by a New Zealander, Clive Pearson, and the final document of the Review 
Conference reflected the ideas of the NAC. The final document had 13 steps to complete 
nuclear disarmament which practically can be regarded as an ‘unequivocal undertaking’ 
of the Nuclear Weapons States to abolish their nuclear arsenals (Burford, 2011, p. 68).  
Later, the members of the NAC joined the Humanitarian Initiative that was a response to 
the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament (Minor, 2015). This initiative attempted to 
push forward nuclear disarmament by raising the problem’s humanitarian consequences. 
Within the Initiative, New Zealand had an important role; for example, in 2013 and in 
2014, on behalf of 125 and later 155 countries, New Zealand delivered the Initiative’s 
public statements to the UN General Assembly (Minor, 2015, p. 715). Beside these moves, 
the NAC remained active within the NPT Review process, and in 2015 on behalf of the 
NAC, New Zealand submitted a working paper highlighting the issue of the incomplete 
nuclear disarmament framework (Minor, 2015, p. 729).     
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There were other private initiatives to promote nuclear disarmament, but not all of them 
received support from the New Zealand Government. For example, Abolition 2000 was 
again a programme initiated by individuals. Although it achieved media attention on the 
nuclear disarmament issue in New Zealand, it could not get the government to make any 
motion against nuclear weapons (Burford, 2011, p. 69). On the other hand, Helen Clark, 
Prime Minister between 1999 and 2008, Foreign Minister Phil Goff, and the Head of 
MFAT’s Disarmament Division, Geoff Randall, along with Canadian, Irish and Swedish 
Foreign Ministers, endorsed the works of the Middle Power Initiatives (a large network of 
NGOs) (Burford, 2011, p. 71).  
As I have described, after 1990, NGOs have had strong support by the New Zealand public, 
and there is no real difference of position between the government and NGOs or the NZ 
public regarding the need for nuclear disarmament nor on the ways in which the 
government works to promote nuclear disarmament (D. Higgie, personal communication, 
May 24, 2018), even though, as Clements (2018) argues, they shifted their focus to other 
issues such as indigenous rights. Besides, the New Zealand government showed a strong 
commitment to nuclear disarmament and performed important policies domestically, for 
example, with the adoption and implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT).  
New Zealand was among the first signatories to the CTBT. The treaty was adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996 (United Nations, 2000) and it 
was opened for signature on the 24 September 1996. New Zealand signed the treaty on 
27 September 1996 and the New Zealand Parliament also ratified it on 19 March 1999 
(CTBTO, 2012). The aim of this treaty is simply to ban all kinds of nuclear explosions and 
through that reduce the possible risks of contamination. To achieve this aim, according to 
the Treaty, 337 sites are planned to be established to monitor explosions (CTBTO, 2012). 
All seven of the sites that New Zealand took responsibility to set up are operating and are 
certified by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). And New 
Zealand was amongst the pioneering countries to establish these sites. By 2001, 
worldwide, there were 11 sites certified, among them two in New Zealand (the Kaitaia 
and the Chatham Islands radionuclide observatory stations). By 2003 New Zealand could 
certify another two sites (the Rata Peaks and the Urewera auxiliary seismic observatory 
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stations), and worldwide there were 47 stations certified. By 2005, another two stations 
became certified in New Zealand (the National Radiation Laboratory in Christchurch and 
the Chatham Islands infrasound observatory stations), and the number of certified 
stations grew to 125 globally. By 2007, New Zealand had fulfilled its commitment with the 
certification of the Raoul Island auxiliary seismic observatory stations; meanwhile, the 
total number of established stations in the world were 194, compared with the planned 
377 (CTBTO, 2017). In 2013, these stations helped to detect the North Korean nuclear test 
(MFAT, 2017b).  
The US government also acknowledged New Zealand efforts against nuclear proliferation 
in 2008 when the then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, visited New Zealand 
(Taylor, 2008). This acknowledgement came after the events in 2006 when North Korea 
had performed a nuclear test. After the test, then Prime Minister, Helen Clark, alerted the 
United Nations and during the negotiations with North Korea, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, Winston Peters, had an important role as mediator.  
Between 2008 and 2017, New Zealand’s antinuclear stance remained straightforward, 
given that the then Prime Minster, John Key unequivocally declared that while he 
remained Prime Minister, the nuclear-free policy would not change. During his term, New 
Zealand continued the efforts to support the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
Conferences, and also organised events, such as Exercise Maru 2015, to test responses to 
an international proliferation event, and during this event, best practices were shared (NZ 
Customs Communications, 2015). But, the efforts to raise the attention on the risks of 
nuclear proliferation, as in the case of the Iranian nuclear programme, started to 
decrease. Scholars such as Clements (personal communication, November 28, 2017) also 
missed the governments’ efforts to raise awareness of possible nuclear proliferation.   
Most recently, the New Zealand government supported (and attended) all three 
Humanitarian Impact Conferences starting with the first in Oslo in 2013 – all of which were 
also supported by the New Agenda Coalition and by the 16-member Humanitarian 
Consequences grouping. The government was also working to advocate for lowering the 
operational-readiness and the launch-readiness status of nuclear weapons, mostly 
promoted by the De-alerting Group (Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, 
Switzerland) and the elaboration of the Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty (D. Higgie, 
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personal communication, May 24, 2018). In May 2018, the New Zealand Government 
decided to ratify this treaty (New Zealand Government, 2018).   
After more than 30 years, it appears to be highly likely antinuclear legislation will remain. 
The youngest generation, the millennials, seem altogether less focused on global issues 
like nuclear disarmament (D. Higgie, personal communication, May 24, 2018). This may 
change after the world comes to know more details about nuclear weapons again because 
of the disarmament talks and debates concerning North Korea’s programme. But the 
generation that helped introduce the antinuclear legislation, the baby boomers and their 
children, are still strongly related to this policy. The baby boomers had grown up by the 
early 1980s and they did not live during the Second World War about which they felt fewer 
risks than their predecessors (Hensley, 2013, pp. 15-16); therefore they were more 
inclined to introduce the antinuclear legislation even with risking the loss of an alliance 
with the US.  
In early 2018, the new government that came into power in 2017 recreated the role of 
Minister for Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control, a role that was disestablished in 
2011. The role belongs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Winston Peters, who 
is also Deputy Prime Minister. In this sense, the government is fulfilling its campaign 
promise to do more on nuclear disarmament (NewsHub, 2018b). 
 
5.4. Leadership and norm life-cycle: Awareness of the nuclear risks 
In this section, I describe how the nuclear-free norm appeared historically. First, I present 
how scientists, politicians and the public recognized the dangers of the application of 
nuclear weapons. Then, this section discusses when and where the first protest groups 
appeared, and I present how the idea of establishing nuclear-free zones emerged. Finally, 
I discuss the use of nuclear power generation. This section is to provide the answer 
whether New Zealand was the first or among the leaders to elaborate and present the 
norm of living nuclear-free. 
With regards to leadership in terms of opposing the use of nuclear weapons, New Zealand 
cannot be recognised as leader for two reasons. The first is because the people who first 
recognised the dangers of nuclear technology were members of the international 
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scientific community. Although there are some arguments that ‘only a few people realised 
what the introduction of nuclear weapons meant to the world’ (Locke, 1992, p. 158), we 
can argue that since the first successful tests in Los Alamos, New Mexico, July 1945, 
criticism against these weapons appeared. Robert Oppenheimer, for example, who was 
the leading scientist of the development of the nuclear bomb, expressed his criticism of 
the use of atomic weapons in October 1945.  
Oppenheimer believed the world after the Second World War was not ready to handle 
nuclear bombs properly: he said, “the peoples of this world must unite or they will perish” 
(cited by Holloway, 2011, p. 15). As a main critic of the nuclear bomb, Oppenheimer also 
presented in many interviews and as well as in a memorial television series that he felt 
personal responsibility for the possible destructive power he had brought to the world. In 
1965 in a televised broadcast, he spoke about the Trinity test and his memories. As he 
remembered, when he had seen the explosion, he recalled a verse from the Hindu script, 
Bhagavad Gita: “Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds” (AtomicArchive.com, 
n.d.). 
Albert Einstein admitted that regarding nuclear bombs, the “annihilation of any life on 
earth has been brought within the range of technical possibilities” (Newnham, 1986, p. 
4). These examples show that the appearance of the nuclear bomb had a deep and 
thorough effect on scientists. The mere existence of nuclear bombs triggered a critical 
approach towards social issues even among natural scientists (Svachulay, 2007, p. 103); 
in other words, prior to the atomic bombs, (natural) scientists were usually “apolitical and 
that began to change” (Wittner, 2009, p. 10). Niels Bohr, the Danish scientist also regarded 
the potential of the atomic bomb as dangerous; he attempted in the first half of 1945 to 
convince both Roosevelt and Churchill about the international control of nuclear 
technology, but his efforts were initially unsuccessful (Holloway, 2011, p. 15). Bohr’s 
approach was later accepted, and in November 1945, US President Truman “called for a 
UN commission to study how atomic weapons might be eliminated and atomic energy 
applied to peaceful uses” (Holloway, p. 16). These governmental efforts were the first 
steps in nuclear disarmament, and these resulted in the US State Department releasing 
the Acheson-Lilienthal Report which recommended a strong international agency to 
control nuclear technology. This report was presented to the UN Atomic Energy 
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Commission in June 1946 by Bernard Baruch, who modified the report and recommended 
the UN Security Council forgo the right of veto in this policy area. Although the Baruch 
Plan was accepted by the UN Atomic Energy Commission, the Security Council did not 
accept it because of the Soviet veto (Holloway, 2011, pp. 16-17). 
The second reason New Zealand is not a leader in the sense of presenting the norm to the 
world is because the first protest movements emerged in Japan, where the atomic bombs 
were dropped. In November 1945, a Japanese author, Yoko Ota, wrote a book, City of 
Corpses, about the devastation in Hiroshima, but the book could not be published because 
of censorship of the American occupying forces. In March 1946, Japanese intellectuals 
launched a magazine, Chugoku Culture, as a protest against the use of nuclear weapons. 
These intellectuals also started a campaign to hold World Peace Day on 6 August, as a 
memorial to the victims of the Hiroshima bombing (Wittner, 2009, pp. 10-11).  
Outside Japan, after the end of the Second World War, there were other countries where 
protest movements appeared. It was because the world public reaction was also critical 
against the use of the atomic bomb by the US. An American journalist, John Hersey, 
published another book, Hiroshima in 1949 (Wittner, 2009, p. 10). After the British H-
bomb test in 1955, scientists composed their criticism of the exploitation of nuclear 
technology in a manifesto (Holloway, 2011, p. 15). Their main argument contained 
cosmopolitan elements, as though they were speaking as humans not as members of any 
nation, and the most important goal was to avoid nuclear warfare, because that could 
lead to the extinction of humankind (Locke, 1992, p. 159). Philosophers, for example, 
Derrida (1993), also wrote about the dangers of nuclear warfare, a vision of an apocalypse 
close to humankind. Also, after the British H-bomb test in 1955, in Great Britain, the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was launched (Locke, 1992, p. 164). In the 
United States, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) was formed in 1957 and 
this movement organized protests in the early 1960s against atmospheric testing and the 
use of nuclear weapons. The CNDs in Great Britain and Australia were also active, and 
there was a peace movement in the Soviet Union too; however, this civil group could not 
strongly oppose the Soviet government’s policy (Locke, 1992, p. 165). The New Zealand 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (NZCND) was established a couple of years later than 
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these groups, in 1959 (Locke, 1992, p. 164), so technically, the New Zealand movements 
were established among the leaders, but they were not the first.  
The third reason New Zealand cannot be regarded as the first actor to present the idea of 
nuclear weapon-free zones is that it came from elsewhere. Templeton (2006, pp. 252-
258) presents how this idea developed. In 1955, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden 
outlined the idea to create a zone free from nuclear weapons between the Western and 
the Eastern armies facing each other on the two sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’. Based on this 
idea, in 1957 the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki specified this zone for Poland with 
a ban on production and storing of nuclear weapons in the country. Also in that year, Asian 
and African state leaders expressed their views on a denuclearized Africa and Asia at an 
Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo. In 1961, Sweden proposed the establishment of 
a ‘non-nuclear club’ at the UN, and the members of the club would not acquire or receive 
nuclear weapons. In 1962, Brazil advocated for a denuclearized Africa and Latin-America, 
meanwhile, Indonesia outlined a vision for a nuclear weapons-free Asia and Pacific region. 
Closer to New Zealand and the South Pacific, in 1962, Arthur Calwell, the leader of the 
Australian Federal Labour Party, composed the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the southern 
hemisphere (Locke, 1992, p. 180). His proposal outlined the extension of the nuclear-free 
zone of Antarctica signed in the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, a treaty initiated by the 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. At that point, the possibility 
of nuclear-free zones was already being discussed worldwide, and the issue was raised by 
others than New Zealand politicians. The first nuclear weapon-free zone13 was created to 
protect the Antarctic, the Antarctic Treaty, coming into effect in 1961 (UNODA, n.d.-a). 
This was followed by the Space Treaty in 1967 (UNODA, n.d.-d), the South American and 
Caribic Treaty (also known as the Tlatelolco Treaty) in 1969 (UNODA, n.d.-c), and then in 
1972 the Seabed Treaty (UNODA, n.d.-e) al came into effect. Although the New Zealand 
government started to consider the option to promote the nuclear-free zone in the 
southern hemisphere, it happened during the late 1960s (Dewes, 2005, p. 106). The first 
government that effectively promoted the idea of the Nuclear Free Southern Pacific was 
 
13 According to the Antarctic Treaty, it is prohibited to use nuclear weapons in that continent, storing such 
weapons is possible. The Space Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Seabed Treaty, beyond banning the 
use of nuclear weapons, they all prohibit the placement of nuclear weapons in the relevant territories too. 
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the Third Labour Government led by Norman Kirk between 1972 and 1974 (Locke, pp. 
308-310), and, eventually, it was Kirk’s successor, Bill Rowling, who convinced the South 
Pacific Forum in 1975 that the South-Pacific Nuclear Free Zone was desirable.  
Similarly to the case of the ideas and the proposals to establish nuclear weapons-free 
zones, New Zealand was not the first in opposing nuclear tests. The first test ban treaty, 
the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, was signed in 1963. It happened nine years before the 
Holyoake government sponsored a draft UN resolution which aimed at banning all sorts 
of nuclear tests. Therefore, regarding the prohibition of the use and the placement of 
nuclear weapons in given territories, the analysis shows that it was neither the New 
Zealand public nor the politicians who first described the norm of living without the use 
and presence of nuclear weapons. The first movements to promote the idea of nuclear-
free policies appeared in Japan, and the idea to create nuclear weapon-free zones did not 
come from New Zealand originally. However, it is relevant to note that the New Zealand 
nuclear-free movements appeared only a couple of years later than the first groups in the 
world; practically, New Zealand was among the leaders of such a policy. Considering that 
it was the initial phase of the norm life cycle – it was the emergence of the norm – New 
Zealand can be considered as a norm entrepreneur in this respect. 
However, regarding the opposition to the utilisation of nuclear power generation, New 
Zealand is definitely a leader. As described in sections 5.2 and 5.3, the opposition against 
nuclear energy appeared in the 1960s. The Nuclear Free Act 1987 prohibited the entry for 
nuclear-powered vessels, but as argued earlier, practically the establishment of a nuclear 
power plant is also impossible in New Zealand because that would contradict the nuclear-
free legislation. 
Earlier in section 5.2 it has been presented that after the establishment of the New 
Zealand nuclear-free identity, the Rarotonga Treaty was signed. Although the chair of the 
drafting committee of the treaty was Helen Clark, who was probably one of the most 
enthusiastic advocates for the nuclear-free stance, the treaty left the question of port 
entries to the member states. That meant that New Zealand could not promote the norm 
even to the closest allied states, the Pacific Island Countries. Eventually, none of the 
countries implemented similar protocols for port entries. Their immediate reactions were 
mixed. There were states which supported New Zealand (Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, 
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Papua New Guinea); however the majority distanced themselves from New Zealand 
(Kevin P. Clements, 1988, p. 402). At that point, it was only South Africa that abandoned 
its own nuclear weapons programme in 1993. Therefore, the New Zealand case could not 
attract followers from other allied countries.  
However, the leadership role of New Zealand may have become important later on, 
especially because of the rejection of nuclear power generation. According to recent 
statistics, there are 28 countries that have established nuclear power plants, and the vast 
majority of the power generation capacities became operational during the 1970s and 
early 1980s. In the Southern Hemisphere, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa employ 
nuclear power generation (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2019). After the Chernobyl nuclear 
accident in 1986 the newly built capacities started decreasing. After the Fukushima 
accident in 2011, there were countries that performed earth-quake simulations (stress 
tests) and Germany decided to phase out all nuclear power generation capacities by 2022 
(International Energy Agency, 2012). 
Regarding the use of nuclear power generation in marine vessels (military or civilian), 
fewer countries applied this technology than the nuclear weapon states. Israel, Pakistan 
and North Korea do not have nuclear powered ships or submarines; meanwhile, the other 
nuclear weapon states (including India) have nuclear ships. Even the civilian use of this 
technology occurs in the case of the nuclear weapons states, and it is Russia that has the 
largest nuclear-powered transportation fleet (World Nuclear Association, 2019a). These 
vessels may bring nuclear risks to many places, regardless of borders.  
Because the New Zealand nuclear-free legislation created a region free from nuclear 
power generation, and because New Zealand has been active in advocating for nuclear 
disarmament, the state can be regarded as a norm entrepreneur. Unfortunately, as 
presented in section 5.3, the damaging power of nuclear weapons is larger than ever, so 
the risks of nuclear catastrophe are also large. Few people appear to be aware of this. As 
William Perry, former US Secretary of Defence warned, the danger of nuclear devastation 
may be larger than in the Cold War, therefore more states like New Zealand are needed 




5.5. Policy consistency: steady disarmament advocacy 
In this section, I discuss the consistency of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy. As it has 
been presented in section 2.6, the first element of this analysis is the observation whether 
the actor’s policies and practices have any direct contradiction to the norm. If there is no 
direct contradiction with the norm, then the researcher should observe whether the 
actor’s policies and practices have inconsistencies with the values and principles 
embodied in the norm. In this analysis the researcher shall decide whether a policy agenda 
is consistent on a case by case basis because there is no scientific method to weigh up the 
possible inconsistencies that may exist between actual policies and the values embodied 
in the norm.  
The nuclear-free norm requires the absence of nuclear weapons and nuclear power 
generation in the agent’s territory. In case any policy aims at increasing the quantity of 
nuclear weapons or the nuclear power generation fuels, then that policy directly 
contradicts the norm. In New Zealand’s case there has been no direct contradiction 
between the norm and the actor’s policies and practices, New Zealand has been 
consistent with the norm. New Zealand has not acquired nuclear weapons, there has been 
no nuclear fuel or waste stored in the country’s territory. Besides, the state has not 
supported other states efforts in establishing nuclear power generation facilities or 
development of nuclear weapons. Instead, the state has been supporting nuclear 
disarmament advocacy after the 1980s, the internalization of the nuclear-free identity.  
Nevertheless, after the 1980s there were debates regarding the nuclear-free legislation, 
however, the debates have not significantly affected the credibility of the actor, the New 
Zealand state. The legislation remained at place and since the Nuclear Free Act came into 
effect, there was no modification to the law. Moreover, the outcome of the debates 
showed that the nuclear-free norm is deeply embedded in New Zealand.  
Earlier, in section 5.2 it was noted that the official ideology of the Fourth Labour 
Government had a contradiction, namely, the belief that nuclear weapons did not play a 
role in the defence of the South Pacific. This left the question open why those weapons 
had a role elsewhere. In that section, the contradiction of the ideology was explained. It 
was caused by external factors. The United States’ diplomatic efforts intended to block 
the possible international promotion of the nuclear-free norm, and there were threats 
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against New Zealand. Therefore, the leaders of the Labour Party had to find an alternative 
explanation why New Zealand could implement the norm and why they did not 
recommend the adoption of the norm to other states. Additionally, the leaders were also 
aware of the contradiction; in his memoirs, David Lange attempted to explain extensively 
why the ‘not for export’ phrase did not make any sense without mentioning the other 
states’ responsibilities over disarmament and finding alternatives to deterrence.  
After the threshold events between 1984 and 1990, and the internalization of a nuclear-
free identity, New Zealand’s international policies regarding the promotion of and 
supporting nuclear disarmament have been extensive and highly consistent, as it was 
described in section 5.3.3. Prior to that, there were inconsistencies, but after the early 
1970s, after the expression of the need to develop an independent foreign policy, 
politicians became aware of the relevance of consistent politics. This occurred because in 
the 1960s, during the correspondence with the French government to (re)consider the 
location of planned nuclear test sites or cancel the tests in the South Pacific, Keith 
Holyoake realized that he could not argue that New Zealand had been consistent in 
opposing nuclear testing in the South Pacific. The cause was simple, the Holyoake 
Government would not oppose British testing in the area in the early 1960’s (Templeton, 
2006, pp. 104-114). After the internalization of the nuclear-free identity, however, which 
was also an expression of independence in foreign policy, the New Zealand government 
opposed Western countries, in case they were planning or performing nuclear tests in the 
Pacific region.  
After 1990, at least four debates have emerged regarding nuclear-free legislation, but 
eventually, none of them affected the nuclear-free status of New Zealand, and the 
nuclear-free policy remained consistent. The debates showed, however, there were 
different views about the country’s defence policy as well and how nuclear-free legislation 
impacted on the options to improve trade relations with Western partners, most 
importantly the United States.   
The first debate took place immediately after the end of the Cold War. The US announced 
that its surface vessels would no longer carry nuclear weapons (Reitzig, 2006, p. 134). 
After this announcement, there was a study commissioned by the New Zealand 
government, examining whether nuclear-powered ships were safe enough to allow them 
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entry into New Zealand’s ports. This was the Somers Commission and their report found 
that nuclear propulsion did not have any significant risk: practically, it was safe. However, 
the anti-nuclear legislation was not modified, owing to public support for the policy (J. 
Bolger, personal communication, May 16, 2018). This study was the first seed of another 
debate about whether New Zealand was really nuclear-free. National Party politicians, 
such as Simon Power (2003), often mention that hospitals using radiology technology (X-
rays) emit more radioactive contamination than any nuclear-powered ship. Practically, 
the fact that New Zealand is not entirely nuclear-free is acknowledged by Labour 
politicians too as, for example, Marian Hobbs (personal communication, June 21, 2018) 
mentioned this during the interview. However, it is crucial to clarify that medical devices 
do not apply nuclear fission nor nuclear fusion (see section 5.1) therefore this argument 
about the radioactive contamination of medical devices is redundant. 
Another debate emerged in 2000, when the then leader of the Green Party, Jeanette 
Fitzsimmons, introduced a Member’s bill to the New Zealand Parliament to extend the 
nuclear-free zone. Originally, the 1987 Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control 
Act set the borders of the nuclear-free zone for the internal waters and the territorial sea 
of New Zealand. The proposed bill aimed to extend the nuclear-free zone up to the limits 
of New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone at sea, up to 200 nautical miles from New 
Zealand’s shores. The bill was not accepted and  it lost its second reading (Green Party of 
Aotearoa New Zealand, n.d.) due to the governing Labour Party. According to the 
justification, it would have been impossible to enforce the law and it would have 
contradicted the UN Convention of the Law of the Seas that includes the freedom of 
navigation in states’ exclusive economic zones. The relevance of this bill, beyond the 
extension itself, is that it recognized the risks of the utilisation of nuclear energy and it 
intended to ban the transport of nuclear waste and reprocessed fuels too. Hence, this 
proposed bill reflected again the idea of nuclear-free New Zealand where it is not only the 
nuclear-powered and capable ships that are banned from the country but also the various 
sorts of nuclear fuels. Although the bill was not adopted, this did not contradict with the 
norm: practically the legislation could not have been enforceable.   
A wider debate emerged during the election campaign in 2005 with the leader of the 
National Party, Don Brash signalling the possible reconsideration of US ship visits and the 
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antinuclear policy. He was quite equivocal, mentioning that this might change only after 
a referendum (Capie, 2006, p. 30). During the interview, Don Brash (personal 
communication, April 30, 2018) explained why the renewal of US ship visits was discussed 
in the National Party in 2004 and 2005: it was the recognition that the nuclear-free policy 
and the ban on US ship visits were straining New Zealand’s relationship with the US, one 
of New Zealand’s longest-standing allies. In New Zealand’s defence policy, the Western 
orientation was the dominating aspect  traditionally because, according to the US, their 
surface vessels were not carrying nuclear weapons after 1991. Therefore the National 
Party leaders thought that there was a way to re-establish the US-New Zealand defence 
relations.  
Academics, experts and policy analysts, however, had a debate in 2005 about the possible 
counter-effects of the nuclear-free status of New Zealand and the country’s opportunities 
to achieve new free-trade agreements (Gentles, 2005; Reitzig, 2006). The main question 
was whether the anti-nuclear policy did harm to the development of New Zealand’s trade 
relations. While there was no evidence that might have shown New Zealand’s trade had 
been detrimentally affected by the anti-nuclear policy, the situation appeared to reach a 
turning point in 2005 given that the United States signed a free-trade agreement with 
Australia but not with New Zealand (Reitzig, pp. 138-139). But, changing the anti-nuclear 
legislation is no longer possible in a way that it would allow US ship visits similarly to the 
compromise which was applied during the cold war.  
In section 5.3.2 it was described that Japan, Iceland and Norway had a ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’ that made it possible for US ships to enter the ports of those countries. This 
was the practice of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell policy’ which was also called the Danish 
compromise: Denmark expressed its intentions to remain nuclear weapon-free and the 
USA officially announced that it would respect Denmark’s intentions. Theoretically, the 
compromise would offer a solution for New Zealand to allow US warships into the 
country’s ports because by 2005, practically the nuclear-propelled vessels were in the 
scope of the legislation. After the end of the Cold War, the US declared its nuclear capable 
ships (surface vessels) would no longer carry nuclear weapons. New Zealand could have 
removed the section of the legislation (section 11) that prohibits the visits of nuclear-
powered ships, a step that would result in the same solution as was used in the case of 
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other states in the Western alliance. However, the agreement between the US and 
Denmark became compromised because the USA had stored nuclear weapons in 
Greenland. Therefore, the solution had been discredited internationally, the USA became 
untrustworthy. Because of this, experts, such as Gentles (2005, p. 23), did not regard the 
option as viable for New Zealand. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed whether New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy can be 
understood as norm entrepreneurship. To regard this policy as norm entrepreneurship, 
we have been seeking answers to four questions: whether the actor considered the norm 
as appropriate for others outside New Zealand; whether New Zealand mobilised 
resources and performed sufficient efforts to promote the norm internationally; whether 
New Zealand was the first country to recognise the importance of the nuclear-free life as 
a norm and promote it internationally; and, finally, whether the policy was consistent. 
New Zealand can be regarded as norm entrepreneur regarding this policy because all the 
elements of the policy the questions address (ideology, efforts, leadership and 
consistency) comply with the requirements of norm entrepreneurship.  
As section 5.2 has presented, the ideology of the New Zealand peace movement, which 
was acquired by the left wing of the Labour Party by 1984 provided a strong basis for norm 
entrepreneurship. The ideology focussed on global nuclear disarmament, and beyond 
this, the ban on all nuclear tests, and it did outline that nuclear-free policies would be 
appropriate for international society. However, the Fourth Labour Government’s official 
ideology was different, and it did not regard the norm as appropriate for others. But there 
are reasons to believe that the composition of the official ideology was a consequence of 
the US opposition of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policies and the norm. 
The execution of the policy, as presented in section 5.3, is also important for why we can 
regard this policy as norm entrepreneurship. The execution can be separated into three 
periods. The first period began at the end of the Second World War and ended in 1984. 
Although in this period the main activity was carried out by pressure groups, especially 
between 1975 and 1984, there were important steps performed by the state as well which 
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show the strong support for nuclear disarmament (for example, sponsoring a draft UN 
resolution aiming to ban all kinds of nuclear tests in 1972) and the establishment of a 
nuclear-free region in the Southern Pacific. Also, there were initial steps to establish a 
nuclear-free New Zealand when the Holyoake Government banned the nuclear-powered 
US ships from entering New Zealand’s ports in 1971 unless the US took liability for any 
kind of nuclear contamination during the visits.  Although during the Prime Ministership 
of Robert Muldoon between 1975 and 1984 the government’s policy was in favour of the 
visits of nuclear vessels, that just triggered the antinuclear sentiment, which claimed a 
breakthrough by the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the Muldoon government was still 
opposing all kinds of nuclear tests and supported the elaboration of the Comprehensive 
Test-Ban Treaty. 
The second period between 1984 and 1990 is the threshold of the New Zealand nuclear-
free policy. This is the period in which the nuclear-free norm was implemented and then 
legalised in 1987 by the Nuclear Free Zone Act. According to the legislation, nuclear-
capable ships cannot enter New Zealand’s ports unless the Prime Minister is content that 
the vessels do not carry such weapons. Nuclear-powered ships cannot enter the ports. 
Furthermore, there is an advisory committee (PACDAC) which is to assist the Prime 
Minister on disarmament and nuclear issues. Given that nuclear propulsion is prohibited 
in New Zealand territorial waters, the legislation established the nuclear-free norm, 
where, beyond nuclear weapons, nuclear power generation devices are not allowed. 
Owing to these efforts, New Zealand’s legislation can be regarded as part of a norm 
entrepreneurship agenda.  
During the threshold period, the execution of the agenda was concentrating on the official 
establishment of a nuclear-free zone in New Zealand. The establishment resulted in the 
United States suspending its obligations towards New Zealand under the ANZUS military 
alliance. In this period there were only a few occasions when New Zealand diplomacy 
could inform the international community about the nuclear-free norm, the most 
important event being David Lange’s participation in the Oxford Union Debate on the 
morality of nuclear weapons in March 1985. 
The third period of the nuclear-free policy began in 1990. In this period the policy became 
a strongly established feature of New Zealand’s image in international politics. Since 1990, 
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New Zealand has performed a consistent diplomacy to promote and support nuclear 
disarmament, for example supporting the World Court Project (WCP) in 1993 and 1994 to 
convince the United Nations General Assembly to ask an advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legal status of the threat and use of nuclear 
weapons (UN resolution 49/75 K) or raising the problem of the North Korean nuclear tests 
in 2006 at the United Nations.  
Although the efforts of this period were aiming at the promotion of nuclear disarmament 
only and the promotion of the ban of nuclear power generation was not the scope of the 
policy, the policy still can be regarded as norm entrepreneurship. Concerning the ‘export 
of the policy’ I have presented why New Zealand was passive in this regard: the export of 
the policy was restricted by the United States. Therefore, we can conclude, the 
international promotion of the policy was intended but it was also prohibited. To the 
extent of the intentions, the policy can be regarded as norm entrepreneurship. 
As demonstrated in section 5.4, the international awareness of the use of nuclear 
weapons increased after the end of the Second World War, and it was not New Zealand 
that first recognised the dangers of those weapons. However, concerning leadership, the 
policy is norm entrepreneurship. Although the first movements to oppose nuclear 
weapons appeared in Japan, in the United States, and in Great Britain, the New Zealand 
peace movement started to stand against the use of nuclear weapons a couple of years 
later than the movements in the other states. For this reason, the New Zealand protesters 
were among the leaders. More importantly, New Zealand was indeed the leader of 
opposing the utilisation of nuclear energy and New Zealand was the first country that 
implemented a nuclear-free zone legislation which prohibits the use of nuclear energy in 
the country.  
Similarly, the consistency of the policy has been proven. There were no intentions to 
install nuclear technologies in the country, therefore, there was no direct contradiction 
between policies and the norm. Although there have been debates regarding the policy, 
these debates did not affect the policy itself, as I have demonstrated in section 5.5. Public 
opinion also remained stable and has been in favour of the policy. Besides, because the 
policy became part of New Zealand’s identity and it appears as stable – it will not change 




6. Facilitating trade liberalization 
For New Zealand, international trade and access to foreign markets are very important. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in its ‘Strategic Intentions 2016-2020’ (MFAT, 
2016, p. 7) describes that New Zealand is “a global trading nation, we seek to advance our 
interests through a robust international rules-based trading system, as well as by 
negotiating high-quality and comprehensive bilateral and regional trade agreements.” 
According to Statistics New Zealand, the value of annual exports in 2017 was NZD 53.7 
billion (Statistics New Zealand, 2018), about 30% of the estimated total GDP of NZD 186.4 
billion (IMF, 2017). Because of the exports’ high proportion within the realized GDP, the 
core of the national income, the securitization of trading relations is vital to the country, 
however, at the same time scholars also treat trade relations as an instrument that 
contributes to New Zealand’s security (Rowe, 2015; Steadman, 2006). The importance of 
trade for New Zealand is illustrated by the fact that even the highest-ranked officials, such 
as the Governor General, often represent New Zealand’s trading interests in international 
relations (Cartwright, 2006, p. 9). 
Although the famous assertion by the former National Prime Minister, Sir Robert 
Muldoon, that New Zealand’s “foreign policy is trade” (Harland, 2001, p. 7) is an 
exaggeration, it is important to observe the country’s trade policy, because this policy 
area shows significant achievements during the last decades. In 1983, Australia and New 
Zealand signed the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA) (Scollay, 2018, p. 124). This agreement aimed to facilitate trading of goods 
and services and the movement of capital investments and workforce between the two 
countries (MFAT, n.d.-f). Therefore, based on these features, ANZCERTA created the first 
common economic market among states. The European Economic Community created 
the Single European Market in 1986, therefore, Australia and New Zealand were among 
the first states in this respect. 
Another important achievement is the Singapore-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement 
which was signed in 2000 (MFAT, n.d.-h), and was the first concluded free-trade 
agreement (FTA) in the Asia-Pacific region (Scollay, 2018, p. 131). Furthermore, China 
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agreed to make an FTA with New Zealand in 2004, which can be attributed to New 
Zealand’s concessions to China regarding the Chinese entry to the WTO. Later, New 
Zealand became the first developed country to sign an FTA with China in 2008 (MFAT, 
n.d.-g; Scollay, 2018, p. 134). This was mainly because New Zealand was the first state that 
had a bilateral accord on China’s WTO accession and the first  to recognize China as a 
market economy (B. J. Lynch, 2007, p. 25). 
Beyond all these achievements, it is important to mention that New Zealand’s trade 
experts are highly regarded. Mike Moore, the former Labour Prime Minister in 1990 was 
elected to be the Director General of the WTO for the period between 1999 and 2002 
(Moore, 2010, 2017). Furthermore, the trade agreements are highly ranked; for example, 
the Singapore-Chile-New Zealand and Brunei Darussalam FTA (P4) which came into force 
in 2006 (MFAT, n.d.-j) provided the basis for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPPA) trade talks (C. Daniels, 2008).        
Taking all these achievements and acknowledgements into account, the question arises 
whether New Zealand’s policies to promote free trade can be regarded as norm 
entrepreneurship. This analysis, however, should be slightly different from the one about 
the nuclear-free policy because open access to foreign markets has been New Zealand’s 
strong economic interest; therefore, the analysis of the promotion of free trade has to 
consider the ideological element of the policy with special emphasis. Scholars, such as 
True and Tanyag (2018, p. 242) often argue that the economic interests of New Zealand 
made it necessary for the country to become an exemplar of promoting free trade 
internationally. However, the norm entrepreneur candidate should also consider the 
norm as appropriate for others too, serving self-interest only is not sufficient to comply 
with the criteria of norm entrepreneurship.  
In the analysis, similarly to that in the former case study, I first present the ideological 
background of New Zealand’s trade policy. Then, the analysis focuses on the efforts of 
norm promotion (the mobilization of resources, the actual policy proceedings). Then the 
analysis addresses the question of whether the actor, New Zealand, was the first or among 
the leaders to perform this policy agenda of promoting free trade internationally, and 
finally, I analyse the consistency of the policy. I argue that the state has had a precise 
ideology about the reasons to promote free trade internationally which was to follow aims 
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beyond the national interest. The state carried out significant efforts to promote the 
norm, and the policy has been fairly consistent until 2017. Although New Zealand was not 
the first country defining and applying the norm of free trade, after 198, New Zealand did 
go ahead of the development curve. Therefore, the state’s policies between 1984 and 
2017 can be regarded as norm entrepreneurship. After 2017 New Zealand’s trade policy 
has changed and it is too early to evaluate this new era of trade policy and the free trade 
norm also appears to be in the internalisation phase. Therefore, after 2017 norm 
entrepreneurship is not applicable.  
 
6.1. Defining the free trade norm 
The free trade norm means that international commercial transactions can be performed 
without any obstacles or restrictions. The commercial transactions, the subjects of trade 
can be identified by analysing the components of a country’s balance of payments. The 
balance of payment usually has three main elements, the trade balance, the capital or 
financial balance and the changes in a country’s foreign currency reserves. The trade 
balance shows the value of the internationally traded goods and services, and it also 
includes the commercial transactions related to tourism. The financial balance includes 
those transactions which are not carried out as payments for goods and services. These 
transactions are typically performed in a way that a certain extent of funds is transferred 
from one country to another. These funds can include income transfers when a citizen of 
a country works abroad and sends his/her income home, corporates’ profits repatriation, 
short term (no longer than one year) and long term investments such as bank deposits, 
purchase of government notes and bonds, corporate shares, and direct investments (into 
machinery or other physical assets, for example real estate). The third component of the 
balance of payments is the changes in the country’s foreign currency reserves. This 
component includes the subject of the trade of a special sort of goods, the currency. 
Regarding the various obstacles to commercial transactions, there are so called ‘at-border 
barriers’ and ‘beyond border barriers’ to free trade (Castle, Le Quesne, & Leslie, 2016, pp. 
44-45). The at-border barriers are the trade tariffs, customs, direct export and import 
subsidies and administrative blocks, such as the simple ban on commerce with a specific 
country. The beyond border barriers are the specific state regulations referring to areas 
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such as health, technical, educational or other standards all of which affect trade relations 
as well.  
The following table 1. shows the elements of the balance of payments and the most 
typical barriers1 to free trade:  
Element of the balance of 
payment 
At-border barriers Beyond border barriers 
Trade balance - Quantitative restrictions (quotas) 
- Financial restrictions (customs and 
tariffs) 
- Administrative barriers 
(restrictions of origin etc.)  
- Export- and/or import subsidies 
- Health-, educational 
restrictions 
- Industrial standards 
- Production subsidies 
- Taxation 
- Varying security conditions 
- Property rights regulations 
Financial balance - Administrative barriers (exchange 
restrictions, money laundering 
rules etc.)  
- quantitative restrictions 
- exchange rate spreads  
- Restrictions on banking 
operations (capital 
requirements etc.)   
- Administrative restrictions 
(pension entitlement etc.)  
Foreign currency reserves - Convertibility limitations 
- Fixed exchange rates 
(manipulation)  
- ‘Dirty floating’2 




1 Regarding the table, it is important to note that this is a theoretically oriented summary of the possible 
obstacles to free trade. In practice, there are other approaches to observe the barriers. For example, the 
WTO monitors the elements of the trade balance and those elements of the balance of payments that are 
listed in the specific Free Trade Agreements which are registered at the WTO. Therefore, the WTO may 
monitor the financial balance as well. Concerning the other two components of the balance of payments, 
the financial transactions and the changes in foreign currency reserves are usually monitored by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
2 The phenomenon of dirty floating refers to situations when the currency of a state is floated, but the 
central bank manipulates the exchange rate of the currency through open market transactions, by buying 
or selling foreign reserves.  
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The norm of free trade is realized when the international commercial transactions in all 
the three elements of the balance of payments3 can occur without obstacles or blocks. 
The main underlying logic of why international trade relations should be free is that 
economic theories argue that resources and goods are optimally allocated when there are 
no distortions for the allocation processes which are caused by state policies. The promise 
of globally optimal allocation of resources and goods outline the maximalisation of income 
and wealth for societies. Concerning the possible realization of international free trade, it 
is relevant to outline two aspects.  
First, the third element of the balance of payments, the changes in a country’s currency 
reserves, is necessary to realize free trade internationally. This element of the balance of 
payment refers to convertibility, when the exchange of the country’s currency to other 
foreign currencies is free. Basically, two types of currency regimes exist: the fixed-rate 
currency rate system and the free-floating one. In the fixed-rate regime, the central bank 
maintains a certain level of the exchange rate for the country’s currency. Fixed-rate 
regimes create obstacles in the commercial transactions of a country with other countries. 
On the one hand, if possible importers want to bring goods to the country, they need to 
purchase foreign currency first and this demand creates pressure on the exchange rate, 
and after a certain amount of demand the central bank needs to intervene by selling its 
foreign currency reserves. After the foreign currency reserves run out, the amount of 
importing transactions will stop. This means that the fixed rate currency regimes limit the 
volume of commercial transactions with other countries. On the other hand, in case the 
currency rate is very low, exporters find very good profit opportunities in selling their 
goods in foreign markets. The rate of a currency can often become an issue in 
international politics as occurred in 2010 when the United States accused China of 
currency manipulation (Navarro & Roach, 2012).   
Second, the full realization of the free trade norm is practically impossible because beyond 
border barriers can hardly ever be fully abolished. At-border barriers can be decreased or 
 
3 The statistical figures about the balance of payments published by states’ authorities are usually based 
on a financial approach, and the three components are different. The first element is the current account 
which includes all the transactions that are included in the trade balance and the financial transactions 
which are either income transfers and short term (shorter than one year) investments. The second 
component of the balance of payment includes long term investments into financial and/or physical 
assets. The third element is the same, the changes in foreign currency reserves.  
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eliminated among trading partners; evidence from existing cases of economic integration4 
shows that the complete elimination of beyond border barriers is theoretically not 
possible. The experience of the European Union (EU) shows this. The EU introduced a 
common currency, the Euro, for the participating member states in 2002. Earlier, by the 
establishment of the Single European Market in 1987, industrial standards, health 
regulations, administrative prescriptions were harmonized for the member states. Even 
educational degrees are mutually recognized by the member states. Even though the 
measures by which the Single European Market was established helped to improve the 
conditions for free trade among the member states of the European Union, there remain 
state policies which create distortions from optimal resource allocation in the economies. 
These distortions are caused by those responsibilities of the member states which are 
decided by the individual countries’ social consensuses. 
In general, the economic responsibilities of states are necessary, mainly because people 
tend to be short-sighted in their economic activities. There are investments which create 
profit only in the very long term that are not elaborated on a market basis, such as 
infrastructure, healthcare and education. Furthermore, there are investments whose 
profitability cannot be expressed in financial terms, such as physical security (policing and 
defence) and legislative security (jurisdiction). Finally, we can mention the necessity to 
organise those services that assist mainly elderly and/or sick people who are not able to 
work either temporarily or permanently (pension and healthcare expenses). The social 
consensus in the various states define the extent of these state services and states take 
the responsibilities to provide them. To provide these state services, states need income 
that is funded by taxation. Because the extent of the state services varies country by 
country, the rate of taxes is likely to vary as well country by country. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that even in a common market, where internal trade can be free from at-border 
barriers and beyond border barriers, market decisions are free from economic distortions. 
 
4 Economic integration is often understood as trade liberalisation, however, this may be confusing. The 
participants may prefer free trade internally, but at the same time externally they may apply common 
customs and tariffs which can be protectionist. This was the case, for example, in the European Union where 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) employed highly protectionist measures since the 1960s.  
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Although the free trade norm cannot be completely realized internationally, there are 
steps by which states can approximate this ideal environment for business and 
commercial relations. These steps are recognized as trade liberalisation. It is important to 
note here that trade liberalisation has not tended to occur at the same time for all 
elements of the balance of payments. Typically, trade liberalisation has been a gradual 
process first encompassing the elimination of at-border barriers for goods. Later, the 
barriers on the trade of services and financial transactions have been removed. And, 
usually, the at-border barriers were abolished first, then the process continued to remove 
beyond border barriers. Most importantly, once trade liberalisation occurs in any areas of 
trade, protectionist policies may still occur in other areas of trade. Therefore, the analysis 
should be comprehensive, and it is likely to create biases if it were performed only for one 
segment; for example, promoting free trade for agricultural products cannot be 
understood as norm entrepreneurship in free trade if this ignores protectionist measures 
in investments, for instance. 
 
6.2. New Zealand’s ideology to promote free trade 
In New Zealand’s history after the Second World War, there have been three periods with 
respect to trade relations. The first period covers the four decades between the end of 
the Second World War and the mid-1980s. This period can be characterised as the gradual 
recognition of the necessity to diversify export markets and the elaboration of new trade 
ties that helped the structure of exports shift from the markets of the United Kingdom to 
the Pacific region. The main attribute of this era’s trade policy was the pursuit of pure 
economic interests, namely, to find export markets for agricultural products. However, it 
is also possible to identify the seeds of the ideology behind the trade policy, namely, the 
support for multilateralism that stemmed from New Zealand’s enthusiasm towards the 
United Nations and its institutions, but this ideology did not play a significant role before 
the second half of the 1980s. 
The second period which started in the mid-1980s and lasted until 2015 can be 
characterised as the period of bipartisan agreement over the benefits of free trade and 
the strong belief in the rules-based international order. This is the period when New 
Zealand achieved its first internationally relevant successes in promoting free trade and 
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the country had many pioneering initiatives. In this period the ideology to underpin the 
development of trade agreements was strongly reliant on the economic benefits of free 
trade. 
The third period started in 2015 and this era has brought about the redefinition of trade 
in a social context. After the recognition of the social opposition towards global capitalism 
which was seen during the protests against the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement in 
2015, New Zealand politicians started to reconsider their approach to trade relations. 
Beyond the social opposition against capitalism, there were two international 
developments that caused New Zealand politicians to reconsider the role of trade. One of 
the international developments is the recognition that the option to gain access to new 
markets has certain limits. The other phenomenon is that trust in the rules-based 
international trading framework might be questioned and may not hold. To adjust to the 
new challenges, social scepticism of global capitalism, the limits of accessing new markets 
and the threats toward the sustainability of the rules-based international trading system, 
New Zealand politicians have reconsidered the role of trade and their ideas are 
synthesized in a new ideology. This ideology puts more emphasis on social inclusivity, such 
as securing gender and racial equality, and the respect for the environment, and at the 
same time has the aim to sustain New Zealand’s position in global value chains. 
In this section, I describe the New Zealand politicians’ ideological considerations in the 
three periods after the Second World War.  
 
6.2.1. The seeds of multilateralism between 1945 and 1984 
To present New Zealand’s attitude towards multilateralism in this period, we have to 
highlight that New Zealand was a founding member of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT) and was a member of the preparatory committee that drafted the 
charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO) during 1946 and 1947. The 
committee was established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. The trade 
organization was designed to be the third element of the UN specified economic 
organizations, alongside the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The 
founding documents of GATT were signed in October 1947 and it entered into force on 1 
January 1948 (WTO, 2005). But, in spite of the enthusiasm towards the UN, New Zealand 
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was not similarly enthusiastic about GATT initially (Reitzig, 2018, p. 398) and the country 
preferred to maintain its protected trade relations with Britain until the early 1960s. As 
one of the former leaders of the National Party, Don Brash (personal communication, April 
30, 2018), also emphasized, from the 1930s, New Zealand had high tariffs and strong 
import controls. During the period between 1945 and 1980, politicians such as Mike 
Moore (2017) or Don Brash (personal communication, April 30, 2018) were mostly in 
favour of protectionism. Although the first significant step to open up trade with countries 
occurred in 1965, when New Zealand elaborated a rather limited free-trade agreement 
(FTA) with Australia after the British bid to enter the European Economic Community (EEC) 
(Iati, 2015, p. 55), it was Robert Muldoon’s government between 1975 and 1984 that 
started dismantling the system of high tariffs and import controls by implementing Closer 
Economic Relations (CER) with Australia in 1983 (D. Brash, personal communication, April 
30, 2018).  
During the political debates on CER, the ideology regarding free trade changed, and the 
preference for the GATT and later on for the WTO also started to evolve, and by the mid-
1980s, the growing preference for these institutions became an important element of the 
ideology behind the promotion of free trade.  
 
6.2.2. Bipartisan agreement on the benefits of free trade (1980-2015) 
During the 1980s, there was a swift shift in New Zealand’s economic policy. The Fourth 
Labour Government executed quick and radical reforms of liberalisation. It was in this 
period that the idea of free trade became important. However, we have to emphasize 
that the ideology behind the promotion of free trade was based on both economic and 
strategic considerations. The economic considerations included both the neoliberal 
attitude to organize the domestic economy which was labelled by the term 
‘Rogernomics’5 and the understanding of the benefits of free international trade. The 
strategic considerations encompassed the ideas that through free trade agreements the 
rule of international law can be supported and the country was able to increase the 
number of its allies by strengthening trade relations. 
 
5 The agenda was named after the then Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas.  
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The ideology had an important attribute: it was accepted by both the National Party and 
the Labour Party until 2015. Scholars usually regard the Fourth Labour Government`s 
(neo)liberal ideology, Rogernomics, as the basis of facilitating free trade agreements after 
the middle of the 1980s (Easton, 1994; Iati, 2015; Keys, 2012) when New Zealand was 
ahead of the world in liberalizing New Zealand markets to intensify the competition and 
to attract international investments. However, these claims can be debated for at least 
two reasons. First, politicians became convinced about the benefits of international trade 
independently from ‘Rogernomics’ and they believed that through free trade developing 
countries can be pulled out of poverty and free trade is mutually beneficial for the 
participating countries. Second, the ideology was not precisely clear and straightforward 
(Matthews, 2017), and the neo-liberal economic reforms were not unique in their 
content. Many steps of the reforms were consistent with earlier and concurrent policies 
in Britain under Margaret Thatcher and the United States under Ronald Reagan; and also 
with the Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed by the International Monetary Fund 
on a number of countries (Keys, 2012). 
However, because the free trade norm includes both the abolition of ‘at-borders barriers’ 
and ‘beyond borders barriers,’ concerning the elimination of these barriers, ‘Rogernomics’ 
was highly relevant.  Roger Douglas’s ideas were the basis to decrease and abolish 
domestic subsidies, privatise state owned enterprises and open New Zealand’s economy 
for imports and investments. The neoliberal policies of the Fourth Labour Government 
were later continued by the successive National Governments between 1990 and 1999.  
The agreement on economic issues and specifically about the benefits of free trade arose 
during the political debate on the elaboration of the CER. Jim Bolger (personal 
communication, May 16, 2018), the National Prime Minister (1990-97), has explained that 
during the debate on the CER, within the National Party, it was widely accepted that free 
trade was beneficial for the countries.6 Another politician of the National Party, Don Brash  
(personal communication, April 30, 2018) composed his PhD thesis about the benefits of 
free trade, but before completing his research on the effects of free trade and investments 
among countries, he had believed protectionism and socialist views were more beneficial 
 
6 However, Bolger also mentioned that the term ‘open trade’ should be preferred over ‘free’ because free 
trade suggests that trade may be costless. 
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for countries. However, his research convinced him of the opposite. Based on this strong 
belief within the National Party about the benefits of free trade, before the Fourth Labour 
Government, New Zealand was among the first countries together with Australia, to 
create in 1983 a comprehensive economic cooperation arrangement, CER (J. Bolger, 
personal communication, May 16, 2018).   
Importantly, Mike Moore, who is regarded as ‘The Trader’ (Moore, 2017) among New 
Zealand politicians, described how his views and beliefs regarding the benefits of free 
trade developed at the end of the 1970s. According to the interview, published by Al-
Jazeera (Moore, 2010), Mike Moore was an economic protectionist and nationalist until 
1979 and he initially intended to falsify the arguments of the National Party that referred 
to the benefits of the planned CER. Then, studying the possible outcome of free trade 
among countries, he also became convinced that countries can be drawn out of poverty 
by free trade and economic integration. By admitting this, Moore confirmed that the 
National Party was convinced earlier about the benefits of international trade.  
Furthermore, in connection to the legal component of the ideology behind New Zealand 
promoting free trade, Moore also expressed in the aforementioned Al-Jazeera interview 
that as the director general of the WTO; his main priority was to bring China into the 
organization. Behind this goal, there was a belief: the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT, 
created a system which was based on rules and by bringing China into the WTO, the 
country could become part of a rules-based international system. As a representation and 
demonstration of this strong belief, Mike Moore (2010) regarded China’s entry to the 
WTO as the decisive moment of his political career: “If I had done nothing else, bringing 
China into a system where the ‘emperor’ should behave according to the rules, to legally 
binding agreements, that would still be fundamental.” After the Fourth Labour 
Government was defeated in 1990, Moore expressed his views on trade liberalisation in 
further details which represents his strong belief on the benefits of globalisation:  
I have fought for economic openings, not only because I believe it is good for New 
Zealand, but because I believe it is the best way of assisting poor and developing 
countries. A deeper motivation is that it will build a more secure, safe, peaceful 
and growing world. (Larner, 2009, p. 1584) 
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Based on these beliefs in the benefits of free trade and the strength of the rules-based 
international system, the New Zealand Government developed a new trade strategy in 
1993, one that reflected a conscious approach to facilitate the elaboration of free trade 
agreements. By 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) was reorganized. 
Prior to this, the Ministry was called the Department of External Affairs between 1943 and 
1988. Between 1988 and 1993 it was called the Ministry of External Relations and Trade 
(Templeton, 1993, pp. 1-2). According to the interview conducted with the Deputy 
Secretary of Trade and Economic Group at MFAT, Vangelis Vitalis (personal 
communication, April 16, 2018), after the 1993 reorganization of MFAT, a new Trade 
Strategy was composed and one of the most important intentions of this strategy was to 
create enforceable rules in international trade.  
That was a strategy synthesizing all the aspects of New Zealand’s trade: multilateralism, 
the issues and roles of the WTO, New Zealand’s geographic location (so that the main 
focus has been the Asia-Pacific region), the size of the country, and the structure of the 
economy. The most important element of the strategy that underpins every step New 
Zealand diplomacy took regarding trade agreements was the elaboration of legally 
binding rules. Before 1994 when the WTO was established, for New Zealand there were 
no enforceable rules in trade regarding agriculture, and the existing rules referred to 
manufactured products only. That meant, in every second year, New Zealand had to go to 
Brussels, for example, to negotiate all the quotas regarding agricultural products such as 
milk and butter (V. Vitalis, personal communication, 16 April 2018). After 1994, New 
Zealand could have legally binding rules for agricultural trade. Before 1994, any state 
could unilaterally raise tariffs, for example, from 5% to 10%, but since 1994 that has not 
been possible.  
The ideology’s strategic element was to create a network of trade agreements so that the 
state would have diversified allies, and by doing this New Zealand would be able to avoid 
the problematic constraint of choosing between the two hegemons of the Asia-Pacific 
region (the US and China). To create a relevant network of agreements the politicians 
believed that multilateralism would be the best approach. Helen Clark, for example, was 
so enthusiastic about creating good trade relations that she believed those diplomatic 
efforts themselves could also contribute to New Zealand’s security (cited by McCraw, 
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1998, p. 22). This is the reverse of the traditional scholarly views on security issues, such 
as those of Steadman (2006) who regards the main security concerns as the protection 
and the securing of trade relations. 
The leading New Zealand political parties, the National Party and the Labour Party 
supported all the trade agreements before the TPPA in 2015. They passed those 
agreements together in Parliament. This agreement among the parties was emphasized 
by Helen Clark (2004) in her address to the NZIIA in 2004. The bipartisan agreement on 
the benefits of free trade is known even by the strongest opponents of globalisation and 
free trade such as Jane Kelsey who often harshly criticises the government economic 
policies. Referring to the economic liberalisation during the 1980s, she wrote: 
The claim that ‘there is no alternative’ to the right wing revolution has, by sheer 
repetition, become accepted truth. But in fact this was not the only option 
available to the New Zealand government. It was simply the only option that had 
been conceived and promoted at the time – the option that enjoyed the patronage 
of the political, bureaucratic and business elites. (Kelsey, 1999) 
After 2015, there were signs that the leading parties no longer agreed on the benefits of 
free trade and during the Parliamentary debate over the TPPA the Labour Party openly 
criticised the agreement and the secrecy around its elaboration (New Zealand Labour 
Party, 2016).  
 
6.2.3. The redefinition of trade after 2015 
After 2015, the ideology that backs New Zealand’s trade policy has changed. There are 
three main reasons for this: the decreasing domestic support for trade deals, the 
perceived end of continuous growth in global trade and the danger that trade deals may 
not constitute legally binding rules.   
With respect to the domestic conditions, first, it is important to note that concerning the 
decreasing support for trade agreements, anonymous interviewees mentioned that the 
bipartisan support for trade agreements disappeared during the TPPA talks between 2008 
and 2015. The TPPA was favoured only by 34% of the voters, while 52% opposed it in 
November 2015 (Kelsey, 2018, p. 147). Although the Labour Party is still in favour of free 
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trade, its approach to facilitate it is different from the one before 2015 because social 
aspects have become more important. The main problems with the TPPA were the secrecy 
which surrounded the negotiations, the asymmetric rights of the governments and of 
multinational investors laid down in the Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS), and 
the so-called beyond border regulations that might have limited elements of sovereignty 
of the participating states (Kelsey, 2018, p. 148). With respect to the public opposition to 
the TPPA, we have to assess whether, similar to Muldoon’s provocation of the public with 
nuclear ship visits in the late 1970s, John Key’s announcements and declarations might 
also have been counter-productive during the TPPA debate. In 2015, John Key also 
expressed his views on the protesters against the TPPA:  
If you think through the logic of those great people outside [the protesters], they 
are proposing you carry on being in a position where the good people of Oxford 
can't sell their products to the biggest economies in the world. Go figure! (Miles, 
2015) 
To the public these sorts of assertions might reflect some arrogance.  
The new government, which was enacted in October 2017, has reacted to the public 
perception about free-trade deals, such as the decreasing support for the TPPA. It is 
important to mention that when Winston Peters announced that New Zealand First would 
form a coalition government with the New Zealand Labour Party in October 2017, he then 
presented the problems with capitalism. Although he said “capitalism has created 
failures”, Winston Peters still has faith in it, but it is important that capitalism must regain 
its human face (Radio NZ, 2017). However, the human face of capitalism is not defined by 
the new Labour Government. When Winston Peters became Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, it was obvious that the government’s new attitude towards free trade would 
change due to social problems.  
There were other signs for this changing attitude. In the 2017 election campaign the 
Labour Party campaigned on the topic of affordable housing, and it was not a surprise that 
the Sixth Labour Government introduced a protection against overseas investments7 into 
the New Zealand housing market in 2018. The main reason was that the Government 
 
7 This protection also affects the free-trade agreement with Korea.  
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wants to ensure the domestic housing market is controlled by domestic actors rather than 
international speculative capital. Beyond affordable housing, there have been other social 
democratic arguments too during the campaign. For example, Helen Clark (2017) also 
expressed criticism of globalisation in a recent interview by Radio NZ, when she has said 
that globalisation is happening, it is good for business but it is not good for social cohesion. 
Maybe this kind of criticism has led the new Labour Government to reconsider the 
approach to free-trade deals.  
Concerning the ideology of the Sixth Labour Government about free trade, it is relevant 
to mention first that the Government made it clear early on that the facilitation of new 
trade agreements is not among the main priorities (The Guardian, 2017). Later, the new 
ideology of the New Zealand government on free trade was clarified.8 Anonymous 
interviewees and recently David Parker (2019), the Minister for Trade and Export Growth, 
have expressed the main background of the ideology. Concerning the changing 
international context, it is important to note that New Zealand had two assumptions 
about the elaboration of free trade deals since 1994, with the establishment of the WTO. 
The first assumption was the openness of the system that would continue and increase, 
so that markets will continue to provide growing access for New Zealand exports. The 
second assumption was that the rules which govern trade relations would be enforceable. 
By 2019 the reality is that the golden era for international free trade is over, and those 
assumptions might not be true anymore. After the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, 
there were symptoms of rising protectionist approaches all around the world. It became 
apparent that public opinion in the United States and in Europe, although not in the Asia-
Pacific region, was increasingly sceptical and critical about trade agreements. Public 
support for the TPPA was especially weak too. Furthermore, no one could predict the 
events of Brexit and the election of President Trump. 
Regarding the diminishing first assumption, the continuous growth of the openness of the 
international trade system, the US withdrew from the TPPA and the Paris Agreement on 
 
8 After the election in 2017, for a short period of time, the incoming Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Winston Peters expressed varying aims for trade. He even mentioned the facilitation of a trade deal with 
Russia and North Korea (Scoop Politics, 2018). The Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern distanced herself from 
Peters and she had to punctuate that Peters’ assertions on a North Korea free-trade deal, mentioning that 
those statements represented only New Zealand’s global free-trade ambitions (Hooton, 2018).  
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Climate, and President Trump announced that he favoured bilateral trade deals (Scollay, 
2018, pp. 140-143). Although both the TPPA (as of today the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership - CPTPP) and the Paris Climate Agreement are still 
relevant, it became less likely that New Zealand could achieve its trade goals through 
multilateral agreements. The further increase of trading options has become uncertain. 
For example, breaking down the barriers that block agricultural trade has become a great 
problem for New Zealand after the GFC. Of New Zealand’s agricultural production, 95% 
cannot be consumed by New Zealanders – it needs to be exported. However, agricultural 
products have much higher tariffs than the tariffs on manufacturing products. In 
manufacturing, the average tariff rate is 2.5% internationally and the average tariff rate 
on agricultural products is 23% (Kasnyik, 2015), but there are states where they are above 
100% (for example, the EU, Japan, and the US).  
The more important questions arise after the realisation that the international trading 
rules may not apply as legally binding obligations. For example, the US President may 
dismantle the existing international trade frameworks too (Scollay, 2018, pp. 140-143). It 
is unknown, how this will affect New Zealand’s trade policy and the ideology that 
underpins it. According to two anonymous interviews with officials at MFAT and the 
Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI), these complaints were very important. For New 
Zealand, it was a priority to promote the rule of law to secure the framework of the WTO. 
Within the WTO, great powers, for example, China, had to behave according to the rules, 
to the legally binding disciplines. However, if the rule of law does not apply any longer, 
and, for example, limiting and decreasing agriculture tariffs becomes a matter of political 
practice, this may lead even to a decision that has been avoided thus far, namely, New 
Zealand having to take sides between the hegemons in the Pacific region, China and the 
US (Scollay, p. 142).  
The new ideology is composed in a way that responds to the most important challenges 
and it is also reflective of a synthesized approach. As David Parker (2019) expressed in his 
address to the 2019 Otago Foreign Policy School, the main considerations of the new 
approach to trade are that trade and economic policy and foreign policy are inseparable. 
International trade remains integral to secure New Zealand’s participation in the global 
value chains. The most important novelty in the ideology is the belief that the role of trade 
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is not just the assurance that New Zealand remains part of the global value chains but also 
that trade should be a vehicle for an inclusive and sustainable society. He expressed why 
the climate change goals should be incorporated in trade agreements, and also the 
sustainability of resources shall be secured, for example through limited fishery quotas. 
Concerning these aspects of trade deals, namely social inclusiveness and sustainability, 
the current government made steps, which signal the belief that trade agreements can 
include regulations to support social goals, simply because trade agreements create 
legally binding rules. For example, gender equality, the use and subsidies of fossil fuels 
across the value chain, and the problems of climate change are all issues which can be 
addressed by trade agreements. Given the legally binding nature of trade agreements, the 
agreements can be understood as measures for sustainable development, or to help 
Māori businesses, to create productivity and growth as well. After the election in 2017, 
MFAT initiated the Progressive and Inclusive Trade for All Agenda (MFAT, n.d.-i). Among 
the main principles of this policy, we find the intention to create new and sustainable 
economic opportunities for New Zealanders and the aims of minimising the risks of global 
and social issues, such as climate change, protecting New Zealanders’ health and well-
being, labour and gender rights, the rights of indigenous peoples, the participation of 
small- and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs) in international markets, and preserving the 
rights of the government to regulate public interests in areas such as land markets, 
taxation of international businesses and public services (MFAT, n.d.-i). Also, the key 
principles include the goal that the trade policy should support all New Zealanders “to 
succeed on the global stage, including women, Māori and people in SMEs” (MFAT, n.d.-i). 
This intention is also highlighted in the press release of the Minister for Trade and Export 
Growth, David Parker (2018b):  
We want small and medium sized businesses, women and Māori – who haven’t always 
benefited as much as big business from trade deals – to succeed on the global stage. 
At the same time we want to protect our unique environment and get the best out of 
our existing and future trade deals. 
Much depends on whether the trade deals remain legally binding rules within the WTO. 
Regarding this, it is crucial that David Parker (2019) and David Walker (Sachdeva, 2019b), 
a New Zealand diplomat who was appointed to be the chairman of the WTO’s dispute 
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settlement body in March 2019, both have argued that there is hope for the renewal of 
the WTO and to maintain the legally binding nature of international trade agreements. 
The WTO is not seen as a moribund organisation by anyone and Walker explicitly believes 
there is a strong desire among the most important trading nations to sustain an 
organisation that can secure the resolution of trade disputes.   
As has been described here in this section, New Zealand’s trade policy has had a strong 
ideological belief regarding the beneficial effects of free trade, and also the strength of 
the legally binding agreements that are the building blocks of a rules-based international 
system since the early 1980s. Therefore, the condition for norm entrepreneurship, 
namely, that the actor should regard the norm as appropriate for others in the 
community, is met with respect to the ideology of free trade for two periods: since the 
mid-1980 until 2015 which was a golden era for the development of New Zealand’s trade 
and also for the period since 2015 when the role of trade has been redefined given trade 
agreements larger role in social inclusiveness and sustainability.   
 
6.3. Mobilising resources and efforts to create free-trade agreements 
New Zealand’s policy efforts regarding free trade can be categorized into three types. 
First, the state has been consistent in deconstructing the ‘beyond border barriers’ since 
the middle of the 1980s by the liberalisation of the economy. Second, the country has 
been successful in signing several free trade agreements that constitute a structure for 
trade. This is a network of free trade agreements which has a focus in the Asia-Pacific 
region. New Zealand’s trade agreements that are already in effect concentrate on this 
region. However, there have been efforts to elaborate trade agreements with a global 
reach (Gulf-Cooperation Countries, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, India and the European 
Union) but these are not yet in effect. Third, New Zealand participated in various global 
initiatives within the WTO and earlier within the GATT that facilitate free trade in specific 
areas.  
In this section I present how these efforts have occurred historically. Concerning the 
criterion of efforts, New Zealand’s steps are altogether compelling evidence to consider 
the state a norm entrepreneur in promoting free trade internationally in the period 
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between 1984 and 2017. The relevance of this policy is large with respect to creating 
intellectual leadership status for the country and contributing to the maintenance of the 
legally binding international system.  
 
6.3.1. 1945-1984: The necessary diversification of markets 
In New Zealand’s economic history, between the end of the Second World War and the 
mid-1980s, the state was gradually recognizing the necessity to diversify export markets 
and to elaborate new trade ties that would help the structure of exports shift from the 
markets of the United Kingdom to the Pacific region. The diversification was helped by 
natural trends, by growing demand for New Zealand export goods in the Pacific region 
(Japan, Korea, United States), and conscious efforts to facilitate free trade played only a 
minimal part.  
During the first years of the period, between 1945 and 1952, until the establishment of 
ANZUS, security depended on Great Britain’s willingness to protect New Zealand, an 
historically defined way rooted in the colonial past. For these simple security concerns, 
New Zealand traded mainly with Britain (Reitzig, 2018, p. 398). Before the Second World 
War, more than 80% of New Zealand’s exports were delivered to the United Kingdom, and 
within imports, the structure was similar: New Zealand’s exports to Britain were 
dominated by agricultural products (butter, cheese, lamb and mutton) and some 
industrial goods that were all designed to meet Britain’s demand (Gould, 1982, p. 102). 
But the UK had already been weakening since the 1930s and started protecting its own 
farmers and seeking new trade links to continental Europe (Harland, 2001, p. 9). 
Furthermore, New Zealand exporters had to realize that demographic trends and the 
British market’s saturation with high quality dairy products meant that it could not absorb 
New Zealand’s growing agricultural surplus (Gould, 1982, p. 104). For these reasons, the 
need to diversify export destinations started to become apparent.   
Until the early 1960s, Britain’s weakening presence in world issues did not cause any shock 
effect. Although exports to the British market were diminishing in the 1950s, they still 
remained large (Iati, 2015, p. 55) and by 1955 they had decreased to 66% (Gould, 1982, 
p. 102). This decrease in the proportion of the exports to the UK was mainly attributed to 
new and strongly growing markets. The economic boom in South Korea demanded large 
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quantities of wool. The United States’ growing population created new markets for New 
Zealand’s beef exports. In 1958, New Zealand concluded a trade deal with Japan, so 
Japan’s markets were partly open for New Zealand farmers too. Furthermore, the 
economic growth in South-East Asia created a massive demand for New Zealand’s casein 
exports (Gould, 1982, p. 102). However, until 1961, when Britain officially applied for the 
entry to the European Economic Community, the immediate need to explore further 
markets did not arise. But, in July 1961, the New Zealand government had to hold a crisis 
meeting. The situation was further deteriorating from March 1962, when Britain 
introduced restrictions on the quotas of butter imports (Gould, 1982, p. 103). This was a 
strong signal that Great Britain would not maintain the unrestricted access for New 
Zealand products to its domestic markets. Therefore, New Zealand had to find new 
markets to which the country could get free access. 
Because of the decreasing trend in Britain’s demands for New Zealand products and the 
protectionist British measures, the proportion of New Zealand’s exports to the UK fell to 
36% by 1965 (Gould, 1982, p. 102) and to one-third by 1973 (Harland, 2001, p. 9). To 
overcome these problems, by 1965 New Zealand had developed strong trade links with 
Australia. After the British bid to enter the EEC, the country signed a rather limited free-
trade agreement (FTA) with Australia (Iati, 2015, p. 55) that came into effect in 1966 and 
helped New Zealand’s exports grow, mainly owing to the inclusion of the exports of 
forestry products (Gould, 1982, p. 106).  
The trade links with Australia later evolved into a broader economic cooperation that 
enhanced the free-trade agreement for investments as well, and the two countries 
established Closer Economic Relations (CER) in 1983 (Iati, 2015, p. 55; Scollay, 2018, p. 
134). This is the main reason New Zealand’s most important trading partner has been 
Australia, and the proportion of New Zealand exports to Australia in 2018 is around 20%, 
similar to the level with China (B. J. Lynch, 2018, p. 107). Besides Australia, during the 
1970s, after Britain’s entry to the European Economic Community in 1973, the opening of 
markets was the main trend in the South-Pacific and in South-East Asia, therefore, New 
Zealand was able to diversify its export destinations (Harland, 2001, p. 10). By 1990, 70% 
of New Zealand’s exports were delivered to the markets of the Asia-Pacific Economic 




6.3.2. 1984-2017: Trade liberalisation as political strategy 
The thirty-three years between 1984 and 2017 welcomed a momentous and prosperous 
course of events for New Zealand in terms of developing trade ties and promoting free 
trade internationally. The start of the period saw the domestic liberalisation of the 
economy with thorough reforms that were ahead of the global trends in their complexity. 
From 1993 the state executed a trade strategy which established the backbone of various 
trade links which constitute New Zealand’s trade structure. Within this period, between 
1999 and 2002, New Zealander, Mike Moore was leading the World Trade Organization 
and brought about progressive ideas such as improving the market access for developing 
countries through capacity building within the WTO. Beyond these, New Zealand 
participated in initiatives that aimed at trade liberalisation, for example the Cairns Group 
and the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform. These diplomatic efforts and achievements 
can be recognised as evidence that New Zealand mobilised resources to promote free 
trade internationally. This section presents these policies.  
After the enactment of the Fourth Labour Government in 1984, at first, the government 
attempted to restore macroeconomic balance because the country was in a debt-spiral. 
Since the 1960s, New Zealand’s exports had been losing their competitiveness and the 
international trade balance got even worse after the British accession to the European 
Economic Community in 1971 and the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979. To counterbalance the 
rising energy costs, the Muldoon government between 1975 and 1984 initiated the so-
called ‘think big projects’ which aimed at establishing new electricity generation 
capacities. In the early 1980s, when fossil fuels became cheaper again, the think big 
projects proved to be expensive and to sustain financial solvency, the government 
implemented a wage- and price-freeze in 1982 (Chatterjee, 1996, pp. 24-25).  
The Fourth Labour Government started to implement thorough reforms, which entailed 
privatization programmes to reduce public debt, removing government subsidies and 
incentives to improve competition, and opening the New Zealand economy to attract 
overseas investments (Iati, 2015, p. 55). There were further steps performed to withdraw 
possible barriers from market-based resource allocation. Those government departments 
which were engaged in commercial activities were reorganised into state-owned 
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enterprises (SOEs). These SOEs were later privatised. Finally, the New Zealand dollar was 
floated in March 1985 (Chatterjee, 1996, p. 26). All these measures were elements of 
trade liberalisation, especially in terms of the elimination of the ‘beyond border barriers.’  
Although the Fourth Labour Government is known as the one that introduced 
neoliberalism in New Zealand, the successive National government continued the 
reforms. This government rationalised public expenditure which meant a significant 
reduction of welfare payments. Besides, while the Labour government did not change 
labour market legislation, to further liberalize the economy, the National government 
between 1990 and 1997 decreased the rights of trade unions and abolished the nation-
wide wage bargaining. To recognise all these efforts, the British journal, The Economist 
regarded New Zealand as ‘the mother of all reformers’ in October 2003 (Larner, 2009, p. 
1579).   
Internationally, in the beginning of this 33-year long period, New Zealand strengthened 
its cooperation with Australia. In 1988 the two countries further developed CER through 
the first five-year review which liberalised the trade of services, “abolished anti-dumping 
and countervailing measures and moved towards coordination of technical standards, 
business law, government procurement policies and quarantine procedures” (Castle et 
al., 2016, p. 48).  
Beyond this step with Australia, in 1986 New Zealand became one of the founding 
members of the ‘Cairns Group’, a coalition of 19 agricultural exporting countries (DFAT, 
n.d.).9 The Cairns Group operates within the WTO, and earlier within the GATT. Although 
it was not New Zealand that initiated the establishment of this coalition during the 
Uruguay Round of GATT, and Australia is the permanent chair (MFAT, n.d.-a), through this 
group New Zealand contributed to promote trade liberalisation for agricultural products. 
Developing countries constitute the majority of the group, and the countries altogether 
make up 25% of the world’s agricultural exports. These countries put special emphasis on 
fair international trade for agricultural products.   
 
9 At the establishment, the Cairns Group had 14 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. 
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As mentioned in section 6.2.2, by 1993 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade had been 
reorganised and a new trade strategy composed. The key assumptions and premises of 
this strategy were focusing on New Zealand’s economic structure, its geographic location 
and the political options which concerned mainly the size of the country. Regarding the 
structure of the economy, the decisive factor is that New Zealand’s exports are made up 
mostly by agricultural products. The strategy had to respond to the challenge that most 
countries intend to protect their agriculture. Concerning New Zealand’s geographic 
location, the country is in the South Pacific, and the Pacific region is the focus of the trade 
policy. Furthermore, the country is distant from all its major trading partners except for 
Australia. In terms of connection to the political options, first, it is crucial to note that the 
trade facilitators of the New Zealand diplomatic corps did not accept the realist theory of 
international relations that small states have to accept what they must do; small states 
can have a choice. In the region there have been two hegemons, China and the United 
States, and as a small country, New Zealand believed that it was possible to avoid the 
selection of one great power as a partner in trade relations. To alleviate this possible 
constraint, the country needs many partners and strategies to manage risks (V. Vitalis, 
personal communication, 16 April 2018).  
From these premises, the most important goals and actions were set. The primary goal 
was that the state wanted to be a thought leader (intellectual leader) in the region. New 
Zealand intended to facilitate trade agreements by taking a nonlinear, incremental 
approach, meaning that there were no dates set to achieve specific trade agreements, but 
that the quality of the agreements had to be of a high professional standard.10 The final 
aim was to create a network of trade deals that entitles New Zealand to be regarded as 
an important partner in politics which relies on legally binding rules. To achieve this goal, 
MFAT started training its staff to be excellent members of the negotiating groups. The 
traditions of this training resulted in the UK hiring trade specialists from New Zealand to 
carry out the post-Brexit trade negotiations. Furthermore, with respect to practicalities, 
to facilitate agreements, New Zealand consciously remained open to discuss the problems 
in agriculture and has asked the countries how many years they need to liberalize the 
agriculture sector. When the countries needed 5, 7, 9 or 12 years for this process, New 
 
10 The concept of intellectual leadership is described in the theory part, in chapter 2. 
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Zealand could bring this open attitude to the negotiating table (V. Vitalis, personal 
communication, April 16, 2018).11 
In the 1993 Trade Policy, New Zealand’s approach was focusing on various methods to 
achieve the goals. First, unilateral steps had priorities; in other words, New Zealand 
proactively attempted to abolish the trade barriers with any possible partners. Second, 
the state had a preference for multilateralism. Third was the regional approach to achieve 
the lifting of trade barriers in large groups, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) or with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The fourth approach 
was the facilitation of bilateral FTAs (Scollay, 2018, p. 128). It was the global political-
economic environment that caused the fourth approach, the promotion of bilateral FTAs, 
to become the main tool in carrying out this strategy (Scollay, 2018, p. 131).  
The execution of the strategy, however, brought about the primacy of bilateral free-trade 
agreements. This was mainly due to the slow progress of trade liberalization within APEC 
(Reitzig, 2018, p. 399) which was established in 1989 by 12 founding members; the United 
States, Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the then six members of ASEAN 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei Darussalam). At first, 
New Zealand wanted to follow a so-called ’multilateral track’ in trade policy, set up by the 
1993 Trade Policy, which meant the country prioritised multilateral agreements. The 
platform of APEC appeared to be applicable for New Zealand to use for the creation of 
multilateral trade agreements and the APEC member states formed a significant target 
for the country as well. But the APEC goals to implement free trade, the ‘Bogor goals’ in 
1994, aimed to create free trade among the developed states only by 2010; meanwhile, 
the developing states might join this regional free trade deal by 2020, therefore they 
appeared to be slow. Although the Osaka Action Agenda of APEC, adopted in 1995, aimed 
at a broad area of trade relations (including intellectual property rights, competition law, 
government procurements, etc.), still, the pace of implementation of the APEC goals was 
not fast enough for New Zealand. Furthermore, there was an initiative of APEC, the Early 
Voluntary Sector Liberalisation System (EVSL) to enable member states to liberalise 
 
11 This open approach also resulted in the so-called asymmetric deals, such as in the case of the China-
New Zealand FTA; in it, New Zealand started liberalizing its markets at a quicker pace than China, and this 
was criticised by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Winston Peters.  
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special markets for trade, but eventually this proved to be a failure. The shocks of the 
1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis and the collapse of the WTO Seattle Round then forced 
APEC members to initiate free-trade negotiations on a bilateral basis. In 1998, Japan and 
Korea announced their intentions to negotiate a free-trade deal, but actually, it was 
Singapore and New Zealand that first concluded such a deal in a ’free trade fever’ among 
APEC members (Scollay, 2018, pp. 126-131). To illustrate the ‘free trade fever’, as a typical 
figure we can mention that by 2008 40 FTAs had been signed among the APEC members 




Table 2: The evolution of New Zealand’s free-trade agreements until 2017 
Trade and/or economic agreement In effect  Relevance for New Zealand 
Australia – New Zealand FTA 
Closer Economic Relations 
1965 
01/01/1983 
First FTA for New Zealand  
The CER was the first single economic 
market between countries 
Singapore – New Zealand CEP 01/01/2001 First closer economic partnership for 
two small states among APEC members 
Thailand – New Zealand CEP July/2005  
P4: Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, 
Singapore 
January/2006 First economic partnership that links the 
Asia-Pacific and South America 
China – New Zealand FTA 01/10/2008 New Zealand was the first OECD country 
to have FTA with China  
Malaysia – New Zealand FTA 01/08/2010  
Hong Kong – New Zealand CEP 01/01/2011  
Australia-New Zealand and ASEAN 2012 First overarching FTA in the region 
including developed and developing 
countries 
Chinese Taipei – New Zealand economic 
partnership 
June 2013  
Korea – New Zealand 20/12/2015  
Source: MFAT 
The trade agreements with Singapore, Hong-Kong China, Chinese Taipei, China and even 
the CER with Australia were the first such deals in the Asia-Pacific region. Behind these 
agreements, there were conscious efforts, and the diplomatic corps of New Zealand have 
always had a strategic component in mind when elaborating trade agreements (V. Vitalis, 
personal communication, April 16, 2018).  
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Practically, the first important achievement of the 1993 Trade Policy was the Singapore-
New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) agreement. Vangelis Vitalis (personal 
communication, 16 April 2018) argues that from a simple economic point of view, there 
was no reason why two open, developed economies would make such a trade deal, 
because at the time of signature, all of Singapore’s exports to New Zealand and vice versa 
were tariff free, so the question arises why it was important to have a trade deal. It was 
an aim to have a first in the world, a high quality and comprehensive deal which created 
a new standard for other trade agreements. This argument is confirmed by Jim Bolger 
(personal communication, May 16, 2018) who highlights that the FTA with Singapore and 
later the one with Brunei and Chile (P4) were paving the way for a larger trade deal, the 
TPPA.  
Although the negotiations to make free-trade deals were quite common in the Trans-
Pacific region, the fast-paced and skilful efforts of the New Zealand and Singapore 
negotiators resulted in a situation when the countries could become leaders by example. 
This argument is strongly supported by evidence. In the National Interest Analysis of the 
Singapore-New Zealand agreement, there is strong emphasis on the strategic aspects of 
the deal:  
The Agreement also serves New Zealand’s broader strategic trade and economic 
interests. It will encourage improved and closer trade and economic linkages 
between New Zealand and ASEAN generally. (New Zealand exports to ASEAN are 
worth approximately NZ$1.7 billion pa). It provides a momentum towards the 
achievement of the APEC vision of free and open trade and investment in the APEC 
region by 2010 for developed members and 2020 for developing members (the 
‘Bogor’ goals). It will provide a clear signal to international markets of New 
Zealand’s commitment to integrate into the regional and global economy. (MFAT, 
n.d.-d)  
It must be added that there are facts indicating the economic reasons were also strong. 
The economic impact of the deal is large, given that between 2004 and 2014 New 
Zealand’s exports to Singapore grew from NZD 362 million to NZD 2.9 billion (MFAT, n.d.-
h). Nevertheless, Don Brash (personal communication, April 30, 2018) also admits that 
since there were few barriers to trade between New Zealand and Singapore, both 
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countries were mainly interested in demonstrating what a high-quality trade agreement 
should look like, in the hope that other countries could be persuaded to sign up to that 
template.  
The timing of the Singapore-New Zealand agreement coincided with Mike Moore’s term 
as director-general of the WTO. In his term, the WTO became more transparent, 
underpinned by neoliberal ideas, and even the least developed countries (LDCs) could get 
access to the organisation’s decision-making processes. The transparency of the WTO was 
improved by the derestriction of WTO documents, the establishment of a public 
newsletter the WTO Focus, engagement with NGOs, formal accreditation process of NGOs 
and business associations, and finally, a thorough development of the WTO website. The 
capacity building measures that aimed to provide better access for LDCs to the WTO 
included the establishment of the Geneva Week to help them with preparation for 
ministerial conferences, the delivery of trade-related technical assistance, establishment 
of advisory centres, the diversification of the WTO Secretariat, a global distance learning 
project, and the founding of a database of all known capacity-building projects (Larner, 
2009, p. 1586). In Moore’s term, China could access the organisation in January 2001, 
which was also facilitated by the former US President, William Clinton (Navarro & Roach, 
2012). One of Moore’s important achievements was to restart negotiations within the 
WTO for trade liberalisation, after the collapse of the WTO Seattle round in December 
1999. This was the Doha Round which set off in 2001. Contemporary analysts such as 
Robert Scollay (NZ Herald, 2001) emphasized that Moore had put a lot of effort into the 
organisation of the Doha Round and overcame such difficulties as convincing the United 
States and European countries to accommodate themselves to the developing countries.   
Mike Moore’s term created a respect for New Zealand’s trade diplomats; however they 
achieved successes later as well independently from Moore’s influence. The first large 
success was the elaboration of the P4 FTA in 2002. After the Singapore-New Zealand 
agreement, the two states were trying hard to persuade Australia and the United States 
to agree on a trade deal. This attempt was strategic because beside New Zealand, both 
countries, Singapore and Australia, independently tried to convince the US to sign a trade 
agreement. New Zealand was not allowed to negotiate a trade deal with the US because 
of the nuclear-free policy. New Zealand wanted to preserve the high standards of the FTAs 
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what the first treaty with Singapore established. But, given the lack of US approval, New 
Zealand convinced Singapore to jointly approach Chile and later Brunei to create a trade 
agreement (V. Vitalis, personal communication, April 16, 2018). This agreement was the 
so-called P4 FTA that was concluded and signed in 2002. The then New Zealand Prime 
Minister, Helen Clark, highlighted the strategic aspects of the agreement, stating that “it 
will provide a foothold in Latin America, it will open trade and it will be a model for other 
agreements" and "this is a pacesetter, an example for APEC of what can be achieved." (NZ 
Herald, 2002). 
The P4 agreement, according to the MFAT Guide, was a high-quality trade agreement 
(MFAT, 2005a, p. 3). The document highlighted that it would raise New Zealand’s profile 
in South America and the agreement could be a new step towards the ASEAN member 
states (MFAT, 2005a, pp. 12-13). The National Interest Analysis also emphasized that, in 
spite of the low level of trade among the members, the agreement was important because 
it would become a building block and a model for other states to join (MFAT, 2005b, p. 
14). The quality of the P4 agreement was acknowledged by the US as well, and in 2008, 
this became the basis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement negotiations. The then 
US Trade Representative, Susan Schwab, emphasized the opportunities of the P4, 
mentioning that "participation could provide a pathway to broader Asia-Pacific regional 
economic integration with like-minded countries committed to high-standard 
agreements" (C. Daniels, 2008). This was a significant result, given that the P4 agreement 
as the basis of the TPPA had to compete with another approach, which was presented in 
a study of the Canadian APEC Business Advisory Council’s proposal to cover the APEC 
member states with a free-trade agreement in the early 2000s (Scollay, 2018, p. 136). 
Eventually, the P4 approach was applied in the elaboration of the TPPA, meaning that the 
New Zealand-Singapore coalition to promote free trade could successfully set the 
framework of how free-trade deals should be composed as well.  
With the P4 agreement, New Zealand gained access to important pathways. The first one 
was the approach of the ASEAN countries, to show the P4 agreement’s quality, where it 
was also important that the P4 included developed and developing countries together in 
an agreement, similarly to the ASEAN countries. The ASEAN countries even had WTO and 
non-WTO members in the deal. Later on, this pathway of having developed and 
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developing countries as well as WTO members and non-WTO members in a deal was the 
platform for the TPPA as well. The free-trade agreement with the ASEAN countries also 
had an indirect benefit. Together with Singapore, it was also a joint and conscious strategy 
to develop the FTAs, to leverage New Zealand’s access to the South-East Asian and Pacific 
regions.  
The second pathway stemming from the P4 agreement was to bring the United States 
back into this region. As mentioned earlier, the P4 was also the pathway to create the 
platform for the TPPA, and after the withdrawal of the US, the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, the CPTPP. Beyond this, New Zealand had access to 
negotiate a trade deal with the Pacific Alliance, Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru, which 
was less important commercially but important strategically. With the South-American 
countries, it was possible to bring in strategically important countries into the region. With 
this trade strategy, New Zealand could create many allies and partners (V. Vitalis, personal 
communication, April 16, 2018).  
Parallel with the P4, New Zealand negotiated the FTA with China. China is the most 
important trade partner for most of the states in the South Pacific region including New 
Zealand. However, for New Zealand, Australia is also highly significant. Eventually, New 
Zealand became the first developed country to have a free-trade agreement with China. 
Although this can be regarded as New Zealand’s large achievement to become a leader in 
this policy area thanks to the trade strategy, the FTA with China also raised domestic 
criticism. The criticism arose because New Zealand was regarded as one of the main 
promoters of human rights internationally, and the FTA with China showed pragmatism 
and pure economic interests (Reitzig, 2018, p. 406). Furthermore, the domestic debates 
over the signing of the FTA in 2008 revealed that apart from the support for FTAs within 
the National Party and Labour, there were different political views as well. The then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Winston Peters, expressed in various interviews that he was 
convinced New Zealand could have done a better deal. One of his criticisms referred to 
the different pace of phasing out of tariffs. Meanwhile, New Zealand was to eliminate 
tariffs on Chinese imports within seven or nine years but China would do so only in 17 
years. For this reason, Winston Peters did not find this a fair deal. However, because of 
the domestic political circumstances and even though he opposed the deal and did not 
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vote for it in Parliament, Peters remained Minister of Foreign Affairs (Campbell Live, 
2008).  
It is also debated whether and to what extent the FTA with China can be attributed to 
New Zealand’s concessions at China’s entry to the WTO (Scollay, 2018, p. 134), such as 
acknowledging China as a market economy. With respect to New Zealand’s policies 
towards China, there are studies published by Anne-Marie Brady (e.g. 2018) that warn 
about China’s influence in New Zealand’s domestic and international politics. Among the 
Chinese Communist Party’s tools to influence New Zealand’s political elite, Brady 
describes the Chinese financial donations to New Zealand’s political parties and the close 
Chinese cooperation with politicians, such as Dame Jenny Shipley (Prime Minister 
between 1997 and 1999), and John Key, who both became leaders of Chinese business 
investments in New Zealand after their Prime Ministership. Furthermore, Chinese media 
investments play a significant role in New Zealand and, finally, Chinese technological 
companies could make investments with which they are able to get access to strategic 
and technological information. With respect to this risk, we can mention Huawei 
Technologies, a company that developed 3G and 4G telecommunications networks in 
New Zealand and has intimate ties to the Chinese military and intelligence agencies 
(Brady, 2018, pp. 70-71). According to Brady, New Zealand has been performing a 
favourable policy towards China since 1972, when official diplomatic relations were 
established. The recent scandals about the National Party receiving donations from 
Chinese sources, as mentioned in section 4.3, confirms the presence of Chinese intentions 
to influence New Zealand’s policies.  
With respect to the other FTAs, the one with ASEAN and the one with Australia, all sides 
were interested in preparing and concluding a broad trade agreement. By 2004, together 
with Australia, New Zealand established the Trans-Tasman Single Economic Market to 
deepen economic integration with Australia (Castle et al., 2016, p. 42). Deepening the 
economic ties with the ASEAN countries is also an aim and it is included in the ASEAN-
Australia-New Zealand free trade agreement. It is a complex agreement, with both rich 
and poor countries in it. Practically, it is also a first of its kind, having countries with various 
levels of development. Furthermore, the agreements with Hong Kong China and Chinese 
Taipei are also first such deals.  
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Regarding the development of the trade structure (the network of such deals), between 
1984 and 2017 the New Zealand Governments initiated the elaboration of trade 
agreements that are beyond the Asia-Pacific region and have a global reach. However, 
these agreements are not yet in effect (MFAT, n.d.-b). For example, the New Zealand – 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)12 Free Trade Agreement was already concluded in 2009. 
Although the main benefits of this agreement include strong and enduring political 
relations with the Gulf States for New Zealand, the agreement has not yet been signed, 
and there is no specific information about the cause (Stuff, 2017). It is probable that New 
Zealand intends to wait until the political situation consolidates in the Middle Eastern 
Region that affects the GCC states. Besides, New Zealand has also initiated the elaboration 
of a free trade agreement with the European Union, India and the RBK group (Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan) for which negotiations have been suspended since 2014 when 
Russia annexed Crimea. 
Within this 33-year long period, New Zealand diplomacy took a leading role to establish 
the group of the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform in 2010. This agenda was already 
analysed as norm entrepreneurship by Rive (2018). During the initiation of the group, a 
New Zealander, Vangelis Vitalis acted as intellectual leader. The group was established in 
2010 by non-G20 countries (Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) to build up consensus for the reforms and phasing out 
fossil fuel subsidies. The group regarded it as important to monitor all those steps 
performed by the UN member states that adhered themselves to the UN General 
Assembly’s Sustainable Development Goals which were adopted in September 2009 
(Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms, n.d.). The effects of this group on fossil fuel 
subsidies are debated because countries might have made decisions without the group. 
However, the main argument is, reforms have been made and these went beyond Vitalis’ 
original plans and hopes (Rive, 2018, p. 167). Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that the 
fossil fuel subsidy reforms are not norms, but instead processes. Because the aim of the 
group is to eliminate the state subsidies on the exploration of fossil fuels, the group 
facilitate free trade in energy generation.   
 
12 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) includes Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Quatar, Kuwait, Oman 
and Bahrein (The World Bank, 2018)  
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As part of the consistent efforts to promote free trade and to promote the rule of law in 
international relations, New Zealand has been consistent and enthusiastic. New Zealand 
took a case against Australia, the United States, the European Union, India, Canada and 
Hungary to the WTO to enforce the rules as a good global citizen (Patman & Iati, 2018, p. 
xxxiv). According to various anonymous interviews, these complaints were very important 
for promoting the rule of law to secure the framework of the WTO. 
Owing to the achievements and the consistent efforts in supporting the creation of free-
trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as within the WTO framework, respect 
for New Zealand has grown as has its soft power. The United Kingdom, for example, hired 
a New Zealander, Crawford Falconer, to help with the post-Brexit trade negotiations 
(Wallace, 2017). More recently, David Walker, a New Zealand diplomat was appointed to 
be the chairman of the WTO’s dispute settlement body in March 2019 (Sachdeva, 2019b). 
Furthermore, New Zealand’s trade negotiators are part of the most important formal and 
informal decision-making members of the WTO. Vangelis Vitalis (personal 
communication, 16 April 2018) has emphasized that New Zealand’s trade negotiators 
have a very good reputation, they are considered to be creative, constructive, interested, 
proactive, and fair. That is the skill a chairperson needs, and these are the features that 
make New Zealand special in international trade networks. New Zealanders often fill 
important positions, for example, the chair of the WTO agriculture negotiations. The WTO 
has 164 members, but the main deals are among 15 to 20 members. New Zealand is 
always part of this small group.  
 
6.3.3. After 2017: Inclusion of social goals in trade agreements 
The short period since the Sixth Labour Government took office in October 2017 belongs 
to a distinctively different period of New Zealand’s international trade policy. However, it 
is too early to judge whether this period can be regarded as norm entrepreneurship. The 
efforts performed by the government still comprise the development of trade structures 
for the country and New Zealand participates in various initiatives to facilitate free trade 
internationally. At the same time, the government intends to include social goals and 
measures to counter climate change into trade agreements, what may become later an 
important new approach to the redefinition of the role of (free) trade. Nevertheless, the 
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government’s focus on domestic issues has already established measures that create 
barriers to free trade.   
Concerning the development of the trade structures for New Zealand, the first major 
development after 2017 is that the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP) agreement entered into force on 30 December 2018, after six 
signatories (Mexico, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia and Canada) ratified. The 
agreement comprises 11 (eleven) countries; Australia, Brunei-Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam, all of which were 
participants of the TPPA before the withdrawal of the United States in 2017. New Zealand 
ratified the CPTPP on 25 October 2018 (MFAT, 2019a).   
At the time of writing, November 2019, there are new trade agreements that have been 
concluded but that have not yet entered into force (MFAT, n.d.-b), which suggests New 
Zealand continues to build up more FTAs:  
- The New Zealand – Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Free Trade Agreement.  
- Pacific Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus, which includes 14 countries: 11 of 
these have already signed the agreement (Australia, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, 
New Zealand, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu); 
meanwhile another three (The Federated States of Micronesia, Palau and Republic 
of Marshall Islands) are still elaborating their domestic processes for signing the 
agreement.  New Zealand became the first country to ratify the agreement on 23 
October 2018.  
- Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement within the WTO. New Zealand and 10 other 
states have signed the agreement, but it is not yet in force.  
Furthermore, there are free-trade agreements which are still under negotiation (MFAT, 
n.d.-c):   
- New Zealand and the European Union FTA. 
- New Zealand and India FTA. 
- New Zealand and the RBK group (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) for which 
negotiations have been suspended since 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea.  
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- Regional Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (RCEP) which includes the ASEAN 
member states (Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Brunei-Darussalam, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) and six other countries, 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, China and India.  
- Pacific Alliance (Chile, Mexico, Peru, Colombia). 
- WTO e-commerce negotiations. 
- Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) negotiations.  
Regarding RCEP, on November 4 2019 the leaders of 16 countries announced the 
completion of the negotiation on the text of the agreement, however, it is likely to be 
signed only in 2020 (MFAT, 2019b). Besides, we need to note the process to upgrade the 
China-New Zealand and the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand free trade agreements.  
As discussed in section 6.2.3, the role of trade has been redefined by the Sixth Labour 
Government and trade is now attributed to promote social goals, such as inclusivity, 
climate change and equality. That is why MFAT initiated the Progressive and Inclusive 
Trade for All Agenda (MFAT, n.d.-i). As part of this agenda, all the new trade agreements 
such as the one with the EU are to include a Treaty of Waitangi clause in order to secure 
indigenous rights. Nevertheless, the New Zealand government has already included a 
Treaty of Waitangi exception into the CPTPP that explicitly allows the government to 
adopt any policy it considers necessary to fulfil its obligations to Māori.  
The aim to create inclusive trade agreements is already being promoted internationally 
because New Zealand participates in the Inclusive Trade Action Group (D. Parker, 2019). 
The group was established by a joint declaration of Canada, Chile and New Zealand in 
March 2018 (D. Parker, 2018a). Among the goals of the group we find the promotion and 
strengthening the rules-based international system, achieving the objectives of the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the incorporation of the views of civil society 
into forming new trade agreements. 
On a smaller scale, New Zealand has recently facilitated people-to-people contacts 
internationally by simplifying the border controls with the introduction of the Electronic 
Travel Authority (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2018). Nevertheless, 
these smaller steps also contribute to the argument that New Zealand has been 
continuing its efforts to promote free trade internationally, since the revenues of tourism 
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are also accounted in the states’ trade balances, and by definition, they constitute an 
element of the free trade norm.  
Concerning the policies on trade barriers, there are elements of the trade policy of the 
Sixth Labour Government which are contradictory to trade liberalisation. After the 
election in 2017 the new government already announced that before the CPTPP was to 
enter into force, the government intended to improve the protection of the housing 
market (D. Parker, 2017). Practically, only people who are New Zealand citizens or have 
residency are entitled to buy existing housing dwellings. The reason for this is the 
government intends to secure that domestic housing market trends are set by domestic 
actors. The ban on overseas investors’ purchases of New Zealand houses was introduced 
in October 2018 (Bond, 2018). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also raised 
concerns about the ban of foreign buyers, mainly because they suggested that New 
Zealand housing problems could be resolved by supply-side measures and tax incentives 
(Kihara, 2018).  
There is another policy element which aims to serve social goals, but which may cause 
difficulties in promoting free trade internationally. This element is the establishment of 
the Provincial Growth Fund (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2019). The 
fund is about to invest 3 billion New Zealand Dollars over a three-year period into sectors, 
such as tourism and forestry. The operation of the fund has raised concerns and questions 
within the WTO by the EU, and experts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, for 
example Vangelis Vitalis, who also warned that the fund might become an object of 
thorough scrutiny (Sachdeva, 2019a). The experts also expressed that this fund was 
contradictory to New Zealand’s long-established traditions and advocacies to limit and 
control agricultural subsidies within the WTO.13  
Both the housing ban and the operation of the Provincial Growth Fund can be regarded 
as protectionist: they create obstacles against the free movement of goods and capital. 
This may create problems for New Zealand in achieving the state’s goals concerning the 
improvement of the conditions for international trade. Concerning these efforts, it is 
 
13 Concerning the Provincial Growth Fund, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has been confident 
that the official response to the EU is convincing that the operation of the Provincial Growth Fund would 
not distort trade or production (Sachdeva, 2019a).  
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essential to note that recently, New Zealand has become a member of the Ottawa Group 
(D. Parker, 2019), a governmental organisation to reform the WTO. The group was 
initiated by Canada in 2018 (Government of Canada, 2018).14 Another relevant work 
which is related to the reform of the WTO is the strengthening of the organisation’s legal 
enforcement capabilities by the revitalisation of the Appellate Body. In March 2019, as 
mentioned in section 6.2.3, a New Zealander, David Walker has been appointed to be the 
chairman of this body. These works may be detrimentally affected by the issues of the 
housing ban and the Provincial Growth Fund, at least because New Zealand’s diplomacy 
may need to allocate resources to explain these policy measures instead of concentrating 
resources on creative agendas, such as the reform of the WTO.   
 
6.4. Leadership in trade liberalisation 
To answer the question whether New Zealand was the first or among the leaders of 
promoting free trade it is relevant to discuss four aspects of New Zealand’s trade policy. 
First, it is crucial to assert that the idea of free trade appeared much earlier than New 
Zealand’s politicians realised its importance. Second, between 1984 and 2017, New 
Zealand was among the leaders of the actors which were promoting free trade 
internationally. Third, after 2017, New Zealand’s trade policy has changed, and the new 
trade deals will include social goals as well. Besides, the trade policy also shows 
protectionist signs, which is likely to weaken the country’s position in international 
negotiations regarding free trade. Fourth, globally, states’ approaches towards trade 
liberalisation appear to be relatively consistent, and the free trade norm appears to be in 
the internalisation phase. Because of the recent changes in New Zealand’s trade policy 
and the status of the free trade norm life-cycle, norm entrepreneurship cannot be applied 
after 2017.  
As discussed earlier, New Zealand signed its first free trade agreement in 1965 with 
Australia. Besides, the leaders of one of the main political parties, the Labour Party, 
became convinced of the benefits of free trade in the beginning of the 1980s. However, 
the academic inquiry into the benefits of free trade, focusing on the movement of goods, 
 
14 Among the members we find Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, European Union, Japan, Kenya, South 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland.  
199 
 
developed much earlier, during the 1800s, owing to the works of David Ricardo. Another 
component of the idea of free trade was neoliberalism in economics that emerged in the 
1960s in the works of Milton Friedman. This economic idea preceded the New Zealand 
reforms. For this reason, the benefits of free trade had been known much earlier than the 
1980s when New Zealand diplomacy took it up as a basis for promoting free-trade 
agreements.  
Regarding the historical development of liberalising trade between countries, it is 
important to note that the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was founded in 1960 
and the Benelux Customs Union with internally free trade was founded in 1944, earlier 
than New Zealand’s first free trade deal. These early trade agreements reflected the 
states’ willingness to facilitate trade liberalisation. The first general idea regarding trade 
liberalisation was announced in 1918 by the then American President, Woodrow Wilson, 
who included the “removal of trade barriers” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 225) into his Fourteen 
Points which were basic principles to compose the peace treaties after the First World 
War.  Therefore, New Zealand cannot be regarded as a global leader in developing the 
idea of free trade or creating free trade agreements.  
Between 1984 and 2017, New Zealand was able to perform a leadership role in all aspects 
of trade liberalisation. Domestically, the Fourth Labour Government elaborated thorough 
reforms which were not entirely new, but their breadth and depth, and their pace were 
all unique. Considering the complexity and the comprehensive approach of the reforms, 
New Zealand was leading by example in domestic economic liberalisation. Beyond the 
domestic policies, in this 33-year long period, New Zealand had significant international 
achievements as it was presented earlier.  
However, we have to mention that within this 33-year long period, the international 
conditions were relatively favourable to develop free trade links; it was the golden age of 
globalisation. As already described, after the end of the Cold War, the United States 
opened up new gates for international economic cooperation, and one of the most 
important regional cooperation initiatives aiming at the facilitation of free trade was the 
APEC. Among the members of APEC, after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, as presented 
in section 6.3.2, there was a so-called  “free-trade fever” (Scollay, 2018, pp. 126-131) 
which meant, the norm of establishing free trade that covers the movements of goods, 
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services and capital as well was accepted by the major players in the region. The norm of 
free trade appeared to be in the internalisation phase of the life cycle. Between the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997 and the GFC in 2008, the APEC member states elaborated and 
signed 40 free trade agreements. This figure illustrates these countries’ intentions to 
develop trade ties.  
Globally, the development of free trade deals showed similar trends. The following figure 
5. shows the number of regional trade agreements that were notified by the WTO: 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat (cited by Kasnyik, 2015) 
In 2009 alone, there were 36 new trade agreements notified. However, after 2009, the 
trend of developing trade agreements has been decreasing. The GFC caused public 
distrust towards capitalism in general, as well as towards new trade agreements 
specifically. In the United States, there were protests against the TPPA and the TTIP, 
mainly because of the risk of job losses. There were protests in Europe too, mainly 
because of the possible detrimental effects of the TTIP on food safety regulations (Kasnyik, 
2015). Nevertheless, after the GFC in 2008, there were signs of protectionism and debates 
201 
 
emerged about economic manipulation. The opposition between the United States and 
China became apparent, and the largest international trade agreements (TPPA, TTIP, TiSA) 
were all under construction so that they purposefully left China out of the deals. In this 
international context, New Zealand remained enthusiastic for free trade and beside the 
support for the elaboration of the TPPA, the state facilitated the RCEP which includes 
China as well. This attitude has recently been called ‘having a foot in two camps’ by 
Terence O’Brien (2018, p. 60).  
As argued earlier, New Zealand’s trade policy has changed after the Sixth Labour 
Government came to power in October 2017. In section 6.3.3 it was described that the 
ban on foreign investors buying New Zealand houses and the operation of the Provincial 
Growth Fun are protectionist measures. It is too early yet to evaluate the policies of the 
Sixth Labour Government and to decide whether these changes will have long-lasting 
effects on New Zealand’s trade policy or just short-term consequences of the nationalist 
New Zealand First party being in a coalition with the Labour Party. It is quite telling, 
however, that the minister who is responsible for the operation of the Provincial Growth 
Fund, Shane Jones has sympathy with the current President of the United States, Donald 
Trump. When Shane Jones announced his return to politics and joined New Zealand First 
in June 2017, he was wearing baseball caps to remind the audience of Trump, he also 
openly emphasized the aim to “Make New Zealand Great Again,” and he pointed to 
nationalist voters all over the world (Edwards, 2017).  
Although it is not possible to evaluate whether New Zealand’s trade policy can still be 
regarded as norm entrepreneurship after the recent changes, the free trade norm appears 
to be entrenched internationally, so the norm life-cycle appears to be in the 
internalisation phase, when norm entrepreneurs do not have any role. This stage of the 
norm life-cycle is the direct consequence of the preceding decades since the middle 
1980s. Prior to the 1980s, during the Cold War it was obvious to scholars that the Western 
countries sanctioned the Communist Block by measures such as the CoCom list that aimed 
at banning technology transfer. Meanwhile, there were other less known international 
measures to block trade liberalisation. For example, within GATT, until the Uruguay Round 
(1986-1994), agriculture was out of the scope of negotiations. Although Article XI of GATT 
prohibited quantitative restrictions on imports in agriculture, the United States 
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threatened that it would leave GATT in case the state could not maintain its protective 
measures on agriculture. Therefore, the United States obtained a waiver from Article XI 
in the 1950s (Bello, 1998). The Uruguay Round of GATT was the milestone after which 
agricultural trade liberalisation could spread internationally, it was then when Australia, 
together with New Zealand, initiated the Canberra Group.   
As Figure 5 showed earlier, after the 1980s, the number of free trade agreements was 
growing. Between the 1980s and 2015, the free trade norm was spreading. Recently, 
there have been protectionist measures made by commercially relevant states. The two 
largest economies in the world, the United States and China have been engaged in a trade 
war since 2018, and both sides have put protectionist measures into effect (Swanson, 
2018). China has made restrictions on capital outflow from the country in 2018 (Galbraith 
& Shan, 2018). There are relevant trade sanctions in effect that limit the option for 
international trade to increase. It is enough to mention that after the annexation of 
Crimea, Western states imposed economic sanctions against Russia. Similarly, due to the 
debated uranium-enrichment programme, there are trade sanctions at place against Iran. 
In spite of the protectionist measures and trade sanctions against Russia and Iran, the free 
trade norm still has strong grounds internationally. Other relevant trading nations are still 
committed to the norm. The countries of the European Union, Japan, Korea, Canada are 
indeed favouring free trade. These states have relevant normative weight in terms of free 
trade, given that concerning free trade, the value of states’ exports is the most decisive. 
The best example that shows that regardless the withdrawal of the US from the TPPA in 
2017, the remaining countries continued the negotiations and established the CPTPP.   
As a summary, this analysis suggests that New Zealand had a leading role in promoting 
free trade internationally between 1984 and 2017. During this period, owing to the skilful 
approach to the negotiations, New Zealand was able to become a recognized leader in the 
internalisation of free trade in the Pacific region where it was the first country with 
Singapore that managed to sign a free-trade agreement. The countries’ diplomats gained 
good reputations and New Zealand played a significant part with influence on the coming 
reform of the WTO. Furthermore, New Zealand’s trade policy is very important from 
another aspect as well: the ideological background of the trade policy was based on the 
strong belief in the rules-based international system. Because of this, the policy can also 
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be regarded as an attempt to justify the (neo)liberal theories of international relations, in 
which international law and cooperation can lead to a peaceful world, and legally binding 
contracts can ensure it. However, after 2017, New Zealand changed its trade policy and 
yet it is not possible to assess whether the country can still be regarded as norm 
entrepreneur.  
 
6.5. The consistency of the policies regarding free trade  
In section 6.1 a definition is the free trade norm has been provided: it is the status of 
affairs when international commercial transactions can be performed without ‘at-border 
barriers’ and ‘beyond border barriers’. The main idea underpinning free trade is that 
optimal economic resource and product allocation can occur when all trade barriers are 
removed. It has also been described that societal consensuses regarding the state’s 
responsibilities modify all those services that the state provides. The extent of states’ 
public services varies country by country and this variation creates distortions in market 
allocation processes. Owing to these distortions, the norm of free trade can never be fully 
realized.  
Although the optimal resource and products allocation cannot occur, it is possible to 
remove those barriers that are independent of the services which the states provide as 
part of their responsibilities (public services). Trade liberalization is the process of the 
removal of the ‘at-borders barriers’ and the ‘beyond borders barriers.’. The concept of 
trade liberalization is crucial to define policy inconsistencies that rule out the credibility 
of the possible norm entrepreneur regarding the free trade norm. Once the opposite of 
trade liberalization occurs, namely, protectionist measures are taken, that means a direct 
contradiction to the norm. The actor is no longer credible in promoting the free trade 
norm; therefore, norm entrepreneurship cannot be applied for the given actor.    
New Zealand’s trade policies entail three sorts of inconsistencies. One of them concerns 
statistical figures, the second one shows problems with the concepts that politicians use, 
meanwhile the third one is a direct contradiction to the free trade norm. First, regarding 
the statistics, New Zealand’s government often emphasises that New Zealand might have 
one of the most open market economies in the world (MFAT, n.d.-e). According to 
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international statistics, on the one hand this can be proven. According to the list of the 
World Economic Forum Global Enabling Trade Report, New Zealand is very close to the 
top countries that enable international trade. However, New Zealand’s ranking is 
deteriorating. The country was ranked 5th in 2012, 4th in 2013 (MFAT, 2015a, p. 23), but 
by 2016, the country had dropped to only 18th (World Economic Forum, 2016).  
The deteriorating ranking can be partially explained. The free movements of goods, 
services, capital and people require governments to abolish all those obstacles that were 
due to administrative and technical reasons. In terms of these technical barriers, New 
Zealand’s geographic location is a natural condition that cannot be changed. Owing to 
this, transport costs may rise which affect pricing and the possible feasibility of importing 
to New Zealand. The distant location, combined with the small population, often causes 
businesses to stay away from New Zealand. For example, the Italian restaurant brand, 
‘Vapiano’ does not sell franchise rights to possible entrepreneurs in New Zealand 
(Vapiano, n.d.). In case other countries are elaborating on the elimination of possible 
technical barriers, that can cause New Zealand’s ranking to fall because the natural 
conditions cannot be changed, and New Zealand’s government cannot do anything to 
mitigate this effect.   
However, there are other bureaucratic obstacles which create cumbersome procedures, 
and these might deter investors from New Zealand. These obstacles can be changed. For 
example, the sensitive lands of New Zealand are protected in a way: when an investment 
affects land that is regarded as such, the investment requires approval by the Overseas 
Investment Office (OIO) (Land Information New Zealand, n.d.). This procedure might take 
a long time, and ministers have the ability to override even a positive decision by the OIO. 
The delays and the uncertainties caused by the ways in which the Resource Management 
Act is applied by local authorities, as Don Brash (personal communication, April 30, 2018) 
emphasised, make the business environment less favourable.15 In this sense, 
administratively, trade and investments are not totally free. These bureaucratic processes 
contribute to the rather problematic evaluation of New Zealand concerning the reception 
of foreign direct investments. The OECD measures the various states’ restrictive policies 
 
15 It is important, however, that Don Brash is often regarded as extremely liberal, therefore, his views 
might not provide unbiased assessment.   
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regarding foreign direct investments. The measures include foreign equity restrictions; 
discriminatory screening or approval mechanisms; restrictions on key foreign personnel; 
and operational restrictions. According to these statistics, New Zealand is rather 
restrictive in receiving foreign direct investments (FDI): the country is eighth among OECD 
members (OECDiLibrary, 2018) and the extent to which New Zealand is measured as 
restrictive is four times larger (24%) than the OECD average (6%).  
Regarding the concepts which politicians use, it is relevant to mention the concept of free 
trade itself. When the current government’s ministers, for example Winston Peters or 
David Parker provide interviews and discuss free trade, they emphasise their enthusiasm 
and support for free trade (see earlier in section 6.2.3). However, the ban on foreign 
investors buying New Zealand houses (described in section 6.3.3) and the subsidies 
provided by the Provincial Growth Fund (also see section 6.3.3) are protectionist. This 
problem was earlier noticed in 2016, when the Labour Party was still in opposition, David 
Clark, the then spokesperson of the Labour Party for Trade and Export Growth questioned 
the New Zealand chief negotiator of the TPPA talks about the content of the planned 
agreement. During the discussion of the parliamentary hearing, David Clark expressed 
that the Labour Party supported free trade. He had to express this because one of his 
significant questions, whether the TPPA would include regulations that would make it 
impossible for New Zealand to impose a ban on foreign investors buying existing homes 
in the country, raised concerns within members of the parliamentary committee (New 
Zealand Labour Party, 2016). Nevertheless, later the Labour government sensed the 
problem of different understandings of concepts: they realised that the ban on foreign 
investors buying existing properties in New Zealand was indeed connected to free trade, 
and intended to implement the ban before the CPTPP (the successor agreement of the 
TPPA) was to come into force (D. Parker, 2017).16  
 
16 The problem of different understandings appears in other policy areas too. In March 2018, the New 
Zealand Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern announced an ambitious plan to reduce child poverty. However, it 
is important to note, that the government was facing the problem of appropriate definition of the 
concept. There were studies earlier, such as the one by an Expert Advisory Committee (EAG) (2012) set up 
by the Children’s Commissioner in 2012, by scholars such as O`Brien (2015). The studies defined child 
poverty in relative terms, and these were based mainly on household income measures and use a 
comparison to the median earning. Furthermore, the statistic figures were based on quite a small sample 
size, that underestimated the number of sole parent families (Trevett, 2018). Therefore, at the time the 
government had only estimations. 
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The discrepancies between the statistical figures and the problems with the use of 
concepts do not rule out New Zealand to be regarded as a norm entrepreneur in free 
trade, because they do not directly affect the free trade norm. However, the ban on 
foreign investors from buying existing housing properties in New Zealand and the 
subsidies provided by the Provincial Growth Fund are contradictory to trade liberalization. 
They constitute new barriers for free trade in the property market and the resource 
allocation in those sectors which the Provincial Growth Fund aims to assist, such as 
forestry and agriculture. Concerning the ban on foreign investors buying existing homes 
in New Zealand, there are further inconsistencies. For example, it is self-contradictory 
because residents from Singapore and Australia are still able to buy existing houses in New 
Zealand (CNBC, 2018). Besides, according to the IMF (see section 6.3.3) the ban is 
problematic, it is discriminatory. The possible appearance of discriminatory measures 
contradicts the principles of the state’s new trade policy which proclaims inclusiveness in 
its name (Progressive and Inclusive Trade For All Agenda).  
Nevertheless, the housing ban has been in effect for only a very short period of time 
(slightly longer than one year) and it is too early to evaluate the Sixth Labour 
Government’s trade policy. However, as argued in section 2.6, in case we find 
inconsistencies between the actor’s practices and the values embodied in the norm in 
concern, it is relevant to analyse the actor’s motivation, especially the actor’s 
commitment to the values of the norm.   
Regarding New Zealand’s commitment to the free trade norm, it appears that among the 
most important groups of the national identity (political leaders, officers and experts of 
the bureaucracy, the general public), only the officers and experts are committed to the 
free trade norm within New Zealand. As presented in section 6.3.3, the experts at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade warned the government that among the WTO the 
operation of the Provincial Growth Fund would raise concerns. Besides, it was the experts 
who have expressed that it is damaging to New Zealand’s reputation that the state needs 
to explain certain agricultural subsidies within the WTO when the country has been 
regarded as the strongest promoter of liberalisation of trade of agricultural products. 
Concerning the commitment of the general public towards free trade, it is relevant to note 
that the public has different opinions about free trade to the United States than to China. 
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According to the findings of Headley and Reitzig (2012, p. 80), in 2008, 59% of the public 
believed the free trade agreement would be good with the United States and only 42% 
considered the China New Zealand FTA to be beneficial for the country. Concerning the 
public attitude towards free trade with China, the case of the investment of a Chinese 
owned corporate, Natural Dairy, is informative. In March 2010, Natural Dairy Holdings Ltd. 
announced its plans to buy out family owned farms, the Crafar farms. The total land area 
of the farms were 16,000 hectares (Evans, 2010). The announcement included further 
plans of acquiring more farms with 100,000 hectares altogether. The size of the planned 
acquisitions caused frightened public reactions, demanding the government to block the 
Chinese expansion into New Zealand’s dairy industry. The Chinese investors argued that 
the reactions showed xenophobia in New Zealand (Otago Daily Times, 2010). The 
acquisition was first blocked by the OIO due to serious fraud accusations against the 
owner of Natural Dairy. However, later in 2012, the acquisition was accepted by the 
government, mostly because the structure of the investment was realised through a 
holding company, Landcorp, which is 50% owned by the New Zealand government (Rowe, 
2015). The case shows that the New Zealand public does not fully support free trade, 
especially when it occurs in farming, an important constitutive element of the national 
identity. 
The ban on foreign investors from buying New Zealand housing properties and the 
establishment of the Provincial Growth Fund were both the consequences of the 
government’s reaction to public attitudes. This reaction shows that the current 
government’s members might not be fully committed to free trade. However, the social 
sensitivity of this government may provide an explanation for this. Social and gender 
equality as conditionalities are already incorporated in the new free trade agreements. As 
part of the redefinition of the role of trade it may later appear that housing, as an essential 
human need, should be excluded of any option where speculation might occur.     
 
6.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analysed New Zealand’s trade policy since the Second World War. 
According to the analysis, for the period between 1984 and 2017, the policy agenda can 
be regarded as norm entrepreneurship because all the necessary criteria are met in that 
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period. Regardless, the Sixth Labour Government introduced protectionist measures after 
2017 which raises questions whether New Zealand has been fully committed to free trade.  
Importantly, the relevance of New Zealand’s trade policy after 1984 is enormous: the state 
gained significant soft power. After 1984, when the Fourth Labour Government was 
elected, there were thorough domestic economic reforms that liberalised the economy. 
The state subsidies were abolished, the economy became open to attract investments, 
privatisation took place and welfare spending was rationalised as well. Then, based on the 
ideology, since 1993, New Zealand has performed a consistent trade policy until 2017, 
gaining momentum especially after 1997-98, after the Asian Financial Crisis, when 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region came to favour bilateral trade deals. Because of the 
professional preparedness of New Zealand’s diplomats, together with Singapore, New 
Zealand could become the first country to conclude a free-trade agreement in the region. 
The fact that New Zealand could have a trade agreement, which was of high quality, 
contributed to concluding other agreements, among which the P3 in 2002 and the P4 
were the most important, because the P4 later became the main platform to elaborate a 
regional deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, of which New Zealand became 
the depositary in 2015. In this sense, New Zealand gained high respect internationally and, 
most importantly, among the members of the WTO. 
Between 1984 and 2017, New Zealand’s success was facilitated in the international 
context. The free trade norm was not in its emerging phase but rather in its internalisation 
phase in this period, therefore governments were open to elaborate free trade 
agreements. Although globally there were other states that developed free-trade 
agreements, such as the European Free Trade Association in 1960 comprising the United 
Kingdom, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal and Sweden, New Zealand was slightly 
ahead of the development curve between 1984 and 2008. Beside this, all the other 
conditions of norm entrepreneurship were met – namely, the state has had a strong 
ideology with which it has regarded free trade as appropriate for other countries as well, 
the state has put significant efforts into the promotion of free trade, and the policies have 
been largely consistent.  
After 2017 the New Zealand free trade policy regime has changed significantly. Partly 
because of the social goals of the government, protectionist steps occurred. Although it 
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is too early to assess the new trade policy, the credibility of the state has been slightly 
diluted. This may later cause difficulties in promoting the market access of the country’s 
products on international markets and also in attempting to reform the rules-based 




7. Discussion: New Zealand promoting norms internationally  
This thesis addressed the research question whether and to what extent New Zealand has 
been acting as a norm entrepreneur in the policy areas of nuclear-free policy and 
promoting free trade internationally. As presented in section 3.1, the research question 
requires analysis of five aspects of the policy agendas:  
- Relevancy of entrepreneurship: Whether the actor has jurisdiction or legislative 
authority over the domain of the given policy agenda;  
- Ideology: Whether the actor has regarded the promoted norm(s) as appropriate 
for others; 
- Efforts: Whether the actor has mobilised resources and put efforts into promoting 
the norm(s) internationally; 
- Leadership: Whether the actor has been the first, or has been among the leading 
actors, that recognised and promoted the specific norm(s) in the first two stages 
of the norm life-cycle, until the norm cascade; 
- Consistency: Whether the actor has been acting consistently with the norm(s) – 
this has particular relevance for states. 
Because New Zealand does not have authority in the policy areas of nuclear-free policy 
and international trade over the addressees of the norms, therefore the first question has 
not been examined in any detail in the thesis. 
 
7.1. Findings 
Concerning New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy, the policy can be regarded as norm 
entrepreneurship from 1984. However, earlier, since the late 1960s, with a slight loss of 
momentum between 1975 and 1984, the policy has shown signs of an uninterrupted and 
historically organic evolution. As defined in section 5.1, the nuclear-free norm means no 
use of nuclear explosive devices, either for military operations or for testing, and no 
presence of nuclear weapons in a certain territory. Finally, the nuclear-free norm also 
means there is no nuclear power generation capacity in a territory. To various extent, New 
Zealand’s nuclear-free policies have included the promotion of all three requirements. 
The following table 3. summarises the main policy steps in certain periods and shows 
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which aspects of the nuclear-free norm have been subjects of the policies of the New 
Zealand governments:  
Historical 
period 
Banning of the use of 
nuclear weapons 
Prohibition of the 
presence of nuclear 
weapons 
No exploration of nuclear 
energy 
1960 – 1975 PTBT in 1963; 
Opposing French tests in 
the South pacific; 
ICJ case in 1973 




Ban on the visits of 
nuclear-powered ships in 
1971  
1975-1984 Opposition of testing; 
Support for the 
elaboration of the CTBT; 
Regular ship visits  The nuclear-propelled ship 
ban was removed after the 
USA took liability 
1984-1990 Support for the 
elaboration of the CTBT 
Ban of nuclear-capable 
ships; 
Nuclear Free Act in 
1987 
Ban of nuclear-propelled 
vessels; 
Nuclear Free Act in 1987 
1990 –  Opposing French tests in 
1995;  
ICJ Test Case revisit  
Participating in nuclear 
disarmament 
advocacies 
Continuous support for the 
Nuclear Free Act 
 
The first steps of the nuclear-free policy occurred in 1963 after the British H-Bomb tests 
had been completed. In 1963, the UN adopted the Partial Test-Ban Treaty that prohibited 
nuclear tests in the atmosphere. New Zealand voted for the Treaty, because the British 
government was no longer engaged in nuclear testing in the South Pacific. Since then, 
successive New Zealand governments have opposed nuclear tests in the South Pacific. 
Even the government led by Robert Muldoon between 1975 and 1984 opposed tests, and 
this government supported the idea of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. Nevertheless, 
this was the government that lifted the ban on the visits on nuclear-powered vessels in 
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1975. The ban was imposed in 1971, because New Zealand studies revealed the possible 
risks of radioactive contamination caused by nuclear-propulsion.  
Although this ban prohibited the visits of nuclear-powered ships, there were other 
warships that visited New Zealand, and these ships were nuclear-capable. Between 1971 
and 1975, a very prolific period occurred in terms of New Zealand supporting nuclear-free 
initiatives. In 1972, New Zealand sponsored a draft UN resolution aiming to ban all kinds 
of nuclear tests. New Zealand voted for the UN Seabed Arms Control Treaty in 1972. The 
New Zealand government organized protests against the French atmospheric tests during 
the third Labour government in 1973. The Third Labour Government submitted a case 
with Australia against the French atmospheric tests at the International Court of Justice 
in 1973. Finally, in 1975 the government created the initial proposal for a Nuclear-Weapon 
Free South Pacific region at the UN. 
Although the government’s policies to promote disarmament focused only on opposing 
testing between 1975 and 1984, the public concern about nuclear technology grew 
further in this period. This was due to the regular US warship visits to New Zealand. By 
1984, the nuclear-free policy gained strong public support and the Labour Party won the 
election in July 1984 with the promise to establish a nuclear-free zone in New Zealand. 
After the election, the new government kept its campaign promise and in practice, the 
New Zealand nuclear-free zone was established. Nuclear-powered ships could not enter 
the country’s ports, and those ships which were not nuclear-propelled but were able to 
carry nuclear weapons could have entered only if they had revealed that they were not 
carrying such weapons. This requirement contradicted the US Navy’s policy of ‘Neither 
confirming nor denying’ the presence of nuclear weapons on their ships. Because the US 
refused to fulfil such requests and New Zealand could not elaborate on an overbridging 
solution for the problem, the US suspended its obligations towards New Zealand under 
the ANZUS alliance in June 1986.  
Later on, in 1987, the New Zealand Nuclear Free Act came into force which legalized New 
Zealand’s nuclear-free status. The Act banned nuclear-powered vessels from New 
Zealand, and this together with the ban of nuclear weapons from the country, the Act 
established the nuclear-free norm. By 1990, the nuclear-free status came to be a ‘taken 
for granted’ feature of the New Zealand identity. Successive governments maintained this 
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status and up until the time of writing, the governments have all been advocating for 
nuclear disarmament. However, the unilateral nuclear-free stance was not promoted 
internationally.  
Similarly, New Zealand’s international trade policy can be regarded as norm 
entrepreneurship for the period between 1984 and 2017. As section 6.1 has defined the 
free trade norm, the norm has breadth in the form of various subjects listed in the 
elements of the balance of payments and depth that refers to the at-border barriers and 
the beyond border barriers. Regarding the removal of both kinds of barriers, we can 
identify three historical periods in New Zealand’s history which brought about new policy 
regimes concerning international trade. Before 1984, the country attempted to shift the 
trade destination from Great Britain to diversified markets. After 1984, significant 
economic reforms took place and these reforms dismantled most of the beyond border 
barriers and the at-border barriers. After that, successive governments mobilised efforts 
to promote free trade internationally. However, after 2017, the Sixth Labour Government 
reconsidered the role of trade and this Government intends to incorporate social goals 
and the requirements of ecological sustainability into new trade agreements. Therefore, 
since 2017, a new period set off in New Zealand’s trade policy and it is too early to 
evaluate this period. Besides, two protectionist measures occurred, the ban on overseas 
investors from buying New Zealand housing properties and the establishment of the 
Provincial Growth Fund. Although the aims of this fund are to assist local communities, 
the fund provides loans to ailing businesses which is a practice similar to subsidies.  
Besides, it is too early to assess the new trade policy which includes protectionist steps 
but there is another reason why norm entrepreneurship in promoting free trade is not 
applicable for New Zealand after 2017. This reason appears that by 2017 the free trade 
norm had become entrenched internationally, and the norm entered its internalisation 
phase. As it was argued in section 6.4, the majority of states adopted the free trade norm. 
Although the largest economies, the US and China have engaged in a trade war and signs 
of protectionism also appeared recently, other commercially relevant states remained 
committed to free trade as the case of the CPTPP showed.  
The following table 4. shows the various periods of trade policy and how the policies 
comply with the criteria to regard the policy as norm entrepreneurship:  
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Period Ideology Efforts Leadership Consistency 
 – 1984  Not relevant Diversification 
only 
Not applicable Not applicable 
1984 – 2017 Effective resource 
allocation and the 












Moore, John Key) 
2017 -  Redefining the role 
of trade 
Extensive efforts Not applicable Inconsistencies 
 
Before 1984, the dominant feature of New Zealand’s international trade policy was the 
continuous attempt to shift the destination of exports from Great Britain to other 
markets. Although the share of Great Britain in New Zealand’s trade was 66% in the 1950s, 
the proportion of this trade relation had decreased to 30% by the mid-1980s. The 
diversification was mainly due to the recognition of the necessity to explore the Australian 
and the Asian markets. This necessity was obvious after Great Britain applied to join the 
European Economic Community in 1961. By the end of the period, political debates 
addressed the advantages of free trade relations and members of both New Zealand’s 
leading political parties became convinced of the benefits of free trade. 
After the Fourth Labour Government came to power in July 1984, the government 
initiated thorough economic reforms. These reforms eliminated largely the beyond 
border barriers to trade. The corporate subsidies were ceased and government 
departments which were engaged in commerce were reorganized into state owned 
enterprises and then privatised. The New Zealand Dollar was first devalued in March 1985 
and then it was floated. The National Government which succeeded the Fourth Labour 
Government continued the reforms after 1990. The labour market was liberalised, and 
the supply and demand became more flexible. This government, led by Jim Bolger, had 
developed a trade strategy by 1993 that synthesized New Zealand’s geopolitical position, 




During the 33-year period between 1984 and 2017, New Zealand performed significant 
efforts to develop free trade globally. In 1986, the state joined the Cairns Group to 
promote the liberalisation of agricultural trade. During the 1990s, New Zealand together 
with Singapore worked to elaborate a free trade agreement, the first in the Asia Pacific 
region. Between 1999 and 2002, New Zealander, Mike Moore was appointed to be the 
Director-General of the WTO. Moore was deeply committed to global free trade and 
during his term, he facilitated the transparency of the WTO, assisted the inclusion of the 
developing countries into the organisation, and managed to get the WTO to accept 
China’s entry. 
In the 2000s, New Zealand had several important achievements. The country composed 
the P4 agreement with Singapore, Chile and Brunei, which later became the basis for the 
TPPA. New Zealand was the first developed country to sign an FTA with China in 2008. By 
2017, New Zealand had developed a significant network of free trade agreements which 
network is also called the country’s trade structure. New Zealand also had a pivotal role 
in an action group within the WTO, the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms to support 
the decrease of subsidies on power generation by fossil fuels. 
These efforts and achievements prove New Zealand can be regarded as a norm 
entrepreneur to promote free trade between 1984 and 2017. However, after 2017 the 
Sixth Labour Government implemented a new trade policy which aims to serve social 
goals and make steps against climate change. Besides, two policy measures, the operation 
of the Provincial Growth Fund and the ban on foreign investors from buying New Zealand 
housing properties are protectionist. It is too early to evaluate the new trade policy and 
besides, the norm life-cycle also appears to be in the internalisation phase, when norm 
entrepreneurs do not have a role. The protectionist measures, however, show that not all 
of the political leaders are committed to free trade, and the general public also has various 
attitudes towards free trade agreements. Although New Zealand individuals have been 
committed to free trade (Mike Moore or John Key), the state never made a commitment 




7.2. The roots of New Zealand becoming a norm entrepreneur 
The conditions and causes that enabled New Zealand to become a norm entrepreneur in 
nuclear-free policy and international trade are multifaceted. Chapter 2 has presented the 
theoretical framework which is dominantly constructivist. This framework has described 
the theoretical prerequisites for a small state to become a norm entrepreneur. According 
to these prerequisites, there are systemic factors which are necessary to be present, and 
besides, the actors must have certain attributes as well. Regarding the systemic factors, 
there must be a specific community (audience) with whom the promoted norms may 
resonate. The internal values represented by the promoted norms cannot differ 
significantly from the values of the members of the international community. For 
example, the Scandinavian states could have become norm entrepreneurs because they 
have been committed to the values of the Western liberal democracies (Wivel, 2016). This 
condition is necessary when the political developments of international relations create a 
window of opportunity to promote new norms (Bloomfield, 2015, p. 17). Concerning the 
actors’ attributes, the actor needs specific resources and options to act, capabilities to 
focus on niche policy areas which usually requires a robust and efficient bureaucracy, 
ambitious politicians and society to influence international politics.  
In chapter 4, it has already been argued that New Zealand as an identity has an efficient 
bureaucracy, the diplomacy as part of the bureaucracy is able to focus on niche areas, and 
both New Zealand society and the politicians have ambitions to influence international 
politics. First, in this section, I elaborate how cultural factors facilitated the state to 
become norm entrepreneur. Second, the section outlines how systemic factors have been 
evolving in the period when the policies were performed. Finally, I describe specific 
elements of the policies in concern and the historical conditions which go beyond the 
limits of the theoretical framework.  
 
7.2.1. Personal ambitions, social and cultural factors 
Regarding the politicians’ ambitions, it is crucial to note that there have been outstanding 
political figures who were whole-heartedly devoted to certain agendas. Prime Minister 
Norman Kirk (1972-74) considered the nuclear-free norm and nuclear disarmament to be 
a moral issue and he would have made sacrifices to secure a nuclear-free New Zealand in 
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terms of losses in trade options.  He also expressed the belief that New Zealand should 
not be defended by nuclear weapons. His consistent efforts resulted in various campaigns 
against nuclear testing performed by France at Muroroa, with constant opposition to visits 
by nuclear-propelled vessels into New Zealand ports, and the promotion of the South-
Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone.  
Similarly, Helen Clark has been a prominent figure of the nuclear-free agenda. She was 
born in 1950, a member of the next generation after Norman Kirk who was born in 1923. 
Helen Clark was an enthusiastic political activist during the Prime Ministership of Kirk and 
she was a strong promoter of the nuclear-free agenda since her early years. She was the 
chair of the drafting committee to the Rarotonga Treaty and she was Minister of Health 
in 1989. Most importantly, she was the leader of the left-wing of the Labour Party that 
elaborated the original ideology of the nuclear-free policy of the Labour Manifesto for the 
1984 election (Clark, 2009). During her term as Prime Minister (1999-2008) she advocated 
in various nuclear disarmament agendas, such as condemning North Korea after a nuclear 
test in 2006.  
During the early 2000s, Helen Clark helped the New Zealand nuclear disarmament 
advocacy thanks to her devotion to the case since her early career. Her successor as Prime 
Minister, John Key (2008-2016) was also committed to the nuclear-free agenda; he 
declared that while he was Prime Minister, New Zealand would remain nuclear-free 
(Houlahan, 2006). However, scholars did miss New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament 
advocacy during his term especially after the Ministry for Disarmament and Arms Control 
was disestablished in 2011.  
The government portfolio of disarmament and arms control was revitalized in 2018 by the 
Sixth Labour Government led by Jacinda Ardern who belongs to a new generation of 
Labour Party leaders. She is thirty years younger than Helen Clark, nevertheless, she also 
recognises the crucial challenges which her generation faces calling ‘climate change’ this 
generation’s nuclear-free moment. Furthermore, she can relate to the former generation 
as her personal mentor, Marian Hobbs was a strong representative of Helen Clark’s 
government and generation. These individual factors contributed to Jacinda Ardern’s 
enthusiasm to give renewed momentum to New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament 
advocacy.       
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Concerning free trade, the role of politicians as individuals was also significant. Mike 
Moore’s ideological background has already been described. He was an enthusiastic 
promoter of international free trade. Besides his efforts as Director-General of the WTO 
he has been a prolific writer publishing papers and books about the benefits of 
globalization (Larner, 2009). Those politicians who have had an Economics background 
have also supported New Zealand’s free trade advocacies. Don Brash or John Key are good 
examples. As Prime Minister after the GFC in 2008, John Key had a pivotal role in New 
Zealand’s quick adaptation to the challenges of the crisis. Scholars such as Reitzig (2018) 
even mention that John Key might have been too enthusiastic regarding free trade 
because he was participating in the elaboration of free trade agreements with 
authoritarian regimes (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan). He also attempted to compose a 
trade deal with Iran even when Iran was criticised for its nuclear programme. Because of 
these policies analysts raised questions regarding New Zealand’s image as a good global 
citizen and the country’s commitment to human rights. 
New Zealand’s negotiators in international trade issues are highly skilled. This is the result 
of the 1993 Trade Strategy that initiated internal training programmes for officials at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The skills and training combined with the creative 
‘can do attitude’ resulted in New Zealand achieving the first free trade deal in the Asia-
Pacific region, and to become the first state among developed countries to have a free 
trade agreement with China. Beyond this, the quality of New Zealand’s trade agreements 
is highly regarded which was the reason that the P4 agreement became the basis to 
elaborate a larger trade agreement, the TPPA. New Zealand’s trade experts can fill in top 
jobs globally,  Recently, Crawford Falconer was appointed to elaborate on the free trade 
deals for Great Britain after  Brexit, and in 2019 David Walker was chosen to be the chair 
of the WTO’s Appellate Body to reform the organisation’s dispute settlement procedures.  
While New Zealand’s diplomats are respected owing to international trade negotiations 
mainly, the same can be said about diplomats who specialize in other policy areas. In 
chapter 4, the case of the drafting of the UN Covenant on the Rights of the People with 
Disabilities was mentioned. In that process Don Mackay gained high respect for New 
Zealand (United Nations, 2008). Furthermore, the diplomats in nuclear disarmament are 
also highly regarded. Recently, for example, New Zealand was appointed to chair the 
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negotiations of 35 countries elaborating on a Missile Technology Control Regime. The role 
will be performed by Dell Higgie who has long been the New Zealand Ambassador on 
disarmament and arms control in Geneva (Peters, 2018).  
Regarding the social background of these policies, it is crucial that the nuclear-free policy 
was strongly supported by the general public in New Zealand. By 1984, more than 60% of 
the population lived in self-proclaimed nuclear-free zones. The policy earned majority 
support from the population at that time. Later on, the general public also preferred the 
New Zealand government to promote the idea of nuclear-free areas at the UN. It is fair to 
argue, the general public has been committed to all elements of the nuclear-free norm. 
The political leaders also developed the same commitment and by 1990 both parties had 
adopted the nuclear-free policy. However, at the beginning of the 1990s, officials in the 
bureaucracy still regarded the policy as a mistake, and they came to favour the idea of 
nuclear disarmament only by the late 1990s (Burford, 2016, pp. 168-169). By the 2000s, 
the policy was supported by all three social groups (political leaders, officials in the 
bureaucracy and the public).  
The support for the free trade policy has been significantly different. In the area of free 
trade, it is the officials of the bureaucracy who are the straightforward supporters of the 
norm.  Meanwhile leading politicians and the general public have more complex attitudes 
towards free trade. Those trade experts who received an education as economists are 
trained to prefer free trade for theoretical reasons. Mainstream economic theories prefer 
solutions for trade in which states do not distort resources and the allocation of goods 
from the market, and where there are no barriers for free trade for political purposes. 
Some politicians also adhere themselves to the idea of free trade (Don Brash, John Key, 
Mike Moore). 
However, there are political leaders who have expressed their reservations. Helen Clark 
mentioned her concerns whether globalization (of which free trade is a constitutive 
element) can facilitate social cohesion (Clark, 2017). Jim Bolger (personal communication, 
May 16, 2018) openly criticises neo-liberalism which is the basic ideology to underpin free 
trade, and he mentions that neoliberalism could not create wage security and caused 
serious income inequalities. When mentioning the problems of housing and homelessness 
in New Zealand, the current Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern regards capitalism as a 
220 
 
‘blatant failure’ (Owen & Satherley, 2017). The list of the politicians who are critical of free 
trade (and capitalism or neoliberalism) is rather long. Perhaps, the most critical case is of 
David Lange. He was the Prime Minister in 1984 when the right wing of the Labour Party, 
as a result of a bargain for the nuclear-free policy, implemented the neoliberal economic 
reforms. After Lange realized the social tensions the liberalisation measures caused, he 
attempted to slow down the reforms. His popularity was declining by 1989; however, the 
decisive moment for him to resign from the Prime Ministership was when Roger Douglas, 
the leading economic reformer, was voted back to the government by the Labour Caucus 
on 3 August 1989. Lange understood this as a vote of no confidence to his leadership and 
resigned on 8 August 1989 (Russell, 1996, p. 202).  
The general public does not appear to be committed to unfettered free trade and the 
protests against the TPPA in 2015 showed this. That specific trade agreement was strongly 
opposed by the public. According to opinion polls (Kelsey, 2012) the secrecy of the 
drafting of the text was opposed by 65% and the plans to give investors the rights to sue 
governments in offshore tribunals were opposed by 61%. An interview (V. Vitalis, personal 
communication, April 16, 2018) also suggested that the traditionally socially more 
sensitive Labour Party did not support the TPPA. It is fair to argue that society tends to 
support the free trade agreements as long as they perceive them to be beneficial for the 
society’s income. In this sense, we cannot identify public commitment to the norm of free 
trade. As the case of the Natural Dairy showed, even foreign direct investments are seen 
as possibly risky for the residents of New Zealand. Because the general public have not 
been committed to unfettered free trade and leading politicians tend to consider the 
public concerns, these factors can explain why the Sixth Labour Government reconsidered 
and redefined the role of trade for New Zealand.  
 
7.2.2. System-related factors 
Concerning the systemic factors, three courses of events need to be discussed: the 
environment consciousness which had been emerging since the late 1960s, the quick and 
dramatically surprising end of the Cold War and the emergence of new 
telecommunication technologies and a different worldview (the intellectual recognition 
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of a globalized world). All three courses of events facilitated New Zealand to become norm 
entrepreneur. 
For New Zealand, the testing of nuclear explosive devices appeared as an environmental 
risk because of the reports of aboriginal people who lived near the test sites.  For New 
Zealand it was obvious that the UN conferences on environment protection (for example 
the Stockholm Conference in 1972) provided a platform where the idea of nuclear-free 
zones could be raised. This link between environment protection and the nuclear-free 
norm resulted in the ‘Clean and Green’ initiative in the 1990s and more recently, in 2018, 
the revival of the disarmament advocacy among which nuclear disarmament has a 
significant role.  
Among the systemic factors, the last decade of the Cold War, between 1981 and 1991, 
until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, had the most dramatic effect on nuclear policies. 
No one could say in 1981 that by 1991 the Cold War would end, that prediction would 
have been regarded as unrealistic. In the beginning of the period, the tensions between 
the two opponents were rising. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In January 
1981, a Republican President, Ronald Reagan came to power who had a harder approach 
to the Soviet Union. In 1983, NATO started the installation of mid-range nuclear missiles 
in Germany and in other NATO member states. The US announced the start of the 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI – ‘Star Wars’) in 1983. The number of nuclear warheads 
was quickly rising and in the middle of the decade its number reached its historic high 
with more than 60,000 warheads. However, a change in the leadership of the Soviet 
Union, the election of Mikhail Gorbachev to be the General Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party, brought about reforms in the communist bloc. The reforms 
encompassed economic and political measures too which eventually resulted in a 
democratization process within the communist bloc and the bipolar world dissipated by 
1991 entirely. 
For the general public, the beginning of the decade triggered fear from the possible 
consequences of a nuclear war, and this caused antinuclear sentiments in Western 
countries. New Zealand’s nuclear-free stance was welcomed by the general public; 
however, other state leaders were in favour of nuclear deterrence strategies. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relevance of the nuclear deterrence strategies could 
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be questioned; seemingly there was no reason to sustain them any longer, since the 
enemy disappeared. Nuclear disarmament advocacies became increasingly supported not 
just by the public but also by political leaders. This condition contributed to the fact that 
New Zealand could forge a coalition with South-East Asian states to oppose French nuclear 
tests in 1995.  
After 1982, when the corporation Cisco constructed the first computer network between 
universities in San Francisco, followed by a global network of computers, the internet has 
been developing rapidly. Together with the democratization of the Eastern bloc and 
former developing countries’ quick economic growth (South Korea became the 11th 
largest economy of the world by 1991), the world was viewed differently. Large numbers 
of scholarly papers were published about globalization. These developments resulted in 
two emerging conditions that facilitated New Zealand’s policy agendas.  
First, the development of the internet and telecommunication in general helped civil 
organisations to contact each other more easily. Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) could plan and coordinate joint initiatives. As described in section 5.3.3, after 
1990, New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacies, to a large extent, were initiated by 
NGOs which became more effective owing to the development of telecommunications. 
The Indian philosopher, the 1999 Nobel Economics Laureate, Amartya Sen (2002) argued 
that even anti-globalization protesters used the achievements of globalization, namely 
the internet,  as a technological invention that was the result of globalization. 
Second, the democratization process in the former Eastern bloc and the maturity of 
economic development in former developing countries made analysts view the world as 
one. Entrepreneurs became interested in exploring the new markets, since the political 
risks of possible nationalization of business assets diminished. The entrepreneurs started 
lobbying at their own governments for the liberalisation of business relations with other 
countries. This created pressure on governments to facilitate free trade globally. This 
factor also helped New Zealand’s efforts to be successful; nevertheless, the skills of the 
New Zealand diplomacy were also needed to be an actor one step ahead of the 




7.2.3. Beyond the limits of the theoretical framework: specific factors 
The thesis developed a basically constructivist theoretical framework in which the 
definition of the concept of norms is clarified, the causal link between norms and interests 
is described, how norms emerge and spread, what roles norm entrepreneurs have in the 
spread of norms and which actors can become norm entrepreneurs. However, there are 
certain limitations to this model, similarly to other IR theories. Regarding the criticism of 
IR theories, scholars such as Milliken (1999, p. 230) assert that IR provide only “ahistorical 
accounts of continuity and structural form that ignore historical transformations.”  
Although Milliken composed this argument mainly about realist theories, it is relevant 
concerning constructivist models too. There are debates among constructivists which 
address this problem. For example, Zehfuss (2001) outlined that one of the most 
prominent constructivist, Alexander Wendt’s use of the identity is dangerous for his 
theory, because Wendt does not discuss how identity is created. Another author, Hopf 
(2000) argues that Wendt’s theory misses the domestic elements of constructing the 
states’ identities, structure and agents who only incidentally construct mutually each 
other. Although there are attempts among constructivists to provide historically informed 
accounts of how identity develops and what roles domestic factors play in identity 
formation – for example Zehfuss (Zehfuss, 2011) who provides an historical overview of 
how identity is created through the example of Germany after the Second World War –, 
the elaboration of a comprehensive logic how identity evolves is still missing.  
The thesis described a factor regarding the nuclear-free policy which is related to the 
question of how identity evolves historically and explains why this factor was present at 
the elaboration of the policy is beyond the limitations of the theoretical framework. This 
factor is the presence of a strong desire to redefine and to express New Zealand’s 
independence and identity since the 1970s onwards. As it was described in the case study, 
both in literature and in academic publications, New Zealand thinkers attempted to define 
an independent identity for the country and the nation which should grow away from its 
British colonial legacy. The declaration of the nuclear-free stance of the country during 
the 1980s provided a platform to express this identity. However, before the 1980s, the 
nuclear-free policy was already an item to emphasize independence when Norman Kirk 
submitted the case independently at the ICJ against the French atmospheric nuclear tests 
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in 1973, although there were diplomatic efforts by Australia to bring France to the ICJ 
together.  
The constructivist models are also often criticised because they do not pay sufficient 
attention to power relations (Checkel, 2005). Concerning this critique, the theoretical 
framework has some elements that mitigate this problem, outlining that the power over 
opinion is not related to the size of the actor and small states may have larger latitude in 
elaborating foreign policies because militarily they cannot modify the overall balance of 
power in the system. However, the concrete threats that a small state faces cannot be 
modelled in this theoretical framework. For New Zealand, the possible threats were very 
specific and had a significant role in the elaboration of the nuclear-free stance. 
For New Zealand, the threat that a hostile power would invade the country has been 
present only to a limited extent since the 1960s. In 1951, when the ANZUS Treaty was 
signed, New Zealand still had in mind the experience of the Japanese attacks on Darwin 
in 1942 and the battle of the Coral Sea. By the early 1960s, however, the imminent threat 
of a hostile invasion had decreased significantly. Although scholars such as Kennaway 
(2000) or McMillan (1987) argue that the threat of a hostile invasion was obsolete, the 
politicians did not believe that it was impossible. At the establishment of the nuclear-free 
policy, the Prime Minister, David Lange wanted to remain within the ANZUS alliance, and 
after New Zealand was ‘ousted’ from ANZUS, the government increased military spending. 
Nevertheless, the largest perceived threat was a possible nuclear accident occurring in 
New Zealand territory. 
This perception of threats has a relevant effect on the contours of how we can explain the 
introduction of the nuclear-free policy. There were countries which had nuclear-free 
policies; however, those countries let US warships visit their ports (Iceland, Norway, 
Japan). These countries expressed that they preferred no nuclear weapons in their 
territories. The United States assured them that they would respect their preferences. 
Therefore, these countries developed a protocol of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ – they never 
asked if there were nuclear weapons on visiting ships. So, the US policy of ‘Neither 
Confirm Nor Deny’ was not challenged. Scholars usually argue that for New Zealand, such 
a guarantee which was based on a gentlemen’s agreement was not applicable, because 
the other countries perceived hostile threats, while New Zealand did not (McMillan, 1987, 
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p. 69). However, because David Lange wanted to keep the ANZUS Alliance alive for New 
Zealand,17 this cannot be true. Therefore, even New Zealand perceived possible military 
threats and still the country required stronger guarantees than the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ 
protocol.  
The possible reason for this request lies in the thinking of the most important members 
of the Fourth Labour Government. David Lange, Mike Moore, Helen Clark and Kevin 
Clements were all part of a generation which was still young when New Zealand sent 
troops to the Vietnam War, and started to perceive the United States as a militant power.  
They could not trust the United States, therefore, the overbridging solution to the ‘Neither 
Confirm Nor Deny’ policy, the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ solution could not serve as an 
assurance. This generational feature of the important members of the Lange Government 
had a decisive component in elaborating the nuclear-free policy. Although constructivist 
models can describe why certain political leaders can achieve success through the 
resonance with the general public (the leaders’ audience), the coincidence that a specific 
generation of leaders comes from a background that has triggered a distrust for the 
leaders against the country’s own allies cannot be modelled by general constructivist 
frameworks.   
It is also important to note that the origins of the nuclear-free stance and the strong 
support for free trade are all linked to the same government in the 1980s, and the two 
policy agendas were initiated at the same time. Some scholars may argue that it is not a 
coincidence because the conditions of the global context were mature for small states to 
be encouraged to perform norm entrepreneurship. It is fair to claim that the technological 
developments made communication easier and quicker. So small states could more easily 
promote their ideas internationally. However, this encouraging factor that information 
about a small state’s policies can travel quickly and these pieces of information are widely 
and easily accessible for others in the world may have significant effects only after the 
2000s.18 During the 1980s it was not yet the case.  
 
17 For Lange and for officials, the joint military exercises with the US was crucial due to the subtle tactics 
the troops could practice.   
18 The events of the Arabic Spring in 2011 are widely regarded as the first political developments in which 
the internet and social media platforms had a significant role in organizing protesters.   
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The reason why the same government initiated both policies is also linked to the 
generational feature of the Fourth Labour Government. In chapter 4 it has been presented 
that New Zealand is fairly active in international affairs and often takes pivotal roles. 
However, that particular generation of politicians of the Fourth Labour Government was 
an outstanding exception. They were personally motivated to perform more than their 
predecessors. Furthermore, the nuclear-free policy was a part of a bargain between the 
right wing and the left wing of the Labour Party. The nuclear-free policy was promoted by 
the left wing of the party and this policy had the decisive role to win the 1984 elections 
for Labour. However, the right wing of the party intended to perform the radical economic 
reforms. The start of the free trade agenda proves the ambitions of that generation 
however, the nuclear-free agenda earned them popularity. The plans for the economic 
reforms were kept secret, and as Kevin Clements  (1988, p. 123) argues, it is uncertain 
whether the government had the mandate to introduce the economic agenda.19  
 Among the specific factors, it is relevant to present some aspects of the observed policy 
agendas, the role of accidental events in the developments of the nuclear-free policy, the 
challenge of the imminent turn of asymmetric economic interdependencies and the 
consequences of New Zealand’s strong agriculture. These aspects are related to the 
possible historical determination of New Zealand, including the role for which New 
Zealand appears to be predestined.  
Regarding the role of accidental events, there are publications that link chaos theory and 
history (SAGE History, 2019). These publications describe how seemingly irrelevant events 
changed the tide of the wars; for example, in the US secession war during the battle of 
Gettysburg, or why Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo. At Gettysburg, 100 prisoners 
were recruited for the Unionist army and that proved to be decisive against the 
Confederation army that had more than 50,000 troops. At Waterloo, due to the lack of 
nails at the hands of the cavalry, Napoleon’s cavalry could not neutralize the British 
artillery and had to retreat. However, linking chaos theory and history suggests that 
accidental events are in favour of the overarching historic trends. This happened in both 
cases: in the US secession war, the Northern industrial production and the population 
 
19 Concerning this, in 1984 the Labour Party gained 43% of the votes but owing to the features of the 
electoral system, the party could achieve a significant majority.  
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were already much larger than the South`s. Similarly, Napoleon was to be defeated, 
because the military forces of Great Britain, Prussia and Russia combined were much 
larger than the French Army. In both cases it was just a question of time when the decisive 
battles occurred.  
In case of the developments of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy in 1984 and 1985, there 
were accidental events as well. During the practical hard test of the nuclear-free policy, 
when the USS Buchanan asked for permission to visit in January 1985, David Lange was 
away on Tokelau. Although Lange was aware of the coming visit of the Buchanan, he 
expected that to happen later, after mid-February or in March 1985. In his absence, the 
Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer had to decide whether the government would 
accept the Buchanan’s request. But Geoffrey Palmer could not decide due to lack of 
certain information.  
After the Buchanan requested entry to New Zealand, the government attempted to reach 
out for the Prime Minister, but there was no telephone line on Tokelau, so the 
government had to wait until Lange’s return to Wellington. However, when Lange was 
travelling back, the ship which was carrying him had accidental damage, as its driveshaft 
was broken, so the ship could only drift and this caused Lange a one-day delay. For this 
reason he could not get back to Wellington by the time of the government meeting to 
decide about the Buchanan`s request (Hensley, 2013, p. 102). In his absence, the decision 
was already made by Geoffrey Palmer based on his legal knowledge and so the 
government had a proposal to decline the Buchanan’s request.  
However, the societal trends show that the nuclear-free legislation was about to occur. 
First, the snap-election was called because of the debate over a proposed bill to prohibit 
nuclear weapons from New Zealand. Second, by 1986, opinion polls showed that 92% of 
the voters were opposing nuclear weapons and 69% were against the US ship visits 
(Dewes, 2005, p. 109).20 Thirdly, as Hensley (2013, p. 93) described, the strength of the 
left wing of the Labour Party, was the leader, Helen Clark, and Kevin Clements, then a 
sociologist in Christchurch. They could mobilise the anti-nuclear network anytime and 
 
20 The opposition of nuclear weapons and the US ship visits grew significantly after two agents of the 
French secret service (DGSE) organized an attack and bombed the Rainbow Warrior in July 1985. The 
flagship of Greenpeace was mooring in the Auckland harbour. For many New Zealanders the attack was an 
action of terrorism that occured in New Zealand’s territory (Greenpeace, n.d.).   
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they could organise massive protests against the ship visits. With respect to these trends, 
it would be more surprising if the antinuclear policy had not been established after 1984. 
Had the Buchanan got permission to enter New Zealand ports, it is likely that protests 
would have occurred pressurizing the government to take a straightforward stance 
against the visits of nuclear-capable ships.  
Regarding the asymmetric economic interdependencies (Török, 1998), it is crucial to 
define this concept. This means that in economic relations the benefits and disadvantages 
do not appear proportionately on the various sides of the participating countries. From 
the beginning of the industrial revolution the distribution of wealth was not proportionate 
because the Western countries reaped most of the benefits. This process is called the 
‘Great Divergence’ by economic historians (White, 2018). New Zealand was on the 
winners’ side.  
However, at the beginning of the 21st Century, the benefits and disadvantages are 
levelling out with the mobility of labour and the liberalisation of investment opportunities 
for developing countries. Cheaper labour appeared in the United States, similarly in Great 
Britain and New Zealand simply because immigrant workers appeared in the labour 
market. Investors from former developing countries appeared in these countries as well. 
This turn of the former asymmetric economic interdependencies affects the Western 
states disadvantageously and these states, including New Zealand, are facing an 
adaptation crisis to this development of globalization. 
The ban on foreign investors from buying New Zealand housing properties and the 
subsidies funded by the Provincial Growth Fund are the first reactions to this adaptation 
crisis. However, because these create trade distortions internationally, in the long term 
these are not sustainable. Therefore, the necessary adaptation to these challenges is 
delayed but not resolved. Recently, there were riots in Chile owing to the severe income 
inequalities in the country caused by liberal economic reforms (The Wall Street Journal, 
2019). Similar protests are likely to happen in New Zealand during the coming five years 
unless a significant economic policy change takes place that would alleviate income 
inequalities.   
Finally, it is relevant to mention another specific factor, the role of New Zealand’s 
agriculture which implies a historical determination for the country. Internationally, 
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agricultural products are typically the most protected goods, and states attempt to 
maintain their agricultural capacities. This phenomenon can be explained by realist 
scholars. According to their argument, in warfare, states need to secure their food supply, 
both for the military and for their residents. Owing to the strength of New Zealand’s 
agriculture, for the country there is a significant interest to promote international free 
trade for agricultural products. Therefore, it appears that New Zealand has a specific 
interest to continuously challenge the realist perceptions of international relations.  
 
7.3. Theoretical implications 
In section 3.1 the thesis outlined what theoretical implications the case studies may have. 
First, the case of New Zealand can reveal whether small states can have independence in 
foreign policy which means that the states concerned do not have to take into 
consideration great powers’ interests when they elaborate their foreign policies. 
Independence for small states means they can perform their policies without the concern 
that something may cause tensions and conflict of interest with great powers. 
Independence is highly relevant regarding norm entrepreneurship, because that means 
the small state can promote its values and ideas freely to become practices, and 
internalised norms. Because New Zealand is distant from all possible buffering zones of 
great powers, therefore the state is understood as the least likely case to face the 
constraint to consider the possible conflicts with great powers’ interests.   
Second, the analysis of the Scandinavian states showed that those states’ distant 
geographical location facilitated them to become norm entrepreneurs. Although the 
Scandinavian states can be regarded as norm entrepreneurs according to the system of 
criteria to recognize norm entrepreneurs (developed in section 2.6), the New Zealand case 
is crucial to bring theoretical insight into the discussion about small states as norm 
entrepreneurs. New Zealand is the most distant country, therefore, if distant location 
facilitates a state to become norm entrepreneur, to test this hypothesis it is essential to 
analyse New Zealand. The country is the most likely case of distant location facilitating 
norm entrepreneurship.  
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Third, beyond the common phenomena that appear in the two policy agendas, the two 
cases of potential norm entrepreneurship for New Zealand can inform about the effects 
small states can have on international politics. The two cases are similar in all aspects, 
except for the political areas in which they have been performed. The policy areas of 
international nuclear issues and international trade are different enough for a 
comparative case study. This study can generate hypothesis about small states’ possible 
influences through norm entrepreneurship.  
 
7.3.1. Independence or entrapment between great powers’ interests?  
For New Zealand, the risks of conflicts with hostile great powers which can escalate into 
military invasion as well are relevant; however, due to the country’s distant location, the 
risks are not permanently apparent. For a landlocked Central European country, such as 
Poland, the risks of either Germany or Russia imposing threats by their expansive politics 
cause the state to be alert regarding the power dynamics between the two nearby 
powers. Meanwhile, for New Zealand, these risks are present only periodically. For 
example, during the First World War, New Zealand was almost isolated entirely from 
military operations, the largest risks occurred when Germany laid mines off the Northern 
tip of the North Island. During the Second World War, the battle of the Coral Sea in early 
1942 was relatively close, and Germany mined the entries to the harbours of Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch causing five deaths (Burford, 2016, p. 69).  
After the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, New Zealand did not perceive any possible 
threats of military invasion. This lack of perceived imminent threats made the nuclear-
free stance possible. Nevertheless, the implementation of the nuclear-free norm after 
1984 was indeed the expression of New Zealand’s independence because New Zealand 
emphasized that no great powers should interfere with the country’s sovereignty. The 
expression of independence caused conflicts with an allied great power, the United 
States, even though this great power had similar values and adhered itself to the 
institutions of Western liberal democracies. Besides, the conflict had a consequence, 
because New Zealand could not elaborate a free trade agreement with the United States. 
This fact signals that absolute independence does not exist even for New Zealand; the 
state has had to bear the costs of the nuclear-free policy which is the lack of a free trade 
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agreement with the United States. After 2006, when Australia signed a free trade 
agreement with the US, scholars such as Iati (2015) believed the free trade agreement 
with the US would be realised through the TPPA; however that did not happen. The lack 
of an FTA with the US is representative of the costs of the nuclear-free policy.  
In section 4.3 I showed that since the debate of the 2010 Defence White Paper, for 
analysts and policy makers the discrepancy between the diversified trade links among 
which China had a significant share (20%) and the almost exclusively Anglo-Saxon ties in 
defence policy posed a challenge. Academics such as Ayson (2011) argued for a more 
balanced approach in elaborating defence cooperation. By 2015, the New Zealand 
government had changed its approach and the 2016 Defence White Paper outlined 
defence cooperation with China too, including even joint exercises. This practice itself 
shows that New Zealand does face the constraint to balance between great powers’ 
interests. Although the recent government documents, such as the 2018 Strategic 
Defence Policy Statement, are more cautious in their approach, China is still described as 
a country with which New Zealand continues to build a strong and resilient relationship.  
In chapter 6, it has been described why the trade negotiators have preferred to avoid the 
constraint to choose between the United States and China and why they have intended 
to remain open to both great powers in the Asia Pacific region. However, after 2016 this 
is an increasing challenge for two reasons. First, states’ attitudes towards international 
trade has changed and protectionism is rising (D. Parker, 2019) and it is crucial to explore 
the markets that are still open for New Zealand. In this trend, China appears to be more 
open. However, China’s increasing presence and influence in the Pacific Islands are posing 
further challenges to New Zealand. China is interested in port access to these islands, 
mainly due to secure its access to economic resources (fisheries). Besides, in 1997 China 
established a satellite tracking station in Kiribati which was later dismantled. However, in 
terms of intelligence monitoring, China’s presence in the region is still concerning. China 
recently signed an agreement with the Solomon Islands to install an internet cable from 
Honiara to Sydney (Powles, 2018). The level of Chinese development assistance in the 
region is concerning, and it is causing further worries for New Zealand (Bracewell-Worrall, 
2019).   
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For all these reasons, we can draw theoretical implications from the New Zealand case. 
The geographical location, the distance from great powers’ buffering zones, does create 
larger latitude for small states; however, full independence cannot be identified in any 
location. Because New Zealand is an extreme case regarding geographic location, it is 
proven that small states and middle powers are all entrapped between great powers’ 
interests.  
 
7.3.2. Norm entrepreneurship without independence?  
New Zealand’s unique geographic location provides another option to test the hypothesis 
according to which the remote geographic location has a role in small states becoming 
norm entrepreneurs. Although small states cannot be fully independent in their foreign 
policies as presented in the former section, geographic distance from conflict zones 
provides larger latitude to perform diplomacy. Concerning remoteness and its inherent 
latitude, New Zealand is an extreme case, therefore, if distance has a role in small states 
acting as norm entrepreneurs, New Zealand is the most likely case. If New Zealand has not 
been acting as a norm entrepreneur, then we can exclude the option that small states can 
have influence on world politics through norm entrepreneurship. However, the analysis 
provides a limited input because earlier the Scandinavian states, which are not that 
remote as New Zealand, were already analysed as norm entrepreneurs (Björkdahl, 2002, 
2013; Smed & Wivel, 2017; Wivel, 2016). 
Chapter 5 and chapter 6 showed that New Zealand has been a norm entrepreneur in 
nuclear-free policy and international trade policy, the hypothesis about the role of 
distance in small states acting as norm entrepreneurs has not been falsified. It is essential 
to note that aside from the Scandinavian states (Sweden and Denmark) and New Zealand, 
during the preparation of the thesis, the author did not come across case studies that 
would attempt to present other examples of small countries acting as norm 
entrepreneurs. This finding is relevant, because authors such as Ingebritsen (2006b), 
Lamoreaux (2014) or Wivel (2016) who discuss small states’ foreign policy behaviour, 
suggest norm entrepreneurship for small states as a way to influence world issues and 
earn soft power. The scarcity of case studies about small states as norm entrepreneurs 
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may be due to the analysts’ positive bias, namely, they present only those cases in which 
the actors have been successful. 
The likelihood that remote geographic location indeed has a role can be shown indirectly. 
Those European small states which are wealthy and landlocked (Austria, Switzerland) 
have not yet been analysed as possible norm entrepreneurs. In the case of Switzerland, it 
is relevant that the country hosts a large number of international organizations. Still, the 
country is not active in international politics, for example, Switzerland became a member 
of the United Nations only in 2003. Therefore, it is possible that being landlocked and 
surrounded by various numbers of neighbouring countries requires such resources from 
the governments to manage these relations that there remain no significant resources for 
focussing on niche areas.  
There are cases that scholars have identified in which diplomats from relatively poor, 
developing countries contributed significantly to policy agendas. For example, the WPS 
agenda, UN Security Council Resolution 1325, was promoted mainly by NGOs. However, 
Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, Minister of Women’s Affairs in Namibia (Landsberg, 2003), 
and Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury, representing Bangladesh also made significant 
contribution in the UNSC to get the resolution adopted (Chowdhury, 2010). This shows 
that even landlocked countries whose diplomacies are intensively engaged may be able 
to focus on specific areas. However, these diplomats could also rely on organizational 
platform, namely the UN, to promote their agendas. If these agendas can be proven to be 
norm entrepreneurships, then the hypothesis regarding the necessary role of remoteness 
in norm entrepreneurship would be falsified.    
 
7.3.3. The influence of small states’ norm entrepreneurship 
The New Zealand cases allow us to generate hypotheses regarding the effects of small 
states performing norm entrepreneurship. Based on the cases, it is likely that small states 
cannot influence international normative development directly or the effects of their 
advocacies are only minimal. However, small states’ domestic policies appear to be more 
influential; and the method of ‘leading by example’ shall be recommended because that 
may prove to be more attractive for others too. This also implies that small states can 
influence global politics: they are not entirely determined by the great powers’ intentions, 
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or by external, unforeseeable events as Templeton (2006, p. 514) believed in the case of 
New Zealand.  
The case of the nuclear-free policy showed that the largest effect of New Zealand’s stance 
was that geopolitical discourses started analysing the options of becoming nuclear-free 
by banning the visits of nuclear-propelled and nuclear-capable ships. This was the largest 
fear of the US strategical analysts too. However, it is difficult to assess what effects this 
independent stand against nuclear ship visits brought about globally because, shortly 
after New Zealand’s unilateral steps, the Cold War ended. After the end of the Cold War, 
in 1991 the United States announced that their surface vessels would no longer carry 
nuclear weapons; therefore, one element of the New Zealand policy became redundant.  
Concerning the promotion of the nuclear-free norm, it is crucial to emphasize that the 
addressees of the norm are different from the advocates. With the only exception of 
South Africa, which withdrew from its nuclear weapons programme in 1993, the nuclear 
powers have been irresponsive to the nuclear-free advocacies. France, for example, in 
spite of the New Zealand and Australian protests, carried out nuclear test programmes 
between 1966 and 1973, as well as in 1995 when President Chirac renewed nuclear testing 
in the South Pacific. Among the nuclear weapons states France, Russia and the United 
Kingdom are members of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, China and the United States 
signed it but did not ratify; meanwhile India, Izrael, North Korea and Pakistan did not sign 
it. Although after 1998, when India and Pakistan exploded nuclear devices, it has been 
only North Korea that has tested nuclear weapons, it appears probable that the nuclear 
weapons states perform their programmes without paying attention to protesting groups 
or other states.   
Internationally, there are rhetorical steps in nuclear disarmament, but recently, the 
United States has been continuously increasing its defence budget, and the spending will 
grow to 750 billion USD by 2020 from the 639 billion USD in 2017. A large part of the 
increase is spent on nuclear weapons development (Erwin, 2019)  and this has caused 
other worrying events. Recently, the United States officially announced its withdrawal 
from the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty on 2 August 2019 (Kimball, 
2019). So far, it has only been China that has applied consistently for a ‘no first use’ policy 
regarding nuclear weapons. Although the Soviet Union declared it in 1982, after the end 
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of the Cold War, Russia renounced it. The NATO alliance, to maintain its deterrent 
credibility, has never introduced such a policy (Burford, 2016, p. 10). Recently, Russia has 
performed relevant developments in supersonic technology which can evade missile 
defence systems by which the nuclear arms race may restart, and also, the Russian 
military is carrying out efforts to renew its nuclear arsenal (Barnes & Sanger, 2019). 
For these reasons, it seems fair to argue that directly small states cannot influence nuclear 
disarmament. Nevertheless, it is crucial to highlight that in warfare, nuclear weapons have 
been used only twice, in 1945. Due to the quick recognition of the risks of nuclear 
technology after the Second World War, the international community condemned the use 
of such weapons therefore it is likely that these weapons will not be used in military 
operations. However, this is not due to any advocacy of small states, rather it is the 
general international sentiment since 1945.     
Concerning the promotion of free trade, similarly to the nuclear-free legislation, New 
Zealand had the largest effect internationally when the liberal economic reforms were 
introduced domestically. That meant the removal of most of the beyond border barriers, 
and the social reforms gained respect for the country internationally, when New Zealand 
was named as the mother of all reformers in 2003. As presented in chapter 6, the country 
can be regarded as norm entrepreneur in promoting free trade internationally. Beyond 
the effects of domestic policies, New Zealand’s direct international advocacy had a large 
effect on global trade policies too.  
During the period when New Zealand was performing its efforts, the majority of the states 
were also working on trade deals, but New Zealand was ahead of the curve between 1984 
and 2017. New Zealand was the first in the Asia Pacific region to sign a free trade 
agreement with Singapore. The qualities of the trade deals were very highly appreciated, 
and the P4 agreement attracted more developed countries, for example the United States 
and Canada, to further develop it into the TPPA. Concerning the promotion of free trade 
within GATT and WTO, New Zealand was again ahead of the norm life-cycle. As part of the 
Cairns Group, from 1986, New Zealand performed efforts so that tariffs on agricultural 
products cannot be voluntarily modified by any states after the establishment of the WTO, 
since 1994. Furthermore, those efforts when New Zealand submitted cases against 
countries that violated the agricultural legislation of the WTO would certainly have 
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deterred countries from similar practices. Furthermore, analysts such as Scollay (NZ 
Herald, 2001) argue that Mike Moore’s term as Director-General of the WTO between 
1999 and 2002 was a great step forward in promoting free trade globally, and his 
advocacies were indeed necessary, but the achievements might have occurred with 
someone else at the leadership of the WTO which showed the free trade norm was in the 
cascade phase then.   
Nevertheless, recently, the free trade norm showed a slight regress. The extreme and 
politically incorrect policies of the current US President, Donald J. Trump, also affects 
trade relations. Besides, the unilateral measures that are possible according to the 
existing free trade agreements and WTO preferential agreements, are being considered 
by great powers. China, for example, imposed restrictions of outward investments by its 
residents in 2018 (Galbraith & Shan, 2018). However, it is crucial to note that, states do 
not explicitly turn to protectionist policies. We don’t see the sharp increase of customs or 
tariffs and commercially relevant states (the EU, Japan, Korea, Canada) remained 
committed to free trade.  
It is also essential to emphasize that small states’ domestic policies can have larger effects 
internationally than direct international advocacies because of the quick spread of 
information. Progressive domestic policies may become attractive for other states too 
which implies, reluctant norm entrepreneurship,21 because the way of leading by example 
is recommended for small states. There is a significant problem, however, which is related 
to the main import of this thesis. In chapter 2, the thesis developed a system of criteria to 
recognize norm entrepreneurs. The criteria are needed because the academic scholarship 
has various understandings of the concept of norm entrepreneurship.  
Similarly, progressive policies may get stranded because the understandings of the 
concepts that describe the policies are not uniform. This problem of various 
understandings of norms is related to the phenomenon that norms are usually contested 
(as described in section 2.2) and opposing political views can raise concerns regarding the 
appropriateness of certain norms. In the debate over the nuclear-free norm, for example, 
it has been obvious that the National Party has been challenging the appropriateness of 
 
21 See section 2.3 and the works of Fisk and Ramos (2014).  
237 
 
the norm from time to time, for example the works of the Somers Committee on the 
possible risks of nuclear propulsion in the early 1990s.  
Both the nuclear-free policy and the international trade policy show this problem of 
different understanding of concepts. In chapter 5 it has been described that the politicians 
of the National Party often argue that New Zealand is not entirely nuclear-free owing to 
the use of medical radiology devices. Labour politicians also acknowledge this problem 
with the understanding of the nuclear-free norm. However, the medical devices cannot 
be accounted as nuclear devices because there is no nuclear fission or fusion occurring in 
them. Concerning free trade, to illustrate the problem of different understandings, it is 
sufficient to present the example when David Clark, the then spokesperson of the Labour 
Party for Trade and Export Growth in 2016 questioned the New Zealand chief negotiator 
of the TPPA talks about the content of the planned agreement. Clark expressed that the 
Labour Party supported free trade. Nevertheless, one of his two significant questions was 
whether the TPPA would include regulations that would make it impossible for New 
Zealand to impose a ban on foreign investors buying existing homes in the country. So, he 
practically asked whether it was possible to implement a protectionist measure according 
to the TPPA.  
The clarity of concepts is relevant from another aspect too. It was presented that neither 
the idea of nuclear-free zones nor the idea of free trade emerged in New Zealand. The 
country “imported” the ideas. However, the implementation of the policies in the 1980s 
showed new elements. The pace how the economic reforms were introduced became 
known internationally owing to which the country gained respect. Also, the specific 
attributes of the New Zealand nuclear-free zone made strategic thinkers reconsider their 
geopolitical views, in theoretical debates New Zealand’s steps were discussed. This 
phenomenon shows, the flow of ideas occurred both ways: New Zealand learned relevant 
ideas and at the same time contributed to the development of the ideas in concern. The 
clarity of concepts would facilitate the flow of ideas internationally, and academics have 
large responsibility to support the clarification of ideas and plans. 
The conclusions from these findings and theoretical implications are presented in the next 





This thesis focused on the research question whether and to what extent New Zealand 
has been acting as a norm entrepreneur in the policy areas of nuclear-free policy and 
promoting free trade internationally. The reason for conducting the research was that 
New Zealand`s foreign policy is regarded as outstanding due to the state`s leading role in 
establishing and promoting progressive social ideas. These include female suffrage, 
neoliberal economic reforms in the 1980s, nuclear disarmament, and more recently a new 
economic attitude that focuses on social well-being rather than economic growth. The 
phenomenon of establishing and promoting progressive ideas internationally is best 
captured by the concept of norm entrepreneurship which is the political agenda when an 
actor mobilises efforts to promote norms to the community it lives in or to other 
communities as well. 
The research entails engagement with three related theoretical debates: what roles 
norms have in international politics; whether small states can elaborate their foreign 
policies independently or they should behave according to great powers’ interests or at 
least they should consider those interests; and finally, how small states can influence 
international politics when structurally they are regarded as system-ineffectual. 
Concerning these debates, the thesis presents three arguments. First, because norms are 
standards of appropriate behaviour for a given identity, norms affect the policy decisions 
of the actors; however, it remains uncertain whether the adoption of norms modifies the 
interests of the actors. Second, small states cannot have full independence, in their 
foreign policies they need to consider great powers’ interests that influences whether 
they can initiate norm entrepreneurship programmes. Nevertheless, the level of latitude 
small states possess varies country by country. Third, small states are system-ineffectual 
only in terms of military power, however, economic power is not entirely related to the 
sheer size of the actor and the power over opinion is completely independent from the 
size. For these reasons, small states acting as norm entrepreneurs are indeed possible 
theoretically, and they can also influence international policy decisions and outcomes in 
various situations.    
Because the norm dynamics scholarship is not uniform in the understanding of norm 
entrepreneurship, the thesis has developed a system of criteria that has been derived 
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from the definition of norm entrepreneurship. By the application of the criteria it is 
possible to recognize the norm entrepreneur. The criteria comprise five questions. First, 
it is essential to decide whether the actor has authority or not over the addressees of the 
proposed norms, because entrepreneurship is applicable only in the lack of authority. 
Second, it is important to analyse the ideology of the actor and whether the actor has 
regarded the norm(s) as appropriate for others too. Third, it is necessary to observe the 
extent and intensity of the efforts of the actor, whether the actor has mobilised resources 
to promote the norm(s) in concern. Fourth, it is relevant to identify which stage of the 
norm life-cycle the actor has been performing the norm-promoting policies, whether the 
actor has been the first, or the actor has been among the leading other actors, to promote 
the specific norm(s). And, finally, it is significant to analyse whether the actor has been 
acting consistently with the norm(s). To answer all questions, the researcher has to 
consider the arguments on a case-by-case basis, because there cannot be developed 
scientifically based methods to decide whether the efforts of a policy can be regarded as 
sufficient for norm promotion and to find the tipping point in any actor’s policies after 
which the policy inconsistencies rule out the option of norm entrepreneurship. 
After the completion of the research, the findings suggest that New Zealand has been a 
norm entrepreneur in promoting the nuclear-free norm since 1984. Domestically, the 
Fourth Labour Government established a nuclear-free zone in 1984 that was codified in 
1987. According to the policy, the first element of the nuclear-free norm, the use of 
nuclear weapons is prohibited. Similarly, the storage of nuclear weapons is banned. 
Regarding the third element of the nuclear-free norm, the use of nuclear power 
generation is prohibited in cases of visiting nuclear-propelled vessels. However, legally, it 
would be possible to establish nuclear power plants in New Zealand. Nevertheless, the 
main principle behind the legislation is to protect the country from the risks of nuclear 
contamination, so it is highly unlikely that any nuclear power plants would be built in New 
Zealand. Internationally, the state has a strong track record in promoting nuclear 
disarmament, the first and second element of the nuclear-free norm. Since 1990, New 
Zealand supported numerous governmental and non-governmental initiatives to promote 
the norm.  
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Concerning the promotion of free trade, New Zealand was acting as a norm entrepreneur 
between 1984 and 2017. First, the state initiated neoliberal reforms domestically which 
largely removed the at-border barriers and the beyond border barriers of international 
trade to attract investments. The New Zealand Dollar was floated since March 1985 and 
the government privatised most of its former commercial operations after organising 
them into state owned enterprises. Since 1993, all New Zealand governments have 
developed a structure of trade based on free trade agreements and the multilateral 
agreements of the WTO. The state also participated in governmental groups to promote 
specific areas of free trade, such as the trade liberalisation of agricultural products within 
the Cairns Group or the decrease of fossil fuel subsidies within the Friends of Fossil Fuel 
Subsidy Reforms. A New Zealander, Mike Moore was acting as Director-General of the 
WTO for the term between 1999 and 2002, during which he initiated the improvement of 
the organisation’s transparency and attempted to increasingly involve developing 
countries. However, after 2017, due to social concerns, the Sixth Labour Government 
implemented a new trade policy and yet it is too early to assess this agenda. Besides, by 
2017, the free trade norm had reached the internalisation phase of its life-cycle therefore 
norm entrepreneurship cannot be applied for this period.  
Among the reasons why New Zealand could become a norm entrepreneur we find 
individual, cultural (domestic) and system-related factors which can be derived from the 
thesis’ constructivist-oriented theoretical framework. However, there are specific factors 
as well, which are beyond the limits of the theoretical framework.  
First, in terms of individual factors, it is crucial to note the ambitions of the politicians. 
New Zealand has had numerous skilled and ambitious politicians, among which Prime 
Ministers, such as Norman Kirk (1972-1974), David Lange (1984-89), Mike Moore (1990), 
Jim Bolger (1990-1997) and Helen Clark (1999-2008) are all outstanding. They all 
contributed to New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy. Second, concerning cultural factors, it 
is important to mention the efficient New Zealand bureaucracy. Among OECD countries, 
the New Zealand government employs 13% of the working population which is relatively 
low. However, the bureaucracy is capable of focusing on niche policy areas. The diplomats 
often take initiative roles at the UN to facilitate specific processes, such as the drafting of 
the International Covenant of the Rights of the Peoples with Disabilities between 2003 
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and 2007. The members of the diplomacy are highly skilled, whose role cannot be 
understated concerning the promotion of free trade. Since 1993, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade initiated trade related training programmes for the diplomats. Their 
training and ‘Kiwi ingenuity’ which includes a ‘can do attitude’ was crucial for the 
diplomats in New Zealand’s achievements in international trade policy. Besides, to 
support the state’s nuclear-free policy, the society’s desire to express both New Zealand’s 
independence and its identity had significant roles as well. Regarding the nuclear-free 
norm, the public became largely committed to the norm by the middle of the 1980’s, 
when more than 60% of the country lived in a self-proclaimed nuclear-free zone. By 1990, 
both leading political parties, the National Party and the Labour Party became committed. 
The bureaucratic officials adopted the norm during the 1990s. Regarding the free trade 
norm, the situation has been slightly different. Only the officials seem to be committed to 
the norm, meanwhile the public and the vast majority of politicians are more inclined to 
prefer the country’s welfare and socially sensitive ideas such as affordable housing, 
gender- and race equality or social inclusivity.  
There have been three systemic factors that facilitated New Zealand’s policies. First, since 
the late 1960s, environmental protection became a relevant issue for the international 
community. It was then when the UN organized the first conference on the human 
environment (Stockholm, 1972), and when the first international environment protection 
agencies appeared (Greenpeace). Those projects that attempted to promote the 
reduction of the risks of nuclear contamination were supported by international public 
opinion. Second, the Cold War ended dramatically, quickly and peacefully by the end of 
the 1980s. The beginning of the decade between 1981 and 1991 brought about severe 
tensions in great powers’ relations.  However, by the end of 1991, one of the main players 
of the bipolar era, the Soviet Union had disappeared. In the beginning of this decade the 
fear from a possible nuclear war was rising, after the end of the decade the mere 
relevance of nuclear weapons were questioned. For this reason, New Zealand’s policies 
gained further momentum, triggered by the international sympathy for the norm.  
The third factor was that corporate lobbies facilitated the spread of the free trade norm. 
After the democratization of the Eastern Bloc, business leaders and investors came to 
realize that the political risks of nationalization evaporated. Therefore, they started 
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pressurizing the relevant governments to elaborate free trade agreements. This resulted 
in global momentum for facilitating free trade. New Zealand gained from this 
international context; however, the country was also one step ahead of the main 
developments, and this resulted in leading achievements, such as the first free trade 
agreement in the Asia Pacific region with Singapore, and the first developed country to 
have a free trade deal with China.   
There were specific factors as well that had explanatory roles in the elaboration of the 
policies. By the 1980s, there was a strong public desire to redefine and to express New 
Zealand’s independence. The timing of such an event was crucial, and it is telling that the 
same government initiated both policy agendas. This can be explained by their 
exceptional ambitions. Furthermore, that generation of politicians were the ones who 
were young when New Zealand sent troops to Vietnam in the 1960s and they started 
perceiving the United States as a militant power. For that generation this perception 
evolved into a significant distrust against the United States, and the distrust had a crucial 
role in the establishment of the nuclear-free norm. Regarding the introduction of the 
nuclear-free norm, there was an accidental factor as well, namely, Prime Minister David 
Lange was absent when the government had to consider the USS Buchanan’s request for 
port entry in January 1985.  
Finally, I mention a systemic factor because of which after 2017 New Zealand faces new 
challenges. After the establishment of numerous free trade agreements, globally the 
former trend of the unequal distribution of wealth appears to turn during the 2010s. This 
also results in economic migration and the international levelling of wages. For those 
countries which benefited earlier from the process of industrialization this is to cause an 
adaptation crisis. The Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New 
Zealand, Ireland and the United States) all face this crisis, meanwhile Western Europe and 
the developed states in Asia are negatively affected. To address these challenges, New 
Zealand needs to elaborate new ideas and policy agendas. The redefinition of the role of 
trade after 2017 is a part of this process. However, further details of new policies are to 
be elaborated that discuss and handle migration, social inclusivity and welfare – all which 
later may become a subject of new norm entrepreneurship programmes.  
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Beyond the answers to the research question, the thesis brings theoretical import for 
three relevant theoretical questions. First, it is crucial to note that small states don’t have 
full independence in foreign policy because, as the case of New Zealand shows, even the 
most distant country faces the constraint to consider great powers’ interests, and 
periodically threats of the expansion from hostile great powers also appear. Earlier 
Germany and Japan, and most recently China’s growing influence in the Pacific prove this. 
Second, the policy option to become a norm entrepreneur is relevant for small states, 
because the most distant small state could elaborate such policies, therefore the option 
is not ruled out theoretically. Third, the two cases are applicable to generate the 
hypothesis that even though small states can become norm entrepreneurs, their influence 
is limited internationally. Their direct advocacies may have limited influence on 
international politics; however, their unilateral steps to domestically introduce 
progressive policies may have a larger influence. Concerning the case of the nuclear-free 
norm, so far it is only South-Africa that abandoned its nuclear weapons development 
programmes, the other nuclear weapon states pursued their nuclear armament agendas 
regardless of the international advocacy for nuclear disarmament. In terms of trade 
relations, New Zealand has had a larger influence on world politics; nevertheless, the state 
could not achieve a free trade deal with the US which shows the limits of a small state 
promoting this norm. 
Since the thesis has contributed to the scholarly investigation of small states’ policies, 
norm entrepreneurship, small states’ possible effects on international politics, and the 
role of norms in international relations, it has raised questions that could be researched 
in further studies. Concerning norm entrepreneurship, the thesis has signalled that it is 
possible, because the most distant country, New Zealand has proved to be norm 
entrepreneur. However, it is relevant to observe the other end of the spectrum, a case of 
a ‘least likely’ actor. A least likely case would be a landlocked, developing country. For this 
purpose, it is relevant to mention that scholars are already aware of individuals who were 
representing developing countries at the UN; however, they became successful in their 
advocacies. For example the WPS agenda was supported by Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, 
Minister of Women’s Affairs in Namibia and Anwarul Chowdhury, representing 
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Bangladesh, also made significant contribution in the UNSC to adopt the resolution. 
Tracing that process might mean a first step in that research.  
The thesis has argued that small states can influence international politics more 
effectively by their unilateral and mainly domestic policies. The case of New Zealand offers 
several examples for further research. Scholars such as MacDonald (2018) and True and 
Tanyag (2018) have already discussed New Zealand’s effects on respecting indigenous 
people’s rights. New Zealand’s track record in human rights is also important for further 
research. Finally, we can mention policies that are currently elaborated by the Sixth 
Labour Government, such as the policy to reduce child poverty, the inclusive trade 
agreements that employ conditionality in new trade deals, or the effects of the changed 
preferences of the state’s economic policies that are embodied in the “well-being 
budget.” These policies could later be addressed by researchers.   
Regarding the role of norms in international politics, it appears to be relevant to observe 
when actors commit themselves to certain norms. As has been argued, when a norm 
becomes part of an actor’s identity, it becomes stable due to the commitment. 
Commitments to certain norms do modify the actors’ interests. Therefore, instead of 
taking for granted that norms influence an actor’s interest, constructivist scholarship 
could research those cases when actors commit themselves to certain norms.  
This research to address the conditions of commitments to norms, how and why 
commitments occur may become a significant contribution to a broader question of how 
to improve international relations through commitments. The concept of improvement of 
international relations means that states modify their interests so that instead of power-
maximation they focus on common goals and mutual interests. This would mean states 
may have to give up realist policies. For such a study, New Zealand may provide a complex 
addition. This study would contribute to the efforts which Alexander Wendt (1995, pp. 
79-80) recommended: if it is possible to modify the shared knowledge of anarchy, then 
politicians should not pursue realist policies any further if they care about the well-being 
of future generations.  
As a concluding remark, the author intends to connect to the initial spark of the research 
which is the fact that New Zealand is widely known for its leadership role in implementing 
progressive social ideas. Because at the beginning of the 2020s the country’s endowments 
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are good (distant geopolitical location, healthy budget conditions, low debt obligations, 
stable economic growth) the state has an enormous responsibility to elaborate those 
ideas that address the greatest global challenges: gender and race inequalities, 
imbalanced distribution of wealth and income, and most importantly, climate change. To 
successfully address all these challenges, the skills and such strong ambitions of the 
politicians which David Lange or Helen Clark had, now are needed, probably more than 
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